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Embodied cognition is the study of how actions and interactions with objects 
and individuals affect cognitive processing.  Neuroaesthetics deals with the 
neural, biological and evolutionary aspects of aesthetic experience which 
occur through the senses and consist of the emotional value placed onto 
objects, for example the appreciation of art work, dance, or music.  These 
are individual and differ depending on level of expertise and experience 
within the art.  The main aim of the thesis was to investigate the link between 
embodiment and aesthetics through examining people’s level of creativity, 
colour perception and sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) in relation to 
levels of empathy and theory of mind (ToM).  Research into this is sparse as 
the role of the body in relation to aesthetic experiences is a relatively new 
concept.  Preference for portraits versus landscapes was also investigated to 
look at any role of social stimuli in aesthetic preference.  Results 
demonstrate that participants with (i) higher levels of creativity (for some 
types of creativity) and (ii) more acute colour perception had higher levels of 
empathy/ToM.  Individuals who had higher SPS demonstrated higher   
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empathy/ToM.  It was also found that colour perception and empathy levels 
decrease with age, and aesthetic preference for portraits increase with age.  
These results have implications for education/schools, the prison service, for 
specific clinical conditions such as autism, Parkinson’s disease, 
schizophrenia, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, particularly given 
the role of dopamine in these disorders and in colour perception.  Future 
research should investigate these findings using brain imaging and 
physiological measures.  
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List of Definitions 
Aesthetics 
Relates to the senses, sensations and perception, and concerns the 
appreciation of beauty.  Can be defined as the appreciation of beauty 
within nature.  Relating to the arts and artworks, can be defined as the 
knowledge and appreciation resulting from an emotional response 
elicited by the perception of great works of art. 
Aesthetics Sensitivity 
Refers to an individual’s level of awareness and appreciation of 
beauty. 
Colour Perception 
Occurs when light is transmitted through a substance and a small 
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum (wavelengths of ~400–700 
nanometres) becomes visible to the human eye in the form of colour. 
Cognitive Empathy 
 Refers to understanding the perspective of others. 
Creativity 
An act (the ability to produce something) or an idea/thought that is in 
some way novel (original, unusual, unexpected, unique) and 
appropriate (effective, useful, beneficial, fit for purpose, adaptive 
concerning task constraints). 
   
xi 
 
Divergent Thinking (DT) 
A component of the creative process, specifically creative thinking.  
DT task are an estimate (or a potential predictor) of creative problem 
solving.  DT tasks are evaluated on fluency (the ability to produce a 
number of ideas for a certain problem), flexibility (the ability to see a 
problem from different approaches, scored by the number of different 
categories implied by the responses), and originality (the ability to 
produce unusual/unique responses). 
Ease of Excitation 
The extent to which an individual feels mentally overwhelmed by both 
internal (pain, hunger, taste) and external (light, noise) stimuli. 
Embodied Cognition 
A post-cognitivist approach that sees the body as the main actor in 
guiding cognition.  Assumes that the body (including body morphology 
– the body’s form and structure, sensory systems, motor systems, and 
emotions) have an influence on psychological processes. 
Embodiment 
When thoughts, feelings and behaviours are grounded in sensory 
experiences and bodily interactions with the environment, and how 
sensory, motor and perceptual processes influence thoughts, feelings 
and behaviours. 
Emotional Empathy 
 Refers to sensing the feelings of others.  
xii 
 
Empathic Concern 
The level of sympathy and concern felt for other less fortunate than 
oneself. A type of emotional empathy. 
Empathising  
The ability to understand the thoughts and emotions of others, and in 
doing so, being able to respond to them in an appropriate manner. 
Empathy 
The capacity to understand and respond to the unique affective 
experiences of another person. 
Fantasy 
The extent to which an individual imagines themselves to be in the 
position of fictitious characters.  A type of cognitive empathy. 
Imagination 
The mind’s ability to conceive things which are not readily available to 
the senses. 
Low Sensory Threshold 
The extent to which an individual feels unpleasantly aroused by 
external stimuli such as bright lights and loud noises. 
Mirror Neurons 
Neurons in the brain that activate during the execution of an action, 
emotion or sensation, and the observation of the same action, 
emotion or sensation.  
xiii 
 
Neuroaesthetics 
The neural, biological and evolutionary aspects of aesthetic 
experiences. 
Personal Distress 
The level of unease and anxiety felt during difficult situations.  A type 
of emotional empathy. 
Perspective Taking 
The ability to understand another’s point of view.  A type of cognitive 
empathy. 
Sensory Processing Sensitivity (SPS) 
An innate trait which is characterised by greater sensitivity to social 
and environmental stimuli. 
Systemising  
The desire to analyse and build systems, with the intention of being 
able to understand and predict non-agentive events.  Systems can be 
technical (e.g., the workings of a machine), natural (e.g., the process 
of coastal erosion), abstract (e.g., mathematics), motoric (e.g., a guitar 
playing technique), taxonomic (e.g., a criteria for ordering compact 
discs) or social (e.g., a taxation system). 
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Theory of Mind (ToM) 
The ability to acknowledge mental states of the self and of others in 
order to predict behaviour based on those specific mental states, 
which may include beliefs, hopes, desires and intentions. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
To successfully relate to and deal with other human beings, emotional 
and cognitive states must be understood.  This ability, known as empathy, 
allows individuals to navigate in an otherwise unpredictable social world 
(Coutinho et al, 2014).  Empathy concerns a large spectrum of phenomena, 
including the concern with other people and consequent motivation to help 
them, the capacity to resonate with the other’s emotions, and the ability to 
understand a given situation from the perspective of another person in order 
to anticipate their actions, to name some examples (Coutinho et al, 2014).  
Humans can feel empathy for others in a number of different contexts, which 
includes basic emotions and sensations such as anger, fear, sadness, joy, 
pain, and lust, and also for complex emotions such as guilt, embarrassment, 
and love (Singer, 2006).  Deficits in empathy have been associated with 
various clinical disorders such as psychopathology/antisocial personality 
disorders, borderline and narcissistic personality disorders, autistic spectrum 
disorders, alexithymia, and stroke/traumatic brain injury (Decety & Jackson, 
2004; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007).  
Empathic concern has been associated with prosocial behaviours 
such as helping a kin, and is considered a key process concerning altruism 
(Decety, 2006).  While an impulse to care for offspring is almost certainly 
genetically hard-wired, it is less clear whether an impulse to care for 
siblings/more remote kin and non-kin, as well as other species, is genetically 
hard-wired (Decety, 2006).  However, humans (unlike other species) are able   
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to put their emotions into words allowing them to state their emotions and to 
report on their current and past emotions.  This enables the opportunity to 
share, explain and regulate emotional experiences with others, enabling 
empathy to develop.  Such communication allows individuals to learn of their 
shared experiences and feelings with other individuals (Decety, 2006).   
A relatively recent proposal made by Freedberg and Gallese (2007) 
assumes that empathy may be felt through the content and subject matter of 
art, and also, that empathy may be felt through the way in which the artist 
has creatively used their materials to convey a representation.  According to 
Freedberg and Gallese (2007), embodied simulation may be a crucial factor 
in allowing the individual to empathize with others through activating their 
own internal representations concerning the actions, emotions, or sensations 
of the bodily states which are being expressed.   
According to the embodiment theory, the body has an influence on 
psychological processes such as sensation, perception, attention, learning 
and memory (Glenberg, 2010).  The body is seen as the main actor in 
guiding cognition (Ionescu & Vasc, 2014).  Cognition is influenced and 
determined by bodily experiences in the physical world, thus important 
factors concerned with embodied cognition include representing the world, 
perceiving it and categorising it, and also acting and interacting with objects 
and individuals (Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004).  The discovery of mirror 
neurons, which activate when the individual performs an action and when 
they observe or hear the same action (Di Pellegrino et al, 1992; Rizzolati et 
al, 1996), has provided evidence of embodiment, as it is proposed that 
individuals do not just perceive an action, emotion or sensation, but they   
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internalise the representations of the physical and neural states associated 
with it.  Specifically, during social cognition, mirror neurons cause the visual 
information that an individual receives to be integrated into their own 
experiences so that they experience the observation as first person rather 
than third person (Ki, 2013).   
Furthermore, the shared manifold hypothesis assumes that there is a 
link between mirror neurons and empathy (empathy is a main focus of the 
current research) (Gallese, 2001), and research has provided support for this 
(Gazzola et al, 2006; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer et al, 2008).  For 
example, in research conducted by Gazzola et al (2006), individuals who 
scored higher on an empathy scale showed stronger activation of the motor 
mirror system, and in a study conducted by Kaplan and Iacoboni (2006), 
participants watched both precision grips and whole-hand prehensions within 
the context of drinking and cleaning.  Findings showed greater activity in the 
right inferior frontal mirror neuron area when precision grips within the 
drinking context were observed, and signal changes within the same area 
revealed a significant positive correlation on an empathy scale, showing 
increased signal changes for higher empathy scores (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 
2006).  In addition, activity was shown in the pars opercularis (the frontal 
component of the mirror neuron system) when participants observed and 
imitated emotional expressions in a study conducted by Pfeifer et al (2008).  
Therefore this shows that there is a link between mirror neurons and 
empathy.  There are two main types of empathy, namely, emotional empathy 
and cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), and mirror neurons have   
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been shown to be involved in both (Gazzola et al, 2006; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 
2006; Pfeifer et al, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). 
Along with various other neural systems, such as the reward network 
(Jacobsen et al, 2006; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004), the 
core emotion centres (the insula and the amygdala) (Cupchik et al, 2009; Di 
Dio et al, 2007), and the default mode network (Cela-Conde et al, 2013; 
Vessel et al, 2012; Vessel et al, 2013), the mirror neuron system has been 
shown to be involved in aesthetic experiences (Ticini et al, 2014).  
Furthermore, research into creativity and aesthetics has shown that experts 
process aesthetic experiences differently from laypeople (Bangert et al, 
2006; Bhattacharyaa & Petscheb, 2002; Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005; 
Calvo-Merino et al, 2005; Chamberlain et al, 2014; Kottlow et al, 2011; Leder 
et al, 2014), and research suggests that the mirror mechanism is 
strengthened through expertise and experience (Gallese, 2010).  For 
example, stronger activations in various brain regions are shown in experts 
whilst observing others perform and also whilst performing themselves 
(Bangert et al, 2006; Calvo-Merino et al, 2005).   
Through the course of this thesis, the overall intention is to generate 
further knowledge concerning the paradigm of embodied cognition by 
focusing on the way in which individuals interact with, and understand, the 
external world’s stimuli and how this may affect, or be affected by, their level 
of sensitivity towards it.  This will be done by investigating aspects such as (i) 
sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) due to its relation to embodiment, as it 
is characterised by greater sensitivity to social and environmental stimuli 
(Acevedo et al, 2014; Jagiellowicz et al, 2016), and (ii) colour perception   
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because of the association between colour and emotion (Clarke & Costall, 
2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954) and 
the research showing that an individual’s feelings and emotions may affect 
their perception of colour (Barrick et al, 2002; Fetterman et al, 2011; 
Sherman et al, 2012).  Both SPS and colour perception are important factors 
to consider in the current thesis as it is questionable as to whether they are 
connected to empathy, and there is a gap in the literature concerning this.  
Other important factors that are focused on within this thesis are (iii) 
creativity and (iv) theory of mind (ToM) which is a form of cognitive empathy 
(Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).   
In particular, the important questions that are raised in this thesis are: 
(i) does level of creativity affect empathy/ToM ability, (ii) can colour acuity 
predict level of empathy/ToM, (iii) does SPS affect empathy/ToM and does 
colour perception affect SPS.  Currently, some of these questions have not 
yet been answered in a thorough manner, and some have never even been 
considered within previous research.   
Firstly, although a link between creativity and empathy has been 
previously shown, only a few studies have investigated this (Carlozzi et al, 
1995; Kalliopuska, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013), most 
of which have focused on a child sample.  The present research goes further 
by looking into different types of creativity in relation to different types of 
empathy within an adult sample, with the overall aim of deciphering whether 
those who are more creative are more empathetic.  Secondly, the aim of 
addressing whether colour acuity can predict level of empathy and ToM 
ability, bridges a gap in the literature, as far as the researcher is aware, as   
6 
 
no previous research has looked into this, thus it is an important avenue of 
research which has various implications for future studies.  For example, 
obtaining a greater understanding of the relationship between colour 
perception and social cognition may contribute to further understanding of 
the neural mechanisms involved in various social cognitive deficits such as 
those found in autism and other disorders such as attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), schizophrenia, addictive behaviours and 
Parkinson’s disease, particularly as they are all linked to a dysregulation of 
the dopamine system, and colour perception also involves the dopaminergic 
system.  Thirdly, and to further investigate the role of embodiment, it is 
important to examine SPS in relation to empathy and ToM, and whether 
colour perception effects SPS, as much of the previous research has tended 
to focus on the negative aspects of SPS in general (Aron & Aron, 1997; 
Benham, 2006; Liss et al, 2005; Meyer & Carver, 2000; Neal et al, 2002), 
and by focusing on how SPS may be beneficial is needed in order to balance 
the literature.  This will allow the field of neuropsychology to grow and would 
be beneficial to individuals high in SPS as it impacts on wellbeing and thus 
aids improved health.  
1.2 Overview of Thesis Structure 
 This thesis is comprised of twelve chapters, three introductory and 
seven experimental.  The following section gives a brief overview of each: 
Chapter 2 discusses embodied cognition which is a topic in the 
cognitive sciences that sees the body as the main actor in guiding cognition 
(Ionescu & Vasc, 2014).  This is important for the current thesis since it   
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focuses on aspects such as sensation (SPS) and perception (colour 
perception), as well as empathy/ToM, which are all concerned with 
embodiment.  Mirror neurons, which provide support for embodied cognition 
(Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Iacoboni et al, 1999; Kilner et al, 2009; Rizzolati 
et al, 1996), are discussed, as well as evidence for a link between mirror 
neurons and empathy.  The types of empathy (including ToM) are also 
discussed, along with the theory of empathising-systemising, which posits 
that there are two opposing cognitive profiles, the male brain and the female 
brain.  An overview of SPS which is an innate trait (Acevedo et al, 2014; 
Jagiellowicz et al, 2016) characterised by greater sensitivity to social and 
environmental stimuli is also given.     
Chapter 3 discusses creativity, the ability to produce something, or to 
have a thought or idea, that is both novel (original, unusual, unexpected, 
unique) and appropriate (effective, useful, beneficial, fit for purpose, adaptive 
concerning task constraints) (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco & Jaeger, 
2012; Sternberg, 1999), and aesthetics.  Creativity is an important aspect to 
consider in the current thesis since creative individuals usually produce 
works that evoke feelings of empathy within its spectators (i.e. dancers, 
artists/painters, musicians).  An aesthetic experience occurs through the 
senses and consists of the emotional value which is placed onto objects, 
allowing the beholder to perceive, feel, and sense (Brown & Dissanayake, 
2009).  This chapter focuses on how creativity is defined and measured, and 
an overview of aesthetics (the knowledge and appreciation of beauty and the 
emotional response elicited by the perception of great works of art) and 
Neuroaesthetics (research into the neural, biological and evolutionary   
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aspects of aesthetic experiences) is given.  Previous research on aesthetic 
experiences is discussed, for example, various research shows a link 
between embodiment and aesthetics, showing a significant relationship 
between the participants’ physiological responses during the perception of 
artwork and their self-reported aesthetic-emotional experience of the artwork 
(Tschacher et al, 2012).  Furthermore, whilst viewing images of sculptures, 
the activation of the ventral premotor cortex and the posterior parietal cortex 
during the observation of the sculptures suggests motor resonance 
congruent with the movements portrayed in the sculptures (Di Dio et al, 
2007).  This chapter then focuses on the differences between experts when 
compared to laypeople.     
Chapter 4 focuses on colour perception (a process that involves 
various areas in the brain) and its effects.  Colour serves as an aesthetic and 
level of colour perception (colour acuity) is important to consider in the 
current thesis as it is an aspect of embodiment.  Firstly, a description of how 
colour perception occurs is given.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
research on how emotions can alter the perception of colour.  Then the link 
between colour and emotion is discussed in terms of associations, and how 
colour can influence an individual’s affect, cognition, and behaviour (Elliot & 
Maier, 2014).  Since colour serves as an aesthetics it is often used by 
creative individuals to make spaces and objects appear more attractive (i.e. 
fashion design, interior design, advertisement, to name but a few), and its 
links with emotion and the influences it has on people.  Thus, it is of interest 
whether/or how colour acuity relates to empathy.   
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Chapter 5 is the first experimental chapter.  While the link between 
creativity and empathy has been examined (Carlozzi et al, 1995; Kalliopuska, 
1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013), an in-depth and thorough 
exploration of the link had not been provided until now.  Specifically, this 
chapter investigates how level of creativity (for different types of creativity - 
specifically, self-reported creative achievement, creative behaviours and a 
test of creative cognition) has an effect on level of empathy (for different 
types of empathy - including self-reported emotional empathy and emotional 
& cognitive empathy taken as a whole).  Measures that were used are: the 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al, 2005; Appendix 4), 
the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours (BICB; Batey, 2007; 
Appendix 1), the Alternate Uses Test, Form B Test Booklet (AUT; Guilford et 
al, 1960; Appendix 6), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; 
Appendix 5), and the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 
2009; Appendix 9).  The findings revealed no significant difference in 
empathy based on creative achievement.  However, important and significant 
differences were found in various types of empathy based on creative 
behaviours and creative cognition (divergent thinking) in that as creativity 
score (behavioural and cognitive) increased so did levels of empathy, with a 
clear and strong relationship.  This suggests that there is a complex link 
between creativity and empathy, whilst also providing some support for 
previous research and the current hypothesis.  These findings could be 
considered as a marker for guiding future neuroscientific experiments into 
the brain regions and neural mechanisms/processes involved in the specific 
types of creativity and empathy, as so far this remains ambiguous.           
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Chapter 6 is the second experimental chapter.  Following the findings 
of the experiment of Chapter 5, it was important to look into the effects of 
creativity on ToM ability, as ToM is a form of cognitive empathy (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).  Such research is important for autism (as those with autism 
have impaired ToM) and the wider field of social cognition.  Therefore this 
chapter’s experiment focuses on the link between creativity and ToM.  Again 
it looks into the different types of creativity in relation to ToM through two 
separate measures varying in difficulty, specifically, the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test, Revised Version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; Appendix 7) and 
the Faces Test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8).  The ToM Eyes test 
(which merely shows an image of the eye region) is more difficult than the 
ToM Faces test (which shows an image of the full face).  Little research has 
investigated creativity and ToM, with only a few studies examining any link 
between the two (Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1997; Suddendorf & Fletcher-
Flinn, 1999), however, both of these studies have utilised child samples.  
Similar to the previous chapter, findings showed no effect of creative 
achievement on ToM.  However, significant effects were found in ToM based 
on creative behaviours and divergent thinking, which showed a clear 
relationship, thus providing some support for the current hypothesis and the 
previous research.  This is particularly important since social cognitive skills 
such as ToM and empathy guide everyday interactions and are imperative 
when it comes to co-operation and sociocultural learning, and deficits in such 
skills have been associated with pathologies such as sociopathy, autistic 
spectrum disorders, and nonverbal learning disorders (Goldstein & Winner, 
2012).  This leads on to the next chapter which focuses on colour perception   
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and empathy, as colour serves as an aesthetic and is involved in many 
aspects of creativity, and colour perception is also an aspect of embodiment.      
Chapter 7 is the third experimental chapter.  This chapter investigated 
colour perception as a predictor of empathy.  Much research has examined 
the relationship between colour and emotion (Clarke & Costall, 2008; Dijkstra 
et al, 2008; Elliot & Niesta, 2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; Kuller et al, 2009; 
Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954; Yildirim et al, 2007), however, 
this is the first, as far as the researcher is aware, to examine colour 
perception as a predictor of empathy in particular.  Colour acuity was 
measured via the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test 
(Farnsworth, 1957; Appendix 3) and empathy was measured via self-report 
as before, specifically using the IRI and TEQ.  Findings revealed colour 
acuity to be a significant predictor of empathy for both emotional empathy 
and for emotional and cognitive empathy taken as a whole.  This is an 
exciting finding.  Exploratory analysis into the subscales of the IRI revealed 
level of colour acuity to have a significant effect on perspective taking and 
fantasy (both cognitive empathy subscales), but no significant effect on 
empathic concern or personal distress (both emotional empathy subscales).  
Finding are discussed in relation to dopamine which has been shown by 
previous research to be linked to both colour perception and cognitive 
empathy.  This is followed by the next chapter which focuses on colour 
perception and ToM, the next logical exploration in this thesis.     
Chapter 8 is the fourth experimental chapter.  Research currently fails 
to extend the concept of the link between colour and emotion to an 
understanding of whether there is a relationship between an individual’s level   
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of colour perception and their ability to accurately perceive emotions.  Colour 
perception as a predictor of ToM is investigated within this chapter, 
extending that of the previous chapter as ToM is a form of cognitive 
empathy.  This is again the first experiment, as far as the researcher is 
aware, to examine colour perception as a predictor of ToM.  The same 
measures of colour perception and ToM were employed as in the previous 
experiments within this thesis.  Colour acuity was found to be a significant 
predictor of ToM for the Eyes Test, but not for the Faces Test.  These 
findings provide some support for the previous research on colour and 
emotion, as well as autism research, and are discussed in relation to 
dopamine.  The next chapter goes on to investigate SPS in relation to 
empathy, ToM and colour perception. 
Chapter 9 is the fifth experimental chapter.  This chapter focuses on 
SPS, empathy, ToM and colour perception in order to discover whether they 
are linked, as SPS is a trait that is embodied, and the measure of SPS used 
in this experiment has a subscale that measures aesthetic sensitivity (HSPS; 
Aron & Aron, 1997; Appendix 10).  Firstly, the experiment investigates 
whether there is an effect of SPS on empathy and ToM, and secondly, the 
experiment investigates the effect of colour perception on SPS.  It was 
shown that SPS has a significant effect on level of empathy and ToM; 
specifically that highly sensitive individuals have higher empathy levels/ToM 
ability.  This was shown for emotional & cognitive empathy taken as a whole, 
emotional empathy, and ToM.  This experiment also revealed a significant 
effect of colour acuity on SPS.  Such findings have implications for clinical 
disorders such as autism, and may explain why autism is linked to sensory   
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processing disorder (Kern et al, 2006).  Following this, the thesis goes on to 
look into the effects of age on aspects such as colour perception, empathy, 
and preference for paintings.  This is particularly important since people’s 
thoughts and faculties tend to change/deteriorate with age, thus it was 
important to look at how colour perception and empathy may alter. 
Chapter 10 is the sixth experimental chapter.  This chapter focuses 
on the effects of age as previous research suggests that colour perception 
deteriorates with age (Kinnear & Sahraie, 2002; Roy et al, 1991; Verriest et 
al, 1982), as does empathy/emotional recognition in cohort designs (Grühn 
et al, 2008; Phillips et al, 2002; Ruffman et al, 2008; Schieman & Van Gundy, 
2000), thus it is an important aspect to consider in the current thesis.  This is 
examined in relation to colour perception and empathy.  Furthermore, it is 
hypothesised that people with higher levels of empathy/ToM may have a 
higher preference for portrait paintings compared to landscapes (Appendix 
12) (this is investigated in the current thesis since portraits relate to the 
empathy/ToM aspect that is focused on throughout the thesis).  This is 
especially important since Freedberg and Gallese (2007) assume that 
empathy may be felt through the content and subject matter of art (i.e. 
portraits/faces compared to landscapes).  The findings of this chapter 
revealed that, consistent with previous literature, colour perception 
deteriorates with age, levels of empathy (for all types of empathy, including 
both emotional empathy and cognitive empathy) decrease with age, and 
interestingly preference for portraits increases with age, thus providing 
support for the hypotheses and previous research.  This suggest that age 
has an effect on both aesthetics and social/emotional cognition.  The finding   
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concerning portraits suggests that as age increases, preference for portraits 
over landscapes also increases, indicating that older adults find portraits 
more pleasing.   
Chapter 11 is the seventh experimental chapter. This last 
experimental chapter looks into a creativity questionnaire which examines 
each creative behaviour individually in relation to each dependent variable 
studied within the thesis, as it was important not to miss any potentially 
important findings in regard to creativity, and given that there was quite a 
consistent finding of non-significance using this creativity questionnaire, this 
methodology was investigated in itself to explore why no effects were being 
seen.  This chapter examines the creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ: 
Appendix 4) (which includes different creative behaviours) in relation to all of 
the dependent variables within the thesis, in order not to miss any potentially 
important findings.  High and low scores in each creative behaviour were 
compared.  It was found that those who scored low in music had a higher 
level of divergent thinking ability, contrary to previous research.  Those 
scoring high in humour also had better divergent thinking ability.  It was also 
found that individuals scoring low in architectural design had higher levels of 
emotional empathy, and those who scored high in inventions had better 
imagination.  As there is little or no previous research regarding some of 
these findings, it is important for future research to examine these thoroughly 
in samples of experts compared to laypeople.  The results of this chapter 
imply that a potential of using this questionnaire is that it appears to be 
perhaps better suited at measuring Big-C creativity (eminent or genius level 
creativity) rather than little-c creativity (everyday creativity), and it is   
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important to look at the individual creative behaviours that are stated within 
the questionnaire, as well as the overall combined creativity score.  The next 
chapter will focus on a discussion of the research within the thesis.  
Chapter 12 is the discussion chapter which summarises the main 
findings of the thesis.  It also suggests some possible ideas for future work, 
and discusses the implications of the thesis.  A conclusion is then provided. 
1.3 Chapter Highlights 
 Empathy involves being concerned with other people and a 
consequent motivation to help them, the capacity to resonate with the 
other’s emotions, and the ability to understand a given situation from 
the perspective of another person in order to anticipate their actions. 
 Humans can feel empathy for others in a number of different contexts, 
including for basic emotions and sensations, and also for complex 
emotions. 
 Deficits in empathy have been associated with various clinical 
disorders. 
 Freedberg and Gallese (2007) assume that empathy may be felt 
through the content and subject matter of art, and also, that empathy 
may be felt through the way in which the artist has creatively used 
their materials to convey a representation. 
 Embodied simulation may be a crucial factor in allowing the individual 
to empathize with others through activating their own internal 
representations concerning the actions, emotions, or sensations of the 
bodily states which are being expressed.    
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 According to the embodiment theory, the body has an influence on 
psychological processes such as sensation, perception, attention, 
learning and memory, and is seen as the main actor in guiding 
cognition. 
 The discovery of mirror neurons, which activate when the individual 
performs an action and when they observe or hear the same action, 
has provided evidence of embodiment. 
 The shared manifold hypothesis assumes that there is a link between 
mirror neurons and empathy. 
 The mirror neuron system has been shown to be involved in aesthetic 
experiences. 
 Experts process aesthetic experiences differently from laypeople and 
the mirror mechanism is strengthened through expertise and 
experience. 
 This thesis is comprised of twelve chapters, three introductory and 
seven experimental.   
 Chapter 2 focuses on mirror neurons, empathy, and sensory 
processing, which are all concerned with embodiment/embodied 
cognition.  
 Chapter 3 discusses creativity and aesthetics. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on colour perception and its effects. 
 Chapter 5 is the first experimental chapter, which focuses on creativity 
and empathy, and has shown a link between the two. 
 Chapter 6 investigates creativity and ToM, a form of cognitive 
empathy, and also found a link between the two.  
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 Chapter 7 investigates colour perception as a predictor of empathy, 
and found colour acuity to be a significant predictor of empathy. 
 Chapter 8 examines colour perception as a predictor of ToM, and 
colour acuity was found to be a significant predictor of ToM for the 
Eyes Test. 
 Chapter 9 focuses on SPS, empathy, ToM and colour perception, and 
it was shown that highly sensitive individuals have higher empathy 
levels/ToM ability, and also revealed a significant effect of colour 
acuity on SPS. 
 Chapter 10 investigates the effects of age, showing that colour 
perception deteriorates with age, levels of empathy decrease with 
age, and preference for portraits increases with age. 
 Chapter 11 examines the CAQ in relation to all dependent variables in 
the thesis, and significant findings were found for music, humour, 
architectural design, and inventions. 
 Chapter 12 is the discussion chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Embodied Cognition: Mirror Neurons, 
Empathy and Sensory Processing 
2.1 Embodiment, Mirror Neurons and Empathy 
Cognition is no longer considered to be different from perceiving and 
acting, as the post-cognitivist approach, labelled embodied cognition, sees 
the body as the main actor in guiding cognition (Ionescu & Vasc, 2014).  
Acting and interacting with objects and individuals, as well as representing 
the world, perceiving it and categorising it, are important factors concerning 
embodied cognition (Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004).  Thus, according to the 
embodiment theory, the body (including body morphology – the body’s form 
and structure, sensory systems, motor systems, and emotions) have an 
influence on psychological processes (Glenberg, 2010).   
The discovery of mirror neurons in macaques (Di Pellegrino et al, 
1992), which later led to the finding of a mirror mechanism within the human 
brain (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009; Iacoboni et al, 1999; Kilner et al, 2009; 
Rizzolati et al, 1996), has provided evidence in support of embodied 
cognition.  The discovery of mirror neurons first transpired from a series of 
experiments conducted on a macaque monkey (Di Pellegrino et al, 1992).   
The experiments initially aimed to investigate neuronal activity within the pre-
motor cortex, specifically area F5, in order to establish the difference 
between stimulus associated responses and activity based movements (Di 
Pellegrino et al, 1992).  However it was found that neurons within this area 
not only discharged when the monkey performed goal-directed movements,   
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but also when it observed the same actions conducted by the experimenters 
(Di Pellegrino et al, 1992).  In a paper four years subsequent to this finding, 
these particular neurons were labelled as mirror neurons (Gallese et al, 
1996).  The mirror neuron system in the human brain consists of the pars 
opercularis and adjacent ventral premotor cortex, and the anterior inferior 
parietal lobule (Pfeifer et al, 2008).  It has been suggested that mirror 
neurons are an integral component in explaining a large degree of social 
cognitions (Hayes, 2010), including imitation (Miall, 2003; Rizzolati et al, 
2001), empathy (Gallese, 2001), mind reading (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), 
and linguistic communication (Gallese, 2008).   
A direct link between mirror neurons and empathy was proposed by 
Gallese (2001) in the shared manifold hypothesis.  The word ‘empathy’ 
originates from the Greek word ‘empatheia’ which translates to ‘passionate’ 
and is composed of ‘em’ (in) and ‘pathos’ (passion, suffering, experience, 
feeling, emotion); scientifically deriving from its use in philosophical 
aesthetics, where the English term later transpired directly from the German 
word ‘einfühlung’ (Singer & Lamm, 2009).  The importance of empathy in 
relation to aesthetics was articulated by Robert Vischer in 1873, where he 
referred to the term as the physical responses that occur during the 
observation of paintings (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007).  Thus, although 
originally deemed as a tool by which works of art and nature could be 
analysed, the term later became known as ‘the capacity to understand and 
respond to the unique affective experiences of another person’ (Decety & 
Jackson, 2006: 54).  Gallese (2001) posits that it is through a shared 
manifold that individuals are able to recognise other human beings, and that   
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it is a mirror matching mechanism which allows others’ pains, emotions and 
sensations to be empathised with and understood.  Various brain imaging 
studies have provided support for this, specifically showing overlapping brain 
activations in individuals who are feeling their own emotions and observing 
the same emotions in others (Jabbi et al, 2007; Morrison et al, 2004; 
Ochsner et al, 2008; Singer et al, 2004; Wicker et al, 2003).  Therefore, the 
implication is that embodied simulation plays a role in the way in which 
individuals empathise with others, as the individual’s own internal 
representations of others’ bodily states are activated via the perception of 
actions, emotions, or sensations which are associated to various social 
stimuli (Gallese, 2005).  Hence, the activation of the same brain region 
during the execution of an action, emotion or sensation, and the observation 
of the same action, emotion or sensation, allows the individual to understand 
and empathise with others.       
2.2 Types of Empathy 
Rather than being viewed as a unitary concept, empathy may be seen 
as comprising of several components (Mazza et al, 2014).  Particularly, 
empathy may be viewed as being an emotional construct which involves 
sensing the feelings of others, however it could also be viewed as being a 
cognitive construct which would involve understanding the perspective of 
others (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  Based on neuroscientific findings, it has 
been suggested that both emotional empathy and cognitive empathy may 
comprise of two separate neural systems, thus being distinct (Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  Nevertheless, these systems 
may overlap to a certain extent, as any response based on feelings of   
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empathy may evoke both components, depending on the social context of 
the event.  Moreover, an fMRI based quantitative meta-analysis has 
identified that specific brain regions are consistently activated during 
empathy in general; these include the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, 
anterior medial cingulate cortex, supplementary motor area (dACC-aMCC-
SMA) and the bilateral anterior insula (Fan et al, 2011). 
The two main elements of empathy (emotional empathy and cognitive 
empathy) can each be further split into several components of their own.  For 
instance, aspects such as emotional contagion, emotion recognition, shared 
pain, empathetic concern and personal distress, are regarded as being forms 
of emotional empathy (Davis, 1980, 1983; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  Whereas, 
affective mentalizing, cognitive mentalizing, perspective taking and fantasy, 
are viewed as forms of cognitive empathy (Davis, 1980, 1983; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).  The term mentalizing is also referred to as theory of mind 
(ToM).  According to Decety and Moriguchi (2007), there are four key 
components which interact in order to create an experience of empathy: (i) 
affective sharing which occurs between the self and the other through 
automatic mirroring, (ii) self-awareness which refers to the distinction 
between self and other, (iii) mental flexibility which allows the others’ 
perspective to be adopted, and (iv) regulatory processes which control the 
subjective experiences concerning the emotion.  Thus, it is evident that 
empathy is a complex phenomenon concerning numerous components and 
several brain networks.   
Research pertaining to the current thesis has specifically employed 
measures of emotional empathy, ToM as a form of cognitive empathy, and   
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emotional and cognitive empathy as a whole.  These include, the Toronto 
Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 2009; Appendix 9) which was 
developed to measure empathy primarily as an emotional process and the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980, 1983; Appendix 5) which is 
a questionnaire that measures both emotional and cognitive empathy and 
contains four subscales: (i) perspective taking (the ability to understand 
another’s point of view – cognitive empathy), (ii) fantasy (the extent to which 
an individual imagines themselves to be in the position of fictitious characters 
– cognitive empathy), (iii) empathic concern (the level of sympathy and 
concern felt for other less fortunate than oneself – emotional empathy), and 
(iv) personal distress (the level of unease and anxiety felt during difficult 
situations - emotional empathy).  ToM was measured through the Faces Test 
(Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test, revised version (Eyes Test; Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; Appendix 7).  
The Faces Test depicts images of the full face expressing both basic and 
complex mental states, each of which contain a choice of two words 
describing an emotion, one being the word which correctly describes the 
emotion expressed in the image and the other being incorrect.  The Eyes 
Test is similar with increased difficulty, containing images of the eye region 
only, with a choice of four words, one of them is the correct emotion being 
expressed, and the remaining four are incorrect.  
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Figure 1: Example of ToM faces and ToM eyes 
 
ToM can be defined as the ability to acknowledge mental states of the 
self and of others in order to predict behaviour based on those specific 
mental states, which may include beliefs, hopes, desires and intentions 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  Differing views concerning ToM have been put 
forward, namely theory-theory and simulation theory (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998).  The theory-theory account of ToM asserts that individuals acquire a 
common sense ToM whereby they attain the mental states of others via 
theoretical reasoning, which involves tacitly known causal laws (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998).  This therefore suggests that ToM is developed through 
learning and experience, whereas, the simulation theory considers ToM to be   
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innate and intuitive (Völlm et al, 2006).  The simulation theory, which posits 
that an individual uses their own mental mechanisms to imagine and 
envisage the mental states of others, fits well with findings on mirror neuron 
activity (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).   
2.3 Mirror Neurons and Types of Empathy 
 It is evident that the mirror neuron system is involved in the 
experience of empathy.  Research shows that physically experiencing a 
sensation activates the same brain regions as watching another person 
experience that same sensation (Jabbi et al, 2008; Singer et al, 2004; Wicker 
et al, 2003).  This has been shown for the sensation of pain in an experiment 
conducted by Singer et al (2004).  The experiment consisted of 16 couples 
that were subjected to a painful stimulation via an electrode attached to the 
back of the right hand.  It was indicated to each couple whether they or their 
partner would feel pain or not.  Findings revealed brain activation in the 
bilateral anterior insula, rostral anterior cingulate cortex, brainstem, and the 
cerebellum during the painful stimulation and also when signalled that their 
partner was experiencing the painful stimulation.  Moreover, stronger brain 
activations were apparent for individuals who scored higher on general 
empathy scales whilst perceiving their partner experiencing the painful 
stimulation (Singer et al, 2004).  Similarly, research has shown that 
physically experiencing disgust, through inhaling odorants which produced a 
feeling of disgust, activated the same brain region as watching video clips of 
others showing the same emotion through facial expression (Wicker et al, 
2003).  Jabbi et al (2008) also provide similar findings showing that   
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observing, imagining, and experiencing the emotion of disgust, elicit the 
same brain regions. 
Furthermore, various research has shown that both emotional 
empathy and cognitive empathy may involve mirror neurons.  In particular, 
several research findings show links between mirror neuron activity and 
emotional empathy (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer et al, 2008; Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2009).  For example, in a study by Kaplan and Iacoboni (2006), 
participants watched both precision grips and whole-hand prehensions within 
the context of drinking and cleaning.  The findings showed greater activity in 
the right inferior frontal mirror neuron area when precision grips within the 
drinking context were observed, and signal changes within the same area 
revealed a significant correlation on the Empathic Concern subscale of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980; Appendix 5).  This suggests that 
mirror neuron areas within the human brain use grasping information, as well 
as contextual information, in order to predict others’ intentions.  This 
therefore implies that mirror neuron activity is an important factor in social 
competence, specifically the ability to understand the intentions of other 
people through cognitive empathy (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006).  Furthermore, 
empathy and interpersonal competence were examined within a sample of 
16 children at the age of 10 years (Pfeifer et al, 2008).  Activity was shown in 
the pars opercularis (the frontal component of the mirror neuron system) 
when participants observed and imitated emotional expressions.  The activity 
in this particular area, and in the anterior insula and amygdala (areas related 
to emotion), showed a positive and significant correlation on behavioural 
measures of empathy (Pfeifer et al, 2008).  In addition, Shamay-Tsoory et al   
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(2009) examined participants with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal or 
inferior frontal gyrus cortices, as well as two control groups.  Participants 
were assessed on empathy measures involving both emotional and cognitive 
dimensions.  An area of the mirror neuron system, Brodmann area 44 (also 
known as the pars opercularis), was found to be vital for emotional empathy, 
but not cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009).  Broca’s area in 
humans, the first area to be identified as involved in language, consists of 
Brodmann area 44 and 45, therefore there is an overlap between action 
imitation and language, which suggests that mirror neurons were involved in 
the evolution of language (Corballis, 2010), and not only imitation and 
emotion recognition (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009).   
However, other research has shown a correlation between mirror 
neuron activity and cognitive empathy, whilst also providing evidence of a 
human auditory mirror system within a sample of 16 participants (Gazzola et 
al, 2006).  The research shows that the left hemispheric temporo-parieto-
premotor circuit is activated during the observation of motor execution, and 
also whilst listening to the sound of an action conducted by the same person, 
therefore suggesting that this is a multimodal system.  The study also 
suggests that there may be a link between cognitive empathy and the motor 
mirror system, as individuals who scored higher on an empathy scale, 
specifically perspective taking, showed stronger activation of the motor mirror 
system (Gazzola et al, 2006).  The research thus shows a link between 
empathy and embodiment through mirror neurons. 
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2.4 Empathising-Systemising 
 Baron-Cohen (2002) proposed a two dimensional theory based on sex 
differences in cognition.  The two dimensions include empathising and 
systemising.  The theory suggests that there are two opposing cognitive 
profiles, the male brain and the female brain, whereby an individual is 
significantly better at either empathising than systemising, or vice versa.  
Empathising refers to the ability to understand the thoughts and emotions of 
others, and in doing so, being able to respond to them in an appropriate 
manner (Baron-Cohen, 2002).  Systemising, on the other hand, can be 
defined as the desire to analyse and build systems, with the intention of 
being able to understand and predict non-agentive events.  ‘Systems can be 
technical (e.g., the workings of a machine), natural (e.g., the process of 
coastal erosion), abstract (e.g., mathematics), motoric (e.g., a guitar playing 
technique), taxonomic (e.g., a criteria for ordering compact discs) or social 
(e.g., a taxation system)’ (Lawson et al, 2004: 302).   
The empathising-systemising (E-S) theory was devised in relation to 
autism spectrum disorder which was observed to present the extremes of 
characteristically male behaviours, particularly as the typical autistic profile 
includes a hyper-developed systemising ability and a hypo-developed 
empathising ability; which has been labelled as the extreme male brain 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002).  Although the E-S theory was devised in relation to 
autism, a study was conducted in order to examine E-S in a sample of adults 
both with and without Asperger Syndrome (AS) (Lawson et al, 2004).  A bias 
towards either empathising or systemising was found in the AS group and 
also in the general population.  However, no significant correlation was found   
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between the Social Stories Questionnaire (SSQ – a measure of empathising) 
and the Physical Prediction Questionnaire (PPQ – a measure of 
systemising), either overall or within any of the groups.  Therefore it seems 
that an individual’s ability to empathise and their ability to systemise are 
independent of each other (Lawson et al, 2004).  Similarly, the findings of 
various other studies concur with this by showing no significant relationship 
between measures of E-S (Carroll & Yung, 2006; Ling et al, 2009; Russell- 
Smith et al, 2013).  However, contrary to this, there are studies which have 
found a negative correlation between the two (Baron-Cohen et al, 2003; 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Jarrold et al, 2000).  This could suggest 
one of two issues: (i) either there are flaws within the data, or (ii) if a 
relationship does indeed exist, it may be more complex than initially thought 
and thus involve a number of other factors.  Thus, it is ambiguous as to 
whether empathising and systemising are completely independent, or 
whether they are separate yet related constructs.   
Sex differences in the general population are apparent in E-S, with 
females tending to score higher on measures of empathising and males 
scoring higher on measures of systemising (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004; Chou et al, 2011; Cook & Saucier, 2010; Manson & Winterbottom, 
2012).  Furthermore, empathising and systemising have been investigated in 
relation to a number of other factors such as anxiety levels (Strutt et al, 
2014), jumping to conclusions (Brosnan et al, 2013), schizotypy (Russell- 
Smith et al, 2013), and degree subject (Manson & Winterbottom, 2012) to 
name some examples.  Strutt et al (2014) found that individuals with higher 
levels of trait anxiety scored high in systemising and low in empathising,   
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whereas those who were less anxious, demonstrated balanced tendencies in 
both domains.  Another study has shown that a jumping to conclusions bias 
resulted in greater empathising and reduced systemising compared to a non-
jumping to conclusions group (Brosnan et al, 2013).  The study into 
schizotypy, conducted by Russell- Smith et al (2013) has provided null 
results, and in relation to degree subject, Manson and Winterbottom (2012) 
found that (i) males score more highly in systemising and females score 
more highly in empathising, (ii) scientists score more highly in systemising 
and artists score more highly in empathising, and (iii) individuals’ scores on 
empathising and systemising were better predictors of degree subject than 
gender. 
2.5 Sensory Processing Sensitivity 
Sensory processing refers to the way in which an individual detects, 
regulates, interprets and responds to sensory stimuli, and can include both 
physiological and behavioural components (Ben-Avi et al, 2012).  The 
functioning of the nervous system and structural changes relate to the 
physiological aspect, and the individual’s ability to regulate reactions to 
stimuli adaptively to the environmental requirements, relates to the 
behavioural aspect.  Atypical sensory processing may be expressed by 
hypersensitivity (the tendency to have a negative reaction to a sensory input 
that is commonly considered harmless) or hyposensitivity (a decreased 
sensitivity to stimuli in the environment) to sensory stimuli.  This is dependent 
on the neurological threshold for sensory stimuli.  An individual with a low 
neurological threshold requires low intensity stimuli to react, whereas an   
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individual with high neurological threshold need high intensity stimuli or takes 
longer to react to the same stimuli (Ben-Avi et al, 2012). 
Sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) is considered to be an innate 
trait which is characterised by greater sensitivity to social and environmental 
stimuli (Acevedo et al, 2014; Jagiellowicz et al, 2016).  It is measured 
through a 27-item questionnaire known as the Highly Sensitive Person Scale 
(HSPS; Aron & Aron, 1997; Appendix 10).  The scale was initially devised in 
order to conceptualise SPS as a unitary factor, however, a psychometric 
evaluation of the HSPS was conducted by Smolewska et al (2006) who 
identified that the scale comprises of three forms of sensitivity.  These 
include: (i) Ease of Excitation, (ii) Aesthetic Sensitivity, and (iii) Low Sensory 
Threshold.  Individuals who score high in ease of excitation are prone to 
being mentally overwhelmed by both internal (pain, hunger) and external 
(light, noise) stimuli, whereas a high score in aesthetic sensitivity is related to 
greater awareness and appreciation of beauty, and individuals scoring high 
in low sensory threshold are more likely to feel unpleasantly aroused by 
external stimuli such as bright lights and loud noises (Smolewska et al, 
2006).   
Being a highly sensitivity person has both its positives and negatives, 
for instance, having a greater awareness and appreciation for the 
environment and surroundings is generally a positive experience, however it 
can easily be turned into a negative experience when the various stimuli 
become overwhelming (Bakker & Moulding, 2012).  Much of the research 
into SPS has tended to focus on the negative aspects.  In particular, 
research has shown links between high SPS and greater perceived stress,   
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along with more frequent symptoms of ill health measured by two separate 
self-reported measures of health (Benham, 2006).  Other research has found 
associations between SPS and anxiety (Liss et al, 2005; Neal et al, 2002), 
depression (Liss et al, 2005), social phobia (Neal et al, 2002), avoidant 
personality disorder (Meyer & Carver, 2000), and social introversion and 
emotionality (Aron & Aron, 1997). 
However, research into the subscales of the HSPS (Appendix 10) has 
found the aesthetics sensitivity subscale to be related to more positive and 
beneficial outcomes than the ease of excitation and low sensory threshold 
subscales (Ahadi and Basharpoor, 2010; Liss et al, 2008; Sobocko & 
Zelenski, 2015).  Specifically, aesthetic sensitivity has been found to be 
associated with well-being and desirable personality traits, including positive 
affect and openness to experience, while ease of excitation and low sensory 
threshold were associated with neuroticism and negative affect (Sobocko & 
Zelenski, 2015).  Similarly, Ahadi and Basharpoor (2010) have shown 
aesthetic sensitivity to be associated with openness to experience and 
conscientiousness, and Liss et al (2008) show aesthetic sensitivity to be 
associated with greater attention to detail and good communication - 
measures of the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001).  This 
was tested in a sample of 201 college students who completed the HSPS 
and measures of anxiety, depression, alexithymia (the inability to identify, 
describe and interpret emotional states), and autism symptoms (Liss et al, 
2008).   
 Brain imaging studies have revealed differences in neural responses 
between individuals high in SPS and those low in SPS (Acevedo et al, 2014;   
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Aron et al, 2010; Jagiellowicz et al, 2010).  During a task involving the 
perception of visual scenes, in which participants performed a change 
detection trial whereby they were instructed to indicate whether the image 
was the same as or different from the proceeding image (both minor and 
major changes in images were shown), individuals high in SPS exhibited 
greater brain activation in regions involved in high-order visual processing, 
as well as increased response times.  This suggests that individuals high in 
SPS take longer to respond to minor, as opposed to major, changes in visual 
scenes, thus showing increased activation in visual attention areas as they 
pay closer attention to the finer details within a scene (Jagiellowicz et al, 
2010).  Other research has found that individuals high in SPS show little 
cultural differences during simple visuospatial tasks which emphasise 
judgements that are either typically easier for Americans (context 
independent) or typically easier for Asians (context dependent), whereas 
those low in SPS show strong cultural differences (Aron et al, 2010).  
Generally, East Asian cultures show interdependence of ideas and practices 
and Americans show independence of ideas and practices.  These cultural 
differences also apply to performance on simple perceptual judgments.  For 
example, people from East Asian cultural contexts perform better on tasks 
with interdependent (relative or context dependent) demands, and people 
from Western cultural contexts perform better on tasks with independent 
(absolute or context independent) demands (Kitayama et al, 2003).  The 
study conducted by Aron et al (2010) consisted of 10 European-Americans 
and 10 East Asians who completed a task which involved judging stimuli that 
depicted a vertical line inside a box.  Participants had to identify whether   
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each line and box combination matched the proportional scaling of the 
previous one (absolute or context independent), or whether each line 
matched the previous line despite the size of the box (relative or context 
dependent).  Thus, it was shown that individuals high in SPS process 
sensory information more carefully and thoroughly, and are more responsive 
to the actual stimuli and less affected by the cultural context than individuals 
low in SPS (Aron et al, 2010).    
 One particular neuroimaging study investigated SPS in relation to the 
perception of other people’s emotions (Acevedo et al, 2014).  The 
experiment consisted of participants viewing images of their romantic 
partners, as well as strangers, displaying facial expressions that were either 
positive (happy), negative (sad) or neutral.  Findings revealed stronger 
activations in brain regions concerned with awareness, integration of sensory 
information, empathy (including a region of the mirror neuron system), and 
action planning in individuals scoring higher in SPS.  It was also found that 
the stronger activations were in response to the images of individuals 
displaying positive emotions, and the images of their romantic partners. Such 
research suggests that highly sensitive individuals have greater awareness 
and are more in tune with environmental stimuli and others’ needs and 
emotions (Acevedo et al, 2014).  
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 Embodied cognition is a topic in the cognitive sciences which 
assumes that the physical body, including the body’s form and structure, 
sensory and motor systems, and emotions, play an important role in   
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influencing psychological processes (including sensation, perception, 
attention, learning and memory) (Glenberg, 2010).  The discovery of mirror 
neurons which suggests that the same neurons in the brain fire during the 
performance of a movement, as well as the observation of the same 
movement, has provided support for embodied cognition (Di Pellegrino et al, 
1992).  Furthermore, mirror neurons have been linked to empathy (Gallese, 
2001), as research shows overlapping brain region during the execution of 
an action, emotion or sensation, and the observation of the same action, 
emotion or sensation (Jabbi et al, 2007; Morrison et al, 2004; Ochsner et al, 
2008; Singer et al, 2004; Wicker et al, 2003).  Empathy can be split into two 
main types, namely emotional empathy and cognitive empathy (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).  Research shows that mirror neurons may be involved in both 
emotional empathy (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer et al, 2008; Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2009) and cognitive empathy (Gazzola et al, 2006).  Baron-
Cohen (2002) has proposed an empathising-systemising theory which posits 
that there are two opposing cognitive profiles, the male brain and the female 
brain.  It is assumed that an individual is significantly better at either 
empathising than systemising, or vice versa.  However, research both 
supports (Baron-Cohen et al, 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Jarrold et al, 2000) and refutes this (Carroll & Yung, 2006; Lawson et al, 
2004; Ling et al, 2009; Russell- Smith et al, 2013).  Another innate trait that 
provides support of embodied cognition is SPS, which is characterised by 
greater sensitivity to social and environmental stimuli (Acevedo et al, 2014; 
Jagiellowicz et al, 2016).  This trait is seen to have both positive and 
negative outcomes (Bakker & Moulding, 2012), and a key finding has shown   
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SPS to be related to increased empathy (including activation of a region of 
the mirror neuron system) (Acevedo et al, 2014).  A link between 
embodiment and aesthetics has been proposed by Freedberg and Gallese 
(2007) who suggest that a fundamental and universal aspect concerning 
aesthetic response to visual artwork (paintings and sculptures) involves the 
activation of embodied mechanisms, including the simulation of actions, 
emotions and corporeal sensations.  This is central because the thesis 
focuses on embodiment and aesthetics through empathy, SPS, creativity and 
colour perception.  Therefore, the next chapter will introduce mechanisms of 
creativity and aesthetics. 
2.7 Chapter Highlights 
 According to the embodiment theory, the body has an influence on 
psychological processes. 
 The discovery of mirror neurons has provided evidence in support of 
embodied cognition. 
 A direct link between mirror neurons and empathy was proposed in 
the shared manifold hypothesis.   
 Embodied simulation plays a role in the way in which individuals 
empathise with others, as the individual’s own internal representations 
of others’ bodily states are activated via the perception of actions, 
emotions, or sensations which are associated to various social stimuli. 
 The activation of the same brain region during the execution of an 
action, emotion or sensation, and the observation of the same action, 
emotion or sensation, allows the individual to understand and 
empathise with others.  
36 
 
 Empathy may be viewed as being an emotional construct which 
involves sensing the feelings of others, and it could be viewed as 
being a cognitive construct which involves understanding the 
perspective of others. 
 It has been proposed that there are two opposing cognitive profiles, 
the male brain and the female brain, whereby an individual is 
significantly better at either empathising than systemising, or vice 
versa. 
 Sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) is considered to be an innate 
trait which is characterised by greater sensitivity to social and 
environmental stimuli. 
 SPS can be measured by the Highly Sensitive Person Scale (HSPS) 
which comprises of three subscales: (i) Ease of Excitation, (ii) 
Aesthetic Sensitivity, and (iii) Low Sensory Threshold.   
 Being a highly sensitivity person has both its positives and negatives, 
and much of the research into SPS has tended to focus on the 
negative aspects. 
 Research into the subscales of the HSPS has found the aesthetics 
sensitivity subscale to be related to more positive and beneficial 
outcomes than the ease of excitation and low sensory threshold 
subscales. 
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Chapter 3: Creativity and Aesthetics  
3.1 Defining and Measuring Creativity 
The general definition of creativity is bipartite, and thus usually 
includes the use of two criteria (Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  Hence, creativity 
can be defined as an act (the ability to produce something) or an 
idea/thought that is in some way novel (original, unusual, unexpected, 
unique) and appropriate (effective, useful, beneficial, fit for purpose, adaptive 
concerning task constraints) (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco & Jaeger, 
2012; Sternberg, 1999).  There are a number of factors such as drive for 
originality, independence, devotion to work, and flexibility, which are thought 
to be related to the process of creativity (Hayes, 1989).  Although creativity is 
usually associated with artists who create works through painting, dancing, 
writing, and music, to name but a few (Zaidel, 2013), individuals that do not 
deal in the arts may also be highly creative in other human endeavours such 
as science, medicine, economics/mathematics, teaching, politics and 
business (Zaidel, 2013).  Therefore, the neuropsychological and 
neuroanatomical source of creativity within artists may not differ from that of 
other individuals (Zaidel, 2013).  Psychological research into creativity only 
began to expand after J. P. Guilford stated in his 1950 American 
Psychological Association presidential address that the topic deserved much 
more attention than it was getting (Simonton, 2000).  
The four ‘P’s’ model is a way of categorising creativity research into 
the creative person, process, product, and press (environment) (Kaufman & 
Sternberg, 2007).  Research into the ‘creative person’ primarily utilises two   
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approaches: trait theories which assume that the creative individual has 
certain mental abilities and attitudes (personality types, profession, life-time 
accomplishments), and psychometric tests which aim to quantify the mental 
abilities that correlate with creative individuals (such as divergent thinking 
tests) (Santanen et al, 2002).  Research focusing on the ‘creative process’ 
has utilised stage models of the creative thinking process (such as the 
concept of flow and the geneplore model which suggests that when people 
engage in creative thinking they move through phases of (i) generation - 
where they construct mental representations termed pre-inventive structures, 
and (ii) exploration – where those pre-inventive structures are interpreted in a 
meaningful way), whereas research focusing on the ‘creative product’ 
investigates what causes creative products to be different from non-creative 
products and uses lists of creative/non-creative products as a form of 
assessment (such as creative achievement and creative behaviours 
questionnaires, as well as divergent thinking tests).  Lastly, research into the 
‘press’ perspective of creativity sees creativity as an interaction between 
individuals and their environment, showing some of the possible factors that 
affect creativity (including motivation, competition, and risk-taking) (Santanen 
et al, 2002).   
 Creativity research tends to focus on either Big-C creativity (eminent 
or genius level creativity, such as the work of Picasso and Einstein) or little-c 
creativity (everyday creativity, such as decorating a room and writing a 
poem) (Kaufman & Sternberg, 2007).  However, Kaufman and Beghetto 
(2009) propose a Four C model of creativity adding to this dichotomy.  The 
model adds two more constructs (mini-c creativity and Pro-c creativity) with   
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the aim of making important distinctions between various levels of creative 
magnitude.  For instance, mini-c creativity refers to the personal and 
developmental aspects of creativity, such as attempting to do a new task like 
learning to ride a bike, and Pro-c creativity refers to a degree of creative 
accomplishment such as working in the profession of art or photography yet 
never reaching stardom (Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009). 
According to a critical review conducted by Sawyer (2011), research 
into the cognitive neuroscience of creativity has largely utilized brain imaging 
techniques to investigate the brain regions involved in creativity.  The three 
most predominant are electroencephalography (EEG), positron emission 
tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  
Findings suggest that almost all brain regions are active during different 
creative tasks (for example, the Alternate Uses Test: Guilford et al, 1960; 
and the Remote Associates Test: Mednick, 1967), with the activation of both 
hemispheres being roughly proportionate (Sawyer, 2011).  However, 
because creativity is such a broad and diverse phenomenon, there are a 
number of alternative ways in which it can be tested.  For instance, many 
self-report scales, performance tasks and other assessment techniques have 
been devised to measure some of the different aspects relating to creativity, 
including creative cognition, creative behaviour, creative accomplishments, 
creative products, and creative traits (Kaufman et al, 2008).   
Some of the fairly new and recent measures of creativity include the 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al, 2005; Appendix 4), 
the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors (BICB; Batey, 2007; 
Appendix 1), the revised Creative Behavior Inventory (CBI; Dollinger, 2003),   
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and the Creativity Domain Questionnaire (CDQ; Kaufman, 2006).  All of 
these employ a simple self-report format which measures creative 
achievement, behaviour, and self-perception (Silvia et al, 2012).  The CAQ 
measures creative accomplishments within 10 different domains (Visual Arts, 
Music, Dance, Architectural Design, Creative Writing, Humor, Inventions, 
Scientific Discovery, Theater and Film, and Culinary Arts) with the aim of 
measuring Pro-c or Big-C creativity (Silvia et al, 2012).  The BICB is similar 
to the CAQ in its behavioural approach, however instead of measuring Pro-c 
or Big-C creativity, it aims to assess little-c or everyday creativity.  It applies a 
34-item scale which covers activities such as art, crafts, creative writing, 
leadership, coaching, and mentorship, and asks the participant to indicate 
which activities they have done within the past 12 months (Silvia et al, 2012).  
The revised CBI is a 28-item measure that contains a four-point scale 
ranging from “never did this” to “did this more than five times” (Dollinger, 
2003).  The scale asks participants to indicate how much they have been 
involved in certain activities, such as, made a sculpture.  The items include 
accomplishments in the visual, literary and performing arts, and crafts 
(Dollinger, 2003).  The CDQ focuses on an individual’s self-concept, 
measuring their beliefs about their level of creativity within various domains 
as opposed to measuring their creative accomplishments and observable 
behaviours (Silvia et al, 2012).  The CAQ asks people “How creative would 
you rate yourself in…”.  Various items are then given for domains such as 
acting, computers, dancing, leadership, and writing (Silvia et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, creativity can be measured through divergent thinking 
tasks.  Divergent thinking (DT) is considered to be an integral component   
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within the creative process, thus DT tests are another common and widely 
used measure of creativity, specifically creative thinking (Batey & Furnham, 
2006).  Nevertheless, it is important to mention that DT is not synonymous 
with creativity; instead, it is merely thought to be an estimate (or a potential 
predictor) of creative problem solving (Runco, 2008).  DT tasks are similar to 
fluency tasks in that they measure production ability in response to a 
constraint (Silvia et al, 2008).  For example, a letter fluency task might ask 
for a list of as many words as can be thought of that begin with the letter P, 
or a semantic fluency task might as for a list of as many countries that can be 
thought of, a DT task might ask for a list of unusual uses for a common 
object such as a brick or newspaper.  DT scores intend to capture the 
creative component or the uniqueness of ideas, whereas fluency task scores 
are simply based on the number of responses generated (Silvia et al, 2008).  
DT tasks are evaluated on fluency (the ability to produce a number of ideas 
for a certain problem), flexibility (the ability to see a problem from different 
approaches, scored by the number of different categories implied by the 
responses), and originality (the ability to produce unusual/unique responses) 
(Pásztor et al, 2015).  DT tasks differ from convergent thinking tasks, such as 
conventional intelligence tests, which only contain one or a few correct 
answers (Pásztor et al, 2015).        
According to Zeng et al (2011), there are several weaknesses 
concerning traditional DT tests, namely: (i) lack of construct validity, (ii) not 
testing the integrated general creative process, (iii) neglect of domain 
specificity and expertise, (iv) and poor predictive, ecological, and 
discriminant validities.  Despite this, a meta-analysis of 44 studies conducted   
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by Kim (2008), has revealed a weak yet statistically significant correlation 
between DT test scores and creative achievement (r = 0.216).  Furthermore, 
a neuroimaging study conducted by Gibson et al (2009) provides support for 
a relationship between divergent thinking and creativity.  The experiment 
consisted of trained musicians and a control group matched in age, 
education and sex.  Frontal cortical activity was measured using near-
infrared spectroscopy.  Findings showed greater bilateral frontal activity 
within musicians, as opposed to the matched controls, whist engaged in DT.  
The results therefore suggest that the creativity in creative individuals may 
be composed of enhanced divergent thinking abilities (Gibson et al, 2009).  
One particular study has examined whether the same or different 
variables are predictors of creativity when measured through divergent 
thinking compared to creative expert performance (An et al, 2016).  A total of 
143 participants, who were college students, enrolled on psychology courses 
at four separate universities in South Korea, completed seven types of tests.  
These were measurements of (i) general intelligence, (ii) domain knowledge, 
(iii) creative behaviours, (iv) motivation, (v) creative personality, (vi) divergent 
thinking, and (vii) creative expert performance.  Different constructs were 
found to underlie divergent thinking and creative expert performance.  
Specifically, general intelligence and creative personality were predictors of 
creativity as divergent thinking, whereas, general intelligence, domain 
knowledge and motivation were predictors of creativity as creative expert 
performance.  This indicates that divergent thinking and creative expert 
performance are two different constructs.  One particular limitation of this   
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study is that different colleges held different assessment criteria for the 
domain knowledge scores (An et al, 2016).  
    Another important aspect to consider in relation to creativity is 
imagination.  According to Vygotsky (2004), imagination refers to thoughts 
and ideas that are not real or true, in the sense that they are not happening 
at that particular moment in time; imagination is the source of creative 
production and is therefore fundamental to every aspect of cultural life.  
Moreover, imagination is the mind’s ability to conceive things which are not 
readily available to the senses; hence, when the individual imagines, the 
individual creates, and according to Clement (2012) this is done through a 
connection between the conscious and subconscious minds.  The human 
mind can only make relationships between two or more different mental 
elements if they are available in the imagination due to the individuals’ 
previous experiences, whether physical or emotional (Vygotsky, 2004).  The 
imagination re-combines the already existing mental elements, thus making 
links and connections which ultimately lead to new ideas and creations 
(Clement, 2012).      
In summary, creativity can be defined as an act, idea, or thought that 
is in some way novel and appropriate (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco & 
Jaeger, 2012; Sternberg, 1999).  According to the four ‘P’s’ model, creativity 
research can be categorised into the creative person, process, product, and 
press (environment) (Kaufman & Sternberg, 2007).  Creativity research tends 
to focus on either Big-C creativity (eminent or genius level creativity) or little-
c creativity (everyday creativity) (Kaufman & Sternberg, 2007).  However, the 
Four C model adds mini-c creativity and Pro-c creativity with the aim of   
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making important distinctions between various levels of creative magnitude 
(Kaufman and Beghetto, 2009).  Cognitive neuroscience uses brain imaging 
techniques to investigate the brain regions involved in creativity (Sawyer, 
2011).  However, self-report scales, performance tasks and other 
assessment techniques, including DT tasks are also used to measure 
creativity (Kaufman et al, 2008).  Creative individuals usually produces works 
that can be considered as aesthetically pleasing.  Therefore the domain of 
Neuroaesthetics will be explored.  
3.2 Neuroaesthetics 
Visual artists often produce objects of admiration and beauty, 
including paintings, drawings, sculptures, etchings, and other decorative arts 
and crafts resembling the profound physical expressions of the human ability 
to produce and appreciate aesthetics (Cela-Conde et al, 2011).  The word 
‘aesthetics’ originates from the Greek word ‘aiesthesis’ which relates to the 
senses, sensations and perception.  The term was first used by a German 
philosopher named Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714 –1762) in a book 
on poetry (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009).  In general, aesthetics concerns the 
appreciation of beauty, and can thus be defined as the appreciation of 
beauty within nature, however, aesthetics also relates to the arts and 
artworks, and concerns the knowledge and appreciation resulting from an 
emotional response elicited by the perception of great works of art (Brown & 
Dissanayake, 2009).  Hence, an aesthetic experience occurs through the 
senses and consists of the emotional value which is placed onto objects, 
allowing the beholder to perceive, feel, and sense (Brown & Dissanayake, 
2009).  Although all cultures have engaged in, discussed, and even studied   
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aesthetics from a subjective, descriptive and humanistic perspective, it is 
neuroscientists and neuropsychologists whom have delved into the neural, 
biological and evolutionary aspects of aesthetic experiences, which has now 
become known as the field of Neuroaesthetics (Cela-Conde et al, 2011).  
According to Cross & Ticini (2012), the aim of neuroaesthetic inquiry should 
be to provide a knowledge and understanding of the way in which the artist’s 
products may alter and affect the neurophysiology of the beholder, as 
opposed to merely focusing on the definition of rules and criteria concerning 
the benchmark of successful and beautiful works of art. 
Neuroaesthetic investigations have identified that the activation of 
sensorimotor, emotional and cognitive mechanisms may be involved in the 
aesthetic experience of visual artworks (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009).  
Neuroaesthetics, which is a relatively new field within cognitive neuroscience 
(Di Dio & Gallese, 2009), is a domain which focuses on the properties of the 
brain as it engages in aesthetic experiences such as art, dance, music, and 
literature (Chatterjee, 2011).  The process of many neuroaesthetic 
experiments usually involves the procedure of participants viewing the 
stimuli, appreciating their aesthetic qualities, rating their value, and 
formulating a response (Cela-Conde et al, 2013).  Both imaging and 
neurophysiological techniques are mainly utilized within these experiments, 
including fMRI, magnetoencephalography (MEG), and EEG (Chatterjee, 
2011).  ‘Art, like everything we do, is generated from electrical impulses 
passed between synapses in the brain, expressed through the body, and 
eventually appreciated through the senses’ (Cross & Ticini, 2012:11).  
However, visual perception in particular is highly important, as it is involved   
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in the majority of aesthetic experiences (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009).  The 
visual brain separates elements such as colour, luminance, and motion; as 
well as separating higher-order objects such as faces, bodies, and 
landscapes (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014).  Dynamic paintings such as the 
work of Van Gogh evoke a subjective sense of movement and activate the 
visual motion area MT, also known as V5, whereas portraits activate the face 
area in the fusiform gyrus, and landscapes activate the place area in the 
parahippocampal gyrus (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014).  Thus, this suggests 
that aesthetic pleasure may arise from a number of different brain structures, 
the perceptions of specific stimuli, and the distribution of relevant 
neurotransmitters in the cortex.  After the initial visual analysis of a particular 
aesthetic stimuli, further levels of processing are undertaken; this leads to an 
aesthetic experience which may be based on either biological or embodied 
mechanisms (see Chapter 2 section 2.1 on embodied cognition) that are 
dependent on factors such as the individuals’ interest in the artwork, the 
context it is in, and their prior knowledge and familiarity concerning the 
artwork (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009).  Thus, the brain basis of an aesthetic 
experience is complex and has been associated with a number of different 
brain networks, including the reward network (Jacobsen et al, 2006; 
Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004), the core emotion centres 
(the insula and the amygdala) (Cupchik et al, 2009; Di Dio et al, 2007), the 
mirror neuron system (Ticini et al, 2014), and the default mode network 
(DMN) (Cela-Conde et al, 2013; Vessel et al, 2012; Vessel et al, 2013).  The 
DMN is a network of brain regions typically found to be suppressed when 
observers engage in externally oriented tasks (Raichle et al, 2001).     
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3.2.1 Previous Research on Aesthetics Experiences 
Firstly, previous research on aesthetics indicates the involvement of 
the brain’s reward network (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009).  In one particular study, 
participants viewed different categories of paintings and were required to 
judge them as being either beautiful, neutral or ugly (Kawabata & Zeki, 
2004).  Enhanced activation was found in the medial orbitofrontal cortex 
whilst the participants viewed the paintings which they judged as beautiful, 
whereas the paintings that were judged as ugly evoked the lowest level of 
activation within the same brain region.  However, this study only used a 
sample of 10 participants (Kawabata & Zeki, 2004).  Even still, the results 
suggest a link between aesthetics and reward as the orbitofrontal cortex 
encodes the identity of rewards and reward outcomes, including visual 
appearance, taste, smell and texture (Klein-Flügge et al, 2013).  Another 
study exposed participants to both representational and abstract paintings in 
three different formats: (i) original, (ii) altered (an object in the painting was 
moved to a different location in the painting) and (iii) filtered (a median noise 
filter was applied resulting in the random distribution of colour levels within a 
16-pixel radius) (Vartanian & Goel, 2004).  The 12 participants, 10 of which 
were female, were required to rate the paintings based on aesthetic 
preference.  The fMRI findings indicated that activation in right caudate 
nucleus decreased in response to decreasing preference, and that activation 
in the bilateral occipital gyri, left cingulate sulcus, and bilateral fusiform gyri 
increased in response to increasing preference.  From this it was concluded 
that the differential patterns of activation within these particular brain 
structures, in response to aesthetic preference, are examples of the roles in   
48 
 
which they play in evaluating reward-based stimuli which vary in emotional 
valence (Vartanian & Goel, 2004).  Similarly, an fMRI study which has 
utilized a set of geometric shapes as stimuli, as opposed to paintings, has 
also provided evidence of a link between aesthetics and reward (Jacobsen et 
al, 2006).  Aesthetic judgements were made by the participants as to 
whether the images were beautiful, and whether or not they were symmetric.  
The symmetric images were considered as more beautiful than the non-
symmetric images, and aesthetic judgements activated the medial frontal 
cortex, the precuneus, and the ventral prefrontal cortex (Jacobsen et al, 
2006).  Furthermore, the left intraparietal sulcus was jointly active for both 
symmetry and beauty judgments, and both the beauty and complexity of the 
images aroused activation within the orbitofrontal cortex (Jacobsen et al, 
2006).     
Research also suggests that aesthetic preference is linked to the core 
emotion centres: the insula and the amygdala (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009).  For 
example, an fMRI experiment conducted by Cupchik et al (2009) examined 
three different conditions including pragmatic, aesthetic and baseline.  Within 
the pragmatic group participants were shown 32 representational paintings 
(nude, group portrait, landscape, still-life) and asked to view them in an 
everyday detached manner, focusing on the content and visual narrative.  In 
the aesthetic group, participants were shown representational paintings and 
asked to view them in a subjective engaged manner, experiencing the mood 
and feelings which they evoked, whilst focusing on the colours, tones, 
composition, and shapes within the paintings.  Finally, in the baseline group, 
participants were shown 16 non-representational paintings (fractal paintings   
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by the American gestural expressionist artist Jackson Pollock and non-fractal 
paintings by the Israeli scholar Dr. Tsion Avital) and asked not to engage in 
either pragmatic or aesthetic viewing.  Within the results, both the pragmatic 
and aesthetic groups were compared to the baseline.  This revealed 
activation in a distributed network including the left insula, left cingulate 
gyrus, left lingual gyrus, and right inferior temporal gyrus, indicating 
engagement in the task and mnemonic processing.  Furthermore, each 
group was individually compared to the baseline.  Activation in the right 
fusiform gyrus was shown when the pragmatic group was compared to the 
baseline, indicating object recognition and visual and spatial search, and 
activation in the bilateral insula was found when the aesthetic group was 
compared to the baseline, suggesting that the participants were emotionally 
engaged during the aesthetic condition (Cupchik et al, 2009).  
 In addition, another fMRI experiment examined a sample of 14 
students with no experience in art theory (Di Dio et al, 2007).  The procedure 
consisted of showing the participants 15 images of Classical and 
Renaissance sculpture differing in proportion, both original and modified 
(long-trunk, short-legs and short-trunk, long-legs) were shown.  The test 
conditions included (i) observation, where the participants were required to 
indicate whether or not they paid attention to the image; (ii) aesthetic 
judgement, where they had to indicate whether or not they liked the image; 
and (iii) proportion judgement, which required the participants to indicate 
whether or not the image was in proportion.  The results revealed activation 
of the right insula and some lateral and medial cortical areas for the original 
sculptures when compared to modified ones, and activation of the right   
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amygdala for the images judged as beautiful compared to those judged as 
ugly.  From these findings it has been suggested that the individuals’ sense 
of beauty is based on two distinct processes.  The first being ‘objective 
beauty’, which involves the activation of sets of cortical neurons and the 
insula, resulting from parameters intrinsic to the stimuli, and the second 
being ‘subjective beauty’, which involves the activation of the amygdala and 
is dependent on the individual’s own emotional experiences (Di Dio et al, 
2007).  
Other research supports the recently established link between 
embodiment and aesthetics, which implicates the involvement of the mirror 
neuron system.  For example, a study consisting of a sample of 373 adult 
participants has provided support for the effect of aesthetic experience on 
emotional physiological responses (Tschacher et al, 2012).  The participants 
wore electronic gloves which measured heart rate, skin conductance and 
locomotion whilst viewing artworks of their choice at a fine art museum.  Both 
emotional and aesthetic responses were evaluated by the use of a 
customised questionnaire subsequent to the viewing.  The findings indicated 
a significant relationship between the participants’ physiological responses 
during the perception of artwork and their aesthetic-emotional experience of 
the artwork (Tschacher et al, 2012).  The link between embodiment and 
aesthetics is also supported by the results found by Di Dio et al (2007) in the 
study delineated above, as the activation of the ventral premotor cortex and 
the posterior parietal cortex during the observation of sculptures suggests 
motor resonance congruent with the movements portrayed in the sculptures.  
Moreover, a recent study conducted by Ticini et al (2014) has demonstrated   
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that action priming matching the artist’s painting style enhances aesthetic 
preference, suggesting that covert painting simulation contributes to 
aesthetic appreciation.  Within this study, participants were primed with either 
a precision grip, a forced grip, or a flat hand.  Firstly, they were required to 
paint dots (precision grip), strokes (forced grip), or place their hand palm 
down on the table (flat hand) to obtain and strengthen a visuomotor 
association.  They then observed 90 pointillist-style paintings preceded by an 
image of the one of the three primes, which were either compatible or 
incompatible with the pointillist style of painting.  The participants also rated 
the paintings on a nine-point Likert scale ranging from “I like it very much” to 
“I do not like it at all” (Ticini et al, 2014).   
Lastly, the DMN is shown to be related to aesthetics in a recent fMRI 
study conducted by Vessel et al (2013).  The study found that regions of the 
DMN were positively activated on the highest-rated trials in a task involving 
rating images of unfamiliar artworks.  The ratings were based on the 
participants’ individual tastes and on how much the artwork “moved” them.  
The findings suggest that certain artworks may be so well matched to an 
individual that it relates to their sense of self through the DMN, giving them a 
sense of being “moved” or of being “touched from within”, which other 
external stimuli do not normally get (Vessel et al, 2013).  The DMN is a 
network of brain regions typically found to be suppressed when observers 
engage in externally oriented tasks (Raichle et al, 2001).  It is inversely 
correlated with attention to external stimuli (Shulman et al, 1997; Buckner et 
al, 2008) and is associated with thinking of the past and imagining the future 
(Buckner & Vincent, 2007).  Brain regions of this network include: the medial   
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prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, the temporo-parietal junction, 
the lateral temporal cortex, the superior frontal gyrus, and the hippocampus 
(Vessel et al, 2013).  Thus, it is possible that aesthetic experiences involve 
an internal orientation evoked by an external stimulus (Vessel et al, 2013).  
Consistent with this, it was demonstrated in another fMRI study that the DMN 
was actively engaged during the viewing of paintings whilst participants 
explicitly focused on internal thoughts and emotions (Vessel et al, 2012).  
This was apparent for the viewing of artworks which were rated as being the 
“most moving”, whereas the artworks which were given lower ratings 
exhibited non-differential activity in the brain regions associated to the DMN 
(Vessel et al, 2012).  Moreover, other than fMRI findings, MEG neural 
responses have also been examined in relation to aesthetics in research 
conducted by Cela-Conde et al (2013).  The findings revealed different 
neuronal patterns for an initial exposure to artwork used as stimuli (250 – 
750 ms) compared to a delayed exposure to the artwork (1000 – 1500 ms).  
Both beautiful and non-beautiful stimuli were shown according to the 
participants’ own judgements.  The latter (delayed) response corresponded 
to frontal, parietal, and temporal medial areas belonging to the DMN, 
however this only occurred within the beautiful condition and not within the 
non-beautiful condition (Cela-Conde et al, 2013).  Thus, this suggests that 
the DMN is active during delayed responses to beautiful artwork.  
In summary, aesthetics can be defined as the appreciation of beauty 
within nature and in works of art (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009).  An aesthetic 
experience occurs through the senses and consists of the emotional value 
which is placed onto objects, allowing the beholder to perceive, feel, and   
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sense (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009).  The field of Neuroaesthetics deals 
with the neural, biological and evolutionary aspects of aesthetic experiences 
(Cela-Conde et al, 2011).  The activation of sensorimotor, emotional and 
cognitive mechanisms may be involved in the aesthetic experience of visual 
artworks (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009).  A number of different brain networks are 
implicated in aesthetic experiences, including the reward network (Jacobsen 
et al, 2006; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004), the core 
emotion centres (the insula and the amygdala) (Cupchik et al, 2009; Di Dio et 
al, 2007), the mirror neuron system (Ticini et al, 2014), and the default mode 
network (DMN) (Cela-Conde et al, 2013; Vessel et al, 2012; Vessel et al, 
2013).  Aesthetic experiences differ in people depending on their level of 
expertise within the arts, which will thus be discussed in the next section.    
3.3 Experts Compared to Laypeople 
 In terms of ability, experts differ from laypeople as they are equipped 
with a structured, specialised knowledge of their area of expertise, and as 
knowledge systems vary in degrees of complexity, this may result in different 
aesthetic processing (Jacobsen, 2010).  Hence, experts have been shown to 
process aesthetic experiences differently from laypeople, even at the 
neuronal level.  For example, it was demonstrated in an fMRI experiment that 
expert dancers in either classical ballet or capoeira, as opposed to non-
expert dancers, show stronger activation in various brain regions when 
observing other dancers performing in the same style (Calvo-Merino et al, 
2005).  Similarly, when compared to a group of laypeople matched for age 
and gender, professional pianists exhibited stronger activation of the same 
cortical network when listening to piano melodies as when performing the   
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musical actions on the keyboard (Bangert et al, 2006).  Such research 
suggests that the mirror mechanism is strengthened through expertise and 
experience (Gallese, 2010). 
 Other research has examined experts compared to laypeople whilst 
engaged in aesthetic performance, showing clear differences between the 
two.  Specifically, a study conducted by Bhattacharya and Petsche (2005) 
utilized EEG to examine whether mentally composing drawings of their own 
choice produces different electrical activity within artists and laymen.  
Synchronization differences were found between the two groups, and it was 
thus concluded that the higher synchrony in the low-frequency band, within 
the group of artists, may be a result of advanced long-term visual art memory 
and extensive top-down processing (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005).  
Moreover, another study which has employed a similar method, using EEG 
to examine both artists and non-artists whilst they undertake drawing tasks, 
has also found differences between the two (Kottlow et al, 2011).  
Specifically, artists compared to non-artists exhibited decreased power (the 
amount of energy per unit within a given frequency) primarily in the upper 
alpha frequency ranges during drawing tasks, suggesting that this is a 
reflection of enhanced semantic memory performance and object recognition 
processes within the artists (Kottlow et al, 2011).  In addition, Chamberlain et 
al (2014) examined 44 graduate and postgraduate art students and non-art 
students who were instructed to complete drawing tasks during an fMRI 
experiment.  The findings show increased grey matter density in the left 
anterior cerebellum and the right medial frontal gyrus, suggesting that 
observational drawing ability relates to changes in structures pertaining to   
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fine motor control and procedural memory.  The study also found a 
correlation between artistic training and increased grey matter density in the 
right precuneus suggesting that artistic training is associated with enhanced 
structures pertaining to visual imagery (Chamberlain et al, 2014).  It should 
be noted that all of the above studies suffer from fairly small sample sizes.  
 Furthermore, one particular study conducted by Bhattacharya and 
Petsche (2002) has focused on the differences between creative individuals 
and laymen during an aesthetic viewing.  The study examined the 
differences between artists and non-artists via the means of EEG phase 
synchrony analysis, and found significant differences during the performance 
of visual perception and imagery of paintings.  Specifically, participants 
carried out two tasks, namely looking at slides of paintings projected onto a 
white wall and imagining each painting just shown before.  Artists showed 
higher phase synchrony in both the high frequency beta and gamma bands 
during perception of paintings, and phase synchrony was mostly enhanced 
during imagery in the low frequency bands (mainly delta).  During both tasks 
there were strong decreases in the phase synchrony of alpha, predominately 
in the artists.  Artists also showed more synchrony in the right hemisphere 
whilst non-artists showed less significant hemispheric asymmetry.  These 
findings suggest that artists showed enhanced synchrony in the high 
frequency band because of their superior binding abilities of several visual 
features, while the enhanced synchrony in the low frequency band may be 
related to their highly developed long-term visual memory of imagery 
(Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002).    
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Lastly, art expertise has been investigated in relation to emotion-
eliciting contemporary artworks and a control set of pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Leder et al, 2014).  Within this 
study, participants’ aesthetic and emotional responses were assessed via 
facial electromyography (EMG) and self-reported rating of valence, familiarity 
and liking.  The findings revealed differences between experts and non-
experts in relation to emotionally-valenced art, specifically showing less 
extreme valence ratings and corrugator supercilii (the frowning muscle) 
activations within the group of experts; they also liked the negative artworks 
more than the non-experts.  However, the study found that this was also the 
case for the control set of (IAPS) pictures, thus implying that art experts 
show general processing differences for visual stimuli (Leder et al, 2014). 
In summary, experts have been shown to process aesthetic 
experiences differently from laypeople, even at the neuronal level.  Research 
suggests that the mirror mechanism is strengthened through expertise and 
experience (Gallese, 2010), as stronger activations in various brain regions 
are shown in experts whilst observing others perform and also whilst 
performing themselves (Bangert et al, 2006; Calvo-Merino et al, 2005).  
Other research suggests that the brain activity of artists may differ to that of 
laypeople due to advanced long-term visual art memory and extensive top-
down processing (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005), and also because of 
enhanced semantic memory performance and object recognition processes 
within the artists (Kottlow et al, 2011).  Furthermore, differences have been 
found in relation to observational drawing ability, and it has been shown that 
artistic training is associated with enhanced structures pertaining to visual   
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imagery (Chamberlain et al, 2014).  Artists have also shown differences 
suggesting that they have superior binding abilities of several visual features 
and a highly developed long-term visual memory of imagery (Bhattacharya & 
Petsche, 2002).  Moreover, art experts compared to non-experts show 
general processing differences for visual stimuli (Leder et al, 2014). 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter has reviewed some of the literature on creativity and 
aesthetics, particularly neuroaesthetics.  Creativity is the ability to produce 
something, or to have a thought or idea, that is both novel and appropriate 
(Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Sternberg, 1999).  
Creativity is apparent in many human endeavours, and is not just restricted 
to the arts (Zaidel, 2013).  Research into creativity can be categorised into 
the creative person, process, product, and press (environment) (Kaufman & 
Sternberg, 2007).  Research tends to focus on either Big-C creativity 
(eminent or genius level creativity) or little-c creativity (everyday creativity) 
(Kaufman & Sternberg, 2007).  While cognitive neuroscience utilizes brain 
imaging techniques to investigate the brain regions involved in creativity 
(Sawyer, 2011), other research applies self-report scales, performance tasks 
and other assessment techniques (Kaufman et al, 2008), including DT tasks 
which measures creative thinking (Batey & Furnham, 2006).  This chapter 
then went on to review the literature on neuroaesthetics which focuses on 
the properties of the brain as it engages in aesthetic experiences such as art, 
dance, music, and literature (Chatterjee, 2011).  An aesthetic experience 
occurs through the senses and consists of the emotional value which is 
placed onto objects, allowing the beholder to perceive, feel, and sense   
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(Brown & Dissanayake, 2009).  The brain basis of an aesthetic experience is 
complex and has been associated to a number of different brain networks, 
including the reward network (Jacobsen et al, 2006; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; 
Vartanian & Goel, 2004), the core emotion centres (the insula and the 
amygdala) (Cupchik et al, 2009; Di Dio et al, 2007), the mirror neuron system 
(Ticini et al, 2014), and the default mode network (Cela-Conde et al, 2013; 
Vessel et al, 2012; Vessel et al, 2013).  Research shows that experts 
process aesthetic experiences differently from laypeople (Bangert et al, 
2006; Bhattacharyaa & Petscheb, 2002; Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005; 
Calvo-Merino et al, 2005; Chamberlain et al, 2014; Kottlow et al, 2011; Leder 
et al, 2014).  The next chapter focuses on colour perception and its effects, 
specifically looking into the biology of the perception of colour, colour 
perception and emotions, and the effects of colour on affect, cognition, 
behaviour and physiology.   
3.5 Chapter Highlights  
 Creativity can be defined as an act (the ability to produce something) 
or an idea/thought that is in some way novel and appropriate. 
 The four ‘P’s’ model is a way of categorising creativity research into 
the creative person, process, product, and press (environment). 
 Creativity research tends to focus on either Big-C creativity (eminent 
or genius level creativity) or little-c creativity (everyday creativity). 
 The Four C model of creativity adds two more constructs (mini-c 
creativity and Pro-c creativity).  
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 Research into the cognitive neuroscience of creativity has largely 
utilized brain imaging techniques to investigate the brain regions 
involved in creativity. 
 Many self-report scales, performance tasks and other assessment 
techniques have been devised to measure some of the different 
aspects relating to creativity, including creative cognition, creative 
behaviour, creative accomplishments, creative products, and creative 
traits. 
 DT tests are another common and widely used measure of creativity, 
specifically creative thinking. 
 Imagination is the mind’s ability to conceive things which are not 
readily available to the senses; hence, when the individual imagines, 
the individual creates. 
 Aesthetics can be defined as the appreciation of beauty within nature 
and the arts and artworks. 
 An aesthetic experience occurs through the senses and consists of 
the emotional value which is placed onto objects, allowing the 
beholder to perceive, feel, and sense. 
 Neuroaesthetics is a relatively new field within cognitive neuroscience 
and is a domain which focuses on the properties of the brain as it 
engages in aesthetic experiences such as art, dance, music, and 
literature. 
 The brain basis of an aesthetic experience is complex and has been 
associated with a number of different brain networks, including the   
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 reward network, the core emotion centres (the insula and the 
amygdala), the mirror neuron system, and the DMN. 
 Experts have been shown to process aesthetic experiences differently 
from laypeople. 
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Chapter 4: Colour Perception and its Effects 
4.1 The Perception of Colour 
 The perception of colour occurs when the projection of light is 
transmitted through a substance, and hence a small portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (wavelengths of ~400–700 nanometres) becomes 
visible to the human eye in the form of colour (Fehrman & Fehrman, 2004).  
Humans with normal colour vision are able to differentiate between many 
thousands of colours through signals from three cone photoreceptors which 
have maximal sensitivities to long, medium and short wavelengths, thus 
making human colour vision trichromatic (Banaschewski et al, 2006; 
Solomon & Lennie, 2007).  However, these photoreceptors are tuned broadly 
enough to respond to light spanning most of the visible spectrum (Solomon & 
Lennie, 2007). 
 Once cone receptors have absorbed light, signals from the retina pass 
on colour information which is then transmitted through the lateral geniculate 
nucleus of the thalamus (LGN) up to the primary visual cortex (V1) (Conway, 
2009).  The colour signals which leave V1 enable the capacity to separate 
changes in colour from changes in brightness, identify hue, and combine 
information from both eyes (Solomon & Lennie, 2007).  Further processing 
occurs in the second visual area (V2), and then by cells located in sub-
compartments (known as ‘globs’) within the posterior inferior temporal (PIT) 
cortex (the brain region encompassing area V4 and areas immediately 
anterior to V4).  The processing of colour then happens within the inferior 
temporal (IT) cortex including cytoarchitectonic area TE (Conway, 2009).     
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4.2 Colour Perception and Emotions  
Various research suggests that a person’s feeling and emotions may 
alter their perception of colour (Barrick et al, 2002; Fetterman et al, 2011; 
Sherman et al, 2012).  For example, depression has been shown to impair 
colour perception in a study conducted by Barrick et al (2002).  The study 
consisted of a sample of 120 inpatients (patients in a state-supported mental 
health facility) and outpatients (patients who were under treatment by a 
psychiatrist in a private practice) with depression.  Colour sensitivity was 
assessed via questionnaire.  Findings demonstrate that colour sensitivity 
correlates with depression (Barrick et al, 2002).   
On the other hand, research shows that negative emotions may 
enhance colour discrimination for the colours associated to that particular 
emotion.  Specifically, priming for anger, as opposed to sadness, led 
participants to be more likely to perceive ambiguously coloured stimuli 
(degraded colours) as being the colour red (Fetterman et al, 2011).  
Furthermore, inducing anger within the participants, through noise blasts 
heard over headphones, also led them to be more likely to perceive the 
colour red as opposed to blue in ambiguous coloured stimuli (Fetterman et 
al, 2011).  In addition, the white equals purity association was tested by 
Sherman et al (2012) whom found that individuals that were able to make 
subtle greyscale discriminations, whereby they had to detect faint grey 
stimuli set against white backgrounds, were more sensitive to disgusting 
stimuli.  Moreover, individuals who were more sensitive to disgust, had 
enhanced ability in detecting variations from white after they had viewed 
disgusting images, suggesting that greater sensitivity to disgust enhances   
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the perception of impurities (Sherman et al, 2012).  Overall, such research 
implies that physiological alterations caused by mood may produce 
differences in colour sensitivity, suggesting that alterations in neurological 
function from changes in mood/emotion, may alter retinal or brain functioning 
as well as perception and interpretation of retinal input (Barrick et al, 2002).  
4.3 The Effects of Colour 
 The perceptual stimulus of colour is a ubiquitous human trait.  The 
purposes of colour are often considered in relation to aesthetics, however the 
effects of colour on human beings has been widely studied and it is evident 
that colour is imbued with meaning and can profoundly influence an 
individual’s affect, cognition, and behaviour (Elliot & Maier, 2014).  For 
example, Cheng et al (2009) show that customers feel more aroused and 
pleasant whilst shopping on an online store with warm colours.  Other 
research has shown warm coloured lighting enhances short-term memory 
and problem solving (Knez, 2001), and Labrecque & Milne (2012) show that 
purchase intent is effected by colour induced brand personality.  
Furthermore, various research into the psychology of colour has 
demonstrated that colour is related to an individual’s feelings and emotions in 
terms of associations (Clarke & Costall, 2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; Terwogt 
& Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954).  For example, research has found that 
the colour orange is associated with the positive mood of excitement and the 
negative moods of upset and distress (Wexner, 1954), and other research 
has shown that the colours which are linked with happiness and other 
positive emotions are white, yellow and orange (Clarke & Costall, 2008).  
According to Terwogt & Hoeksma (1995), yellow is associated with   
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happiness even though it is liked less than other colours such as blue, red, 
green, white and black.  In addition,  principal hue colours (red, yellow, 
green, blue, and purple) have been found to have more positive colour-
emotion associations compared to intermediate (yellow-red, green-yellow, 
blue-green, purple-blue, and red-purple), and achromatic (white, grey, and 
black) shades (Kaya & Epps, 2004).   
Moreover, it is thought that cool colours are calming and sedative, 
whereas warm colours elicit more dynamic feelings and emotions (Clarke & 
Costall, 2008).  Based on Goldstein’s (1942) notion which suggests that 
there are differences between warm colours (such as yellow, orange and 
red) and cool colours (such as purple, blue and green) in terms of 
psychology, physiology and performance, much research has tended to 
focus on comparing the two (Akers et al, 2012; Dijkstra et al, 2008; Hatta et 
al, 2002; Kuller et al, 2009; Mehta & Zhu, 2009; Meier et al, 2012; Stone & 
English, 1998; Stone, 2001; Stone, 2003; Yildirim et al, 2007), however this 
has generated mixed results (some of which will thus be discussed in the 
next paragraphs) making it unclear as to whether warm colours or cool 
colour enhance or reduce performance and arousal.  Therefore, it is evident 
that within different contexts and situations, colours can hold different 
meanings and associations, which consequently may have a different impact 
upon the individual’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours during a specific time 
and place (Elliot et al, 2007).   
 For instance, one study has found the colour green to be more 
beneficial to exercise than the colours red or grey (Akers et al, 2012).  
Specifically, a total of 14 participants completed five-minute cycling tasks of   
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moderate intensity whilst watching a video of a cycling course through 
natural scenery (shown in green, red or grey).  Both mood disturbance and 
ratings of perceived exertion were lower after watching the video in green 
compared to red or grey, and feelings of anger were higher after watching 
the video in red compared to green or grey (Akers et al, 2012).  Another 
study has shown that individuals walked faster to a dating interview when 
perceiving the colour red as opposed to blue, however walking speed 
decreased with the colour red when the participants were approaching an 
interview on intelligence (Meier et al, 2012).  Within the study, participants 
were told that there were several interviewers and were shown a picture of 
the person (of the opposite sex, rated as attractive in a pilot study) who 
would be interviewing them later.  The picture was of the head and shoulders 
of the interviewer, wearing either a red or blue t-shirt.  Following this, 
participants were taken to the doorway of the initial room and were told to 
walk down the hallway to the interview room (Meier et al, 2012).  Both 
studies suggest that the effects of the colours perceived are indeed context 
dependent.  Furthermore, age has been shown to affect colour emotion 
responses (Ou et al, 2012).  Specifically, all colours were rated as less liked, 
less active and cooler for older observers (aged over 60 with an average of 
64.8 years) compared to younger observers (ages ranging from 20-30 with 
an average of 24.5 years) within two experiment examining single colours 
and colour pairs (Ou et al, 2012).  Other research shows that humans use 
colour for evaluating food (Foroni et al, 2016), specifically showing that the 
more red brightness that is present in food images, the greater the arousal 
they elicit.  Indicating that humans are more motivated by food with more   
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reddish nuances, as arousal is a proxy for motivational value toward an 
object, particularly food (Foroni et al, 2016). 
 Other research demonstrates colour to have an impact on 
physiological reactions (Kuller et al, 2009; Tsunetsugu et al, 2005).  Kuller et 
al (2009) carried out three experiments, one involving a colourful room (the 
walls were covered with four different kinds of wallpapers with strong colours 
and patterns, mostly in red, yellow, and white) and a grey room, and the 
other two involving a red room and a blue room.  The participants’ mood and 
heart rate were measured whilst performing various tasks.  It was found that 
strong colours, including red, caused a slowing of heart rate.  This was more 
extreme in introverts and those who already reported being in a negative 
mood, and thus, had a greater effect on their level of performance which was 
measured through writing a story about what the room made them think 
about.  This was scored for number of words.  Performance was also 
measured by proof reading and correcting a lengthy text (Kuller et al, 2009).  
A limitation of this study is that it lacks ecological validity (Kuller et al, 2009).  
Another study examined two living-rooms with different designs, one ordinary 
designed room with plain white walls, and another room with visible brown 
posts and beams (Tsunetsugu et al, 2005).  A small sample was used 
consisting of 15 males.  Participants’ cerebral blood flow, pulse rate and 
blood pressure were measured during 90 seconds sat in the rooms.  The 
physiological measures revealed participants to be more calm and relaxed in 
the ordinary room, whereas they had a more active and aroused state in the 
second room.  Participants were then asked to evaluate the room using two 
13-point scales along the dimensions of comfortable-uncomfortable and   
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restful-restless.  However, no significant differences were found in their self-
reported evaluations of their emotional states (Tsunetsugu et al, 2005).  
Thus, the physiological effects of colour and room design are apparent 
whether or not this is known to the individual himself. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed some of the literature on colour perception 
and its effects.  When colour becomes visible to the human eye it is then 
process by the brain in the LGN, and areas V1, V2, and V4.  Research 
shows that a person’s feeling and emotions may alter their perception of 
colour (Barrick et al, 2002; Fetterman et al, 2011; Sherman et al, 2012).  
Moreover, colour is imbued with meaning and can profoundly influence an 
individual’s affect, cognition, and behaviour (Elliot & Maier, 2014).  Colour is 
also related to an individual’s feelings and emotions in terms of associations 
(Clarke & Costall, 2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; 
Wexner, 1954).  Both warm colours and cool colours have differing effects on 
individuals in terms of psychology, physiology and performance (Akers et al, 
2012; Dijkstra et al, 2008; Hatta et al, 2002; Kuller et al, 2009; Mehta & Zhu, 
2009; Meier et al, 2012; Stone & English, 1998; Stone, 2001; Stone, 2003; 
Yildirim et al, 2007).  However, this seems to be context dependent.  Now 
these areas have been reviewed, this thesis will go on to report the first 
experiment which investigated the effect of creativity on empathy.  The 
purpose of the experiment was to investigate the link between creativity and 
empathy, which has previously been poorly explored.  The study examines 
level of creativity in relation to level of empathy, for different types of 
creativity and different types of empathy.  The literature that has been   
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reviewed so far suggests that there are differences between experts and 
laypeople in the processing of aesthetic experiences (Bangert et al, 2006; 
Bhattacharyaa & Petscheb, 2002; Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005; Calvo-
Merino et al, 2005; Chamberlain et al, 2014; Kottlow et al, 2011; Leder et al, 
2014), and that the brain basis of an aesthetic experience may involve the 
mirror neuron system (Ticini et al, 2014), which is related to empathy 
(Gallese, 2001).  Thus, are those who are more creative also more 
empathetic?  
4.5 Chapter Highlights 
 The perception of colour occurs when the projection of light is 
transmitted through a substance, and hence a small portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (wavelengths of ~400–700 nanometres) 
becomes visible to the human eye in the form of colour. 
 A person’s feeling and emotions may alter their perception of colour. 
 Colour sensitivity correlates with depression. 
 Negative emotions may enhance colour discrimination for the colours 
associated to that particular emotion. 
 Colour is imbued with meaning and can profoundly influence an 
individual’s affect, cognition, and behaviour. 
 Colour is related to an individual’s feelings and emotions in terms of 
associations. 
 It is thought that cool colours are calming and sedative, whereas 
warm colours elicit more dynamic feelings and emotions.  
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 Within different contexts and situations, colours can hold different 
meanings and associations, which consequently may have a different 
impact upon the individual’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours during 
a specific time and place. 
 The physiological effects of colour and room design are apparent 
whether or not this is known to the individual himself. 
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Chapter 5: Creativity and Empathy 
This chapter is the subject of a manuscript in preparation entitled ‘The Creativity-Empathy 
Connection: How Level of Creativity Effects Level of Empathy’, by Kiou J.L. and Lesk V.E 
5.1 Introduction 
 Some of the previous introduction chapters have focused on areas 
which have specifically explored creativity (Chapter 3) and empathy (Chapter 
2), looking into how creativity can be defined and measured, and how 
empathy may be related to mirror neurons and embodiment.  This chapter 
will explore the link between creativity and empathy, investigating whether 
there is an effect of level of creativity on level of empathy within a sample of 
participants from the general population.  This is important since very little 
research has focused on an in-depth exploration of creativity and empathy in 
a sample of adult participants.  Therefore, the current study looks into 
different types of creativity in relation to different types of empathy in order to 
find out if (or how) they may be connected.  
Creativity, ‘the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, 
unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task 
constraints)’ (Sternberg, 1999:3), encompasses many areas of everyday life.  
As does empathy, which can generically be defined as ‘the capacity to 
understand and respond to the unique affective experiences of another 
person’ (Decety & Jackson, 2006: 54).  To date, research has not yet 
provided a thorough exploration into the link between creativity and empathy 
as only a few studies have investigated this (Carlozzi et al, 1995; 
Kalliopuska, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013).  Thus, the   
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current experiment aims to address this issue through examining different 
types of creativity in relation to the different types of empathy.  Both are 
complex and multifaceted phenomena.  For example, recent neuroscientific 
evidence indicates that empathy may comprise of two separate neural 
systems, one based on emotional processing (sensing the feelings of others) 
and the other based on cognitive processing (understanding the perspective 
of others) (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  Moreover, there is currently no evidence 
suggesting a distinct cerebral localization concerning creativity; that is, 
almost all brain regions are active during different creative tasks, with the 
activation of both hemispheres being roughly proportionate (Sawyer, 2011).  
Nevertheless, certain evidence regarding frontotemporal dementia (FTD), 
suggests that the frontal lobes and their inhibitory interactions concerning the 
temporal, occipital, and parietal lobes, may play an important role in 
creativity, while dysfunctional or lesioned frontal lobes (including conditions 
such as depression, anxiety and Wernicke’s aphasia) have been 
hypothesized to block creative drive (Jung & Haier, 2013).  Thus, with 
findings from brain imaging studies it is difficult to infer that the two (empathy 
and creativity) may be connected.    
 However, as the work produced by artists is often able to evoke 
feelings of empathy within its spectators, it is perhaps appropriate to assume 
that the artists themselves may be inclined to feel and understand empathy 
at a greater level than the average individual.  Especially if they are aspiring 
to portray it through their work, which is often the case, since it is deemed 
that ‘the value of art lies at least largely in the value of its expression of 
emotion’ (Neill, 2003:442).  Furthermore, although this specific area of   
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research is novel, a link between creativity and empathy has already been 
assumed, and based on Moreno’s theory of spontaneity-creativity (1955), it 
has been suggested that a deeper look into the relationship between 
creativity and empathy (in the form of role reversal) is required (Yaniv, 2011).   
Although the current study does not look into empathy in the form of 
role reversal, it does examine both emotional and cognitive empathy (taken 
together and separately).  Various behavioural assessment techniques are 
used to measure the different aspects of creativity, including creative 
cognition, creative behaviour, creative accomplishments, creative products, 
and creative traits (all from Kaufman et al. 2008).  This study has specifically 
chosen to focus on creative achievement, creative behaviours, and creative 
cognition (through a divergent thinking task).  Previous research has found 
that individuals who experience extreme and intense emotions regularly, 
tend to score higher in creative capacity (Ceci & Kumar, 2015).  Furthermore, 
affective engagement (referring to the extent to which an individual is open to 
the full breadth and depth of their emotions) was found to be a predictor of 
artistic creativity (Kaufman, 2013).  Hence, since individuals who engage in 
emotions more strongly and more often, are shown to be more artistic and 
creative, it is hypothesised that individuals who are more creative will show 
higher levels of empathy.   
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants   
A total of 39 individuals, including both males and females of the age 
of 18 and over, participated in the study.    
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5.2.2 Design 
A within-subjects design was utilised whereby all participants were 
exposed to the same conditions.  The data were analysed through a General 
Linear Model.  All measures were standardised.  
5.2.3 Materials       
5.2.3.1 Self-reports  
Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours (BICB; Batey, 2007; 
Appendix 1) 
  The BICB is a measure of the number of creative behaviours which 
the participant has conducted within the past 12 months.  This specific self-
report consists of 34 items of creative behaviours (e.g. Choreographed a 
dance, Composed a poem).  The participant was simply required to place a 
cross (X) next to the items which applied to them.  
Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al, 2005; 
Appendix 4) 
The CAQ is a measure of creative accomplishments within 10 
different domains: the Visual Arts (painting, sculpture), Music, Dance, 
Architectural Design, Creative Writing, Humour, Inventions, Scientific 
Discovery, Theatre and Film, and Culinary Arts.  Each of the 10 domains 
consists of eight items which carry differing (cumulative) weights.  
Participants were required to place a check mark next to the items which 
applied to them; and for the items that were marked with an asterisk, the   
74 
 
participants were asked write the number of times that these sentences 
applied to them, if at all. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; Appendix 5) 
 The IRI is a measure of both cognitive and affective/emotional 
empathy containing four subscales: perspective taking (cognitive), fantasy 
(cognitive), empathic concern (emotional/affective), and personal distress 
(emotional/affective).  This questionnaire also encompasses a five point 
Likert scale which ranges from ‘Does not describe me well’ to ‘Describes me 
very well’ (A, B, C, D, E).  There are a total of 28 statements and participants 
were required to indicate how well each of the statements describes them by 
choosing the appropriate letter and writing it next to the statement.  
Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 2009; Appendix 9) 
 The TEQ is a fairly recently developed questionnaire which was 
designed to measure empathy primarily as an emotional process.  It 
encompasses a five point Likert scale ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Always’ 
(Never = 0; Rarely = 1; Sometimes = 2; Often = 3; Always = 4) and a list of 
16 statements whereby participants write the most appropriate number as 
their answer next to each of the statements.  
5.2.3.2 Test of Cognition 
Alternate Uses Test, Form B Test Booklet (AUT; Guilford et al, 1960; 
Appendix 6) 
 The AUT is a measure of divergent thinking ability.  Participants 
completed form B test booklet which comprised of two parts.  Each part   
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contained three items consisting of a common object, and each object had a 
common use which was stated.  Participants needed to list as many as six 
other (alternative) uses for which the object, or parts of the object, could 
serve.  Four minutes was allowed per part.  
5.2.4 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in an experimental cubicle at the 
University of Bradford, Division of Psychology.  On arrival, participants 
provided informed consent.  Participants were then given the Alternate Uses 
Test, form B test booklet (Guilford et al, 1960; Appendix 6).  This consisted of 
two parts with a time limit of four minutes per part.  Following this were the 
empathy questionnaires: the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (Spreng et al, 
2009; Appendix 9) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983; 
Appendix 5).  Last to be completed were the creativity questionnaires: the 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire (Carson et al, 2005; Appendix 4) and 
the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours (Batey, 2007; Appendix 1) 
respectively.  More challenging tasks were presented to the participants first 
as they required more attention and concentration.  Ethical approval was 
granted from the Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Panel, University of Bradford. 
5.3 Results 
The intention of the present experiment was to investigate the link 
between creativity and empathy.  This was done specifically by examining 
the effect of level of creativity on level of empathy, and exploring the different   
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types of creativity and empathy that are related to one another.  See Table 1 
for the descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Creative 
Achievement  
Creative 
Achievement 
Questionnaire (CAQ; 
Carson et al, 2005) 
10.26 8.13 2-36 0->280 
Creative 
Behaviours 
Biographical 
Inventory of Creative 
Behaviours (BICB; 
Batey, 2007) 
6.77 3.86 1-17 0-34 
Divergent 
Thinking 
Alternate Uses Test, 
Form B Test Booklet 
(AUT; Guilford et al, 
1960) 
17.51 6.41 1-33 0-36 
Emotional & 
Cognitive 
Empathy 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; 
Davis, 1983) 
71.10 14.35 35-97 0-112 
Emotional 
Empathy 
Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire (TEQ; 
Spreng et al, 2009) 
47.79 7.60 30-61 0-64 
 
  
77 
 
Three separate univariate general linear models (GLM) were 
conducted with the dependent variable being the measure of emotional 
empathy (TEQ), and the measures of creativity (CAQ, BICB, AUT) being the 
covariate in each analysis.  The analyses revealed that there was no 
statistically significant difference in either emotional empathy (TEQ) based 
on creative achievement (CAQ) or divergent thinking (AUT) (N.S).  However, 
a significant difference was shown in emotional empathy (TEQ) based on 
creative behaviours (BICB), (F(1, 37) = 4.36, p < 0.05, hp2 = 0.11).  See 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
creative behaviours and emotional empathy  
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The total score of emotional & cognitive empathy (IRI) was submitted 
to a univariate ANOVA with creative achievement (CAQ) as a covariate.  The 
same was carried out with divergent thinking (AUT) as the covariate, and 
then again with creative behaviours (BICB) as the covariate.  No significant 
difference was found in the total score of emotional & cognitive empathy (IRI) 
based on creative achievement (CAQ) (N.S), divergent thinking (AUT) (N.S), 
or creative behaviours (BICB) (N.S).  Exploratory analysis was used to 
further analyse the subscales of the measure of emotional & cognitive 
empathy (IRI) (these included: perspective taking (cognitive), fantasy 
(cognitive), empathic concern (emotional), and personal distress (emotional).  
A multivariate analysis revealed significance with divergent thinking (AUT) as 
the covariate (F(4, 34) = 3.18, p < 0.05, hp2 = 0.27).  Significance was found 
in perspective taking (F(1, 37) = 4.17, p < 0.05, hp2 = 0.10) and personal 
distress (F(1, 37) = 8.55, p < 0.01, hp2 = 0.19).  A multivariate analysis also 
revealed significance with creative behaviours (BICB) as the covariate (F(4, 
34) = 2.92, p < 0.05, hp2 = ).  Significance was found in perspective taking 
(F(1, 37) = 11.05, p < 0.01, hp2 = 0.23) and empathic concern (F(1, 37) = 
4.88, p < 0.05, hp2 = 0.12).  See Figure 2 for scatterplots. 
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Figure 2: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationships between 
creativity measures and emotional & cognitive empathy measures  
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5.4 Discussion 
 The findings of the current experiment provide support for the 
assumption that there is a link between creativity and empathy, showing that 
empathy levels are dependent on an individual’s level of creativity: as level of 
creativity increases level of empathy also increases.  However, this finding is 
not apparent across all creativity and empathy measures within the study.  
Specifically, an individual’s level of creative achievement was not shown to 
have an effect on any of the measures of empathy.  Creative behaviours, on 
the other hand, was shown to have a significant positive effect on emotional 
empathy, perspective taking and empathic concern.  Furthermore, divergent 
thinking was shown to have a significant positive effect on perspective taking 
and personal distress.  While these findings are novel, they are in 
accordance with those of the few previous studies which have investigated 
the link between creativity and empathy (Carlozzi et al, 1995; Kalliopuska, 
1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013).  However, research into 
this is limited and an in-depth examination into the relationship had not been 
conducted prior to the present experiment.  Moreover, whereas the current 
study has focused on an adult population, the majority of these previous 
studies (mentioned above) have used a sample of children.  
 The only measure of creativity which did not yield any significant 
results in relation to empathy was creative achievement (CAQ; Carson et al, 
2005; Appendix 4).  Perhaps this is because the CAQ only considers 
observable and noteworthy accomplishments, thus aiming to capture Pro-c 
(expert level creativity) and Big-C creativity (creative genius) (Beghetto & 
Kaufman, 2007; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) which are less characteristic of   
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the general population.  It is anticipated that this measure may yield different 
results within an expert sample.  The present results suggest that the 
measure of creative behaviours (BICB; Batey, 2007; Appendix 1), which 
broadly resembles the CAQ in its behavioural approach (Silvia et al, 2012), 
yet mostly covers little-c creativity (everyday creativity), is a better tool for 
assessing level of creativity within the general population.  Furthermore, the 
test of divergent thinking (AUT; Guilford et al, 1960; Appendix 6), which is 
considered to be an estimate or potential predictor of creative problem 
solving and creative cognition/processing (Piffer, 2012; Runco, 2008), is also 
a measure little-c creativity. 
Findings from the current study provide a deeper insight into the link 
between creativity and empathy and are supportive of the previous research 
which has touched upon this.  For example, a recent study has investigated 
the implementation of a musical group interaction (MGI) programme in 
primary school children (Rabinowitch et al, 2013).  The programme, which 
involved the children performing various musical tasks in the form of pre-
arranged musical games, was run for one full school year.  Emotional 
empathy was measured before and after, revealing that MGI children 
showed higher emotional empathy scores after the study compared to its 
beginning, and higher scores than the control group of children at the end of 
the study (Rabinowitch et al, 2013).  Similarly, another study investigated a 
sample of junior ballet dancers (Kalliopuska, 1989).  Within this study 
participants were given four self-esteem questionnaires measuring creativity, 
empathy and other personality factors.  When compared to an age matched 
control group, the ballet dancers had more interest in other creativity based   
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behaviours, less interest in technology, and their empathy levels were 
significantly higher (Kalliopuska, 1989).  In addition, a further study 
conducted by Kalliopuska (1991) yielded similar results, specifically 
demonstrating that children who studied music obtained higher empathy 
scores than children who had not studied music.   
Other research has hinted at a connection between perspective taking 
and creativity (Grant & Berry, 2011; Hoever et al, 2012), but none have 
touched upon fantasy, emotional concern and personal distress in relation to 
creativity.  Thus, these particular findings are imperative in guiding a greater 
understanding into the creativity-empathy connection.  Here, a negative 
relationship was found in regards to personal distress and divergent thinking, 
indicating that not all aspects of empathy are positively related to the various 
types of creativity.  While divergent thinking was found to have a negative 
effect on personal distress, it was also found to have a positive effect on 
perspective taking, suggesting that the ability to creatively shift one’s 
thoughts in an alternative direction may be a crucial factor in understanding 
the other person’s point of view, as opposed to focusing on how oneself 
would feel in their situation - thus causing further distress.  According to 
Batson et al (1987), an individual’s response to the pain of others may be 
modulated by both cognitive and motivational processes, which may result in 
empathic concern, thus instigating altruistic motivation in order to help the 
other, or personal distress, which may cause egoistic motivation in order to 
reduce one’s own experience of personal distress (Batson et al, 1987).  A 
neuroimaging study conducted by Lamm et al (2007) has provided support of 
this, showing that when individuals imagine themselves in painful or   
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dangerous situations, a stronger fearful/aversive response is triggered 
compared to when they imagine another individual in the same situation.  
The brain regions which showed stronger activation in the self-perspective 
condition include the bilateral insular cortices, the anterior midcingulate 
cortex and the amygdala (all of which are involved in the coding of 
motivational-affective dimensions of pain), as well as certain structures 
involved in action control (Lamm et al, 2007).  
In conclusion, this study provides empirical evidence suggesting that 
there is a link between creativity and empathy.  It specifically indicates that 
individuals who are more creative have higher levels of empathy; that is for 
most types of empathy, personal distress being the exception.  This is 
apparent for both those who engage in a larger number of creative 
behaviours and for those who have superior creative cognition.  The 
importance of these findings is the implications regarding prosocial behaviour 
and the encouragement of creativity, whether it be in schools, the prison 
system (i.e. rehabilitation), and everyday life.  These findings could also be 
considered as a marker for guiding future neuroscientific experiments into 
the brain regions and neural mechanisms/processes involved in the specific 
types of creativity and empathy, as so far this remains ambiguous.  Future 
investigations should focus on the effect of creativity in relation to empathy 
within a sample of experts.  The next study follows on from this by looking at 
the effect of level of creativity on ToM ability (which is considered to be a 
form of cognitive empathy).    
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5.5 Chapter Highlights   
 Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel and 
appropriate. 
 Empathy is the capacity to understand and respond to the unique 
affective experiences of another person. 
 The current experiment examined different types of creativity in 
relation to the different types of empathy. 
 The aims of the current study were to examine whether there was an 
effect of level of creativity on level of empathy. 
 The sample consisted of 39 adult participants. 
 Measures included self-reports and tests of cognition. 
 Results revealed that individuals who are more creative (specifically 
those who engage in more creative behaviours and those who have 
superior creative cognition/divergent thinking) have higher levels of 
empathy (for most types of empathy). 
 The current findings provide some support for the hypothesis and 
previous research. 
 The study has implications for schools and prisons, as well as 
everyday life. 
 Future investigations should focus on the effect of creativity in relation 
to empathy within a sample of experts.    
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Chapter 6: Creativity and Theory of Mind 
6.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter (Chapter 5) has focused on the effects of level 
of creativity on level of empathy, for different types of creativity and different 
types of empathy, showing that there is a significant difference in empathy 
based on creativity, as level of creativity increases, level of empathy also 
increases (for various types of empathy and creativity).  Chapter 5 provides 
further insight into the connection between creativity and empathy, and this is 
important because no other research has done an in-depth exploration of the 
two before.  The current study extends that of Chapter 5 by focusing on the 
effect of level of creativity on ToM ability (as a form of cognitive empathy).  
This study looks into the same types of creativity as the previous chapter, in 
relation to two measures of ToM varying in difficulty.       
The study of creativity within the domain of psychology had been 
somewhat neglected, until over the past decade or so when it began to gain 
a considerable amount of attention (Simonton, 2012).  Despite this, there 
seems to be a gap in the literature investigating creativity in relation to 
empathy, and more so, theory of mind (ToM) as a form of empathy.  The 
current study intends to bridge that gap by examining whether level of 
creativity, within a sample of individuals from the general population, as an 
effect ToM ability.  Firstly, the previous research which has examined 
creativity in relation to empathy (in general) suggests that individuals who are 
creative, or those who engage in creative behaviours compared to those who 
do not, score significantly higher on empathy measures and are therefore   
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more empathetic than non-creative individuals (Carlozzi et al, 1995; 
Kalliopuska, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013).  Other 
research, focusing specifically on ToM, has provided evidence of a positive 
correlation between creative cognition and ToM (Suddendorf & Fletcher-
Flinn, 1997; Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999). 
 The definition of creativity is usually thought to involve two criteria 
(Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  These criteria have been termed in various ways, 
such as ‘novel’ and ‘appropriate’ or ‘original’ and ‘valuable’ etcetera 
(Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Sternberg, 1999).  Nevertheless, the meaning 
of such terms within this context remains the same, and thus, creativity has 
become known to represent an act (or thought) which is in some way unique, 
as well as being beneficial and fit for purpose.  Since this definition is rather 
generic the ways in which creativity is measured, from a psychological 
perspective, is also wide ranging.  For example, methods of assessment 
measure a number of different aspects of creativity such as creative 
cognition, creative behaviour, creative accomplishments, creative products, 
and creative traits (all from Kaufman et al. 2008).  
ToM, otherwise known as mentalizing, is the ability to understand the 
mental states (including beliefs, hopes desires and intentions) of other 
individuals, as well as being able to understand one’s own mental states, 
thus enabling the ability to predict future behaviour based on those mental 
states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  The two theories of ToM include: 
theory-theory, which assumes that ToM is gained by theoretical reasoning 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998) and is closely connected to cognitive ToM 
(Schaafsma et al, 2015), and simulation theory, which assumes that   
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individuals use their own mentality to imagine other’s mental states (Gallese 
& Goldman, 1998) and is closely connected to emotional ToM (Schaafsma et 
al, 2015).  Theory-theory posits that ToM occurs through learning and 
experience and simulation theory assumes ToM to be innate and intuitive 
(Völlm et al, 2006).  Brain regions which are thought to be involved in ToM 
include: the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and the temporal poles (TP) 
(Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  
Here creativity and ToM is examined by employing self-report 
measures and tests of cognition.  Specifically, two tests of cognition examine 
ToM (ToM Eyes; Appendix 7 and ToM Faces; Appendix 8), both differing in 
their level of difficulty, and a test of creative cognition is also used to 
measure divergent thinking.  Furthermore, self-reports have been utilised to 
measure two other aspects of creativity, namely, creative achievement and 
creative behaviours.  It is hypothesised that there will be a significant 
difference in ToM based on level of creativity as previous research shows a 
correlation between ToM and divergent thinking (Suddendorf & Fletcher-
Flinn, 1997; Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999). 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants  
The study included 39 male and female adult participants.  Exclusion 
criteria was no history of autism.   
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6.2.2 Design 
 The design was a within subjects design as each participant was 
subjected to the same conditions.  A general liner model was utilised to 
analyse the data, and all measure were standardised.   
6.2.3 Materials       
6.2.3.1 Self-reports  
Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours (BICB; Batey, 2007; 
Appendix 1) 
 See Chapter 5 for details. 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al, 2005; 
Appendix 4) 
 See Chapter 5 for details. 
6.2.3.2 Tests of Cognition 
Alternate Uses Test, Form B Test Booklet (AUT; Guilford et al, 1960; 
Appendix 6) 
 See Chapter 5 for details.  
Faces Test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8) 
 Social cognition is measured through the ToM Faces test which 
includes 20 images of the full face expressing both basic and complex 
mental states.  The participant was required to choose one out of two words 
under each image, which they believed was describing the emotion 
portrayed in each image of the face.       
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Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, Revised Version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 
2001; Appendix 7)   
 Social cognition is also measured through the ToM Eyes test.  This is 
similar to the ToM Faces test, yet more difficult.  The ToM Eyes test was 
devised in order to create a more sensitive measure of social intelligence 
within the adult population, which is able to detect meaningful individual 
differences, unlike the original which is only able to measure extreme 
performances.  This test contains 37 images of the eye region only, 
expressing different emotional states.  With each image there are four words 
describing various emotions and the participant was instructed to circle the 
word which they believed described the emotion expressed in each image of 
the eyes.  
6.2.4 Procedure 
Experimentation took place at the University of Bradford within an 
experimental cubicle.  Participants firstly provided informed consent, and 
were then given the Alternate Uses Test, form B test booklet (Guilford et al, 
1960; Appendix 6) to complete.  The booklet contained two parts; four 
minutes was permitted per part.  Participants then completed the two tests of 
ToM: the Eyes Test, revised version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; Appendix 7) 
and the Faces Test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8).  Next to be 
completed were the creativity questionnaires: the Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire (Carson et al, 2005; Appendix 4) and the Biographical 
Inventory of Creative Behaviours (Batey, 2007; Appendix 1).  The most 
challenging tasks were presented to the participants first as they required   
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more attention and concentration.  Ethical approval was granted from the 
Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel, 
University of Bradford.  
6.3 Results 
The intention of the present experiment was to investigate whether 
there is a link between creativity and ToM.  Specifically, by examining the 
effect of level of creativity (for different types of creativity) on level of ToM.   
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Creative 
Achievement  
Creative 
Achievement 
Questionnaire 
(CAQ; Carson et 
al, 2005) 
10.26 8.13 2-36 0->280 
Creative 
Behaviours 
Biographical 
Inventory of 
Creative 
Behaviours 
(BICB; Batey, 
2007) 
6.77 3.86 1-17 0-34 
Divergent 
Thinking 
Alternate Uses 
Test, Form B 
Test Booklet 
(AUT; Guilford et 
al, 1960) 
17.51 6.41 1-33 0-36 
ToM Eyes Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Test, Revised 
Version (Baron‐
Cohen et al, 
2001)   
26.67 4.21 17-34 0-37 
ToM Faces Faces Test 
(Baron‐Cohen et 
al, 1997) 
18.44 1.33 14-20 0-20 
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Figure 3: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
creativity measures and ToM measures 
 
Six separate univariate general linear models (GLM) were conducted 
to test the third hypothesis.  In each analysis, the measures of theory of mind 
were the dependent variable, and the measures of creativity were the 
covariate.  No significant difference was found in any theory of mind test 
based on creative achievement (N.S), and no statistically significant 
difference was found in ToM Eyes based on divergent thinking (N.S).  
However, a significant difference was found in ToM Faces based on 
divergent thinking scores (F(1, 37) = 5.77, p < 0.05).  Moreover, significant 
differences were found in ToM Eyes based on creative behaviours (F(1, 37)   
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= 4.68, p < 0.05) and ToM Faces based on creative behaviours (F(1, 37) = 
5.07, p < 0.05).     
6.4 Discussion 
The results of the present experiment reveal a significant difference in 
ToM Faces based on divergent thinking ability and creative behaviours. 
Significant differences were also found in ToM Eyes based on creative 
behaviours.  This shows that for these specific findings, as level of creativity 
increased ToM ability also increased.  However, no significant differences 
were found in ToM based on creative achievement, and no significant 
difference was found in ToM Eyes based on divergent thinking ability.  Thus, 
the hypothesis, that there will be a significant difference in ToM based on 
level of creativity, was partly supported.   
Perhaps the measure of creative achievement did not generate any 
significant results, in relation to ToM, because it was the only measure of 
Pro-c and Big-C creativity within the current study.  Both the measure of 
divergent thinking ability and the measure of creative behaviours, are 
characteristic of little-c creativity, which is more likely to be a better fit for 
measuring creativity within the general population.  Pro-c creativity refers to 
expert level creativity and Big-C creativity refers to creative genius, whereas 
little-c creativity is basically everyday creativity (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007; 
Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009).   
It seems ambiguous as to whether the current research fits well with 
previous research on the same subject, as this is greatly lacking.  For 
instance, merely two experiments have investigated creativity and ToM in   
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relation to one another, with the focus being on divergent thinking as a form 
of creativity, showing that the two are correlated (Suddendorf & Fletcher-
Flinn, 1997; Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999).  The first experiment 
included 40 children (23 girls and 17 boys with a mean age of 50 months) 
whom completed Wallach and Kogan’s (1965) creativity test and a false-
belief task (Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1997).  Findings show a 
relationship between creativity, specifically the amount and uniqueness of 
creative responses, and the attribution of false-beliefs (Suddendorf & 
Fletcher-Flinn, 1997).  
The second experiment used a longitudinal and cross-sectional 
method (Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999).  The experiment took two parts, 
the first involved a sample of 59 preschool children who completed a 
divergent thinking task, as well as three false-belief tasks.  Significantly more 
items (including original items) were produced by the children who passed 
the false-belief tasks compared to those who did not.  Three months later, 20 
children who fail the false-belief tasks within the first part of the experiment 
took part in the second part.  Again, findings revealed that divergent thinking 
was enhanced in the children who passed the false-belief tasks (Suddendorf 
& Fletcher-Flinn, 1999).   
Other research which has focused on creativity (in the form of creative 
behaviours) and empathy in general has demonstrated that creativity does 
have an effect on empathy.  In particular, it has been shown that those who 
either studying or learning to play/perform music, have higher empathy levels 
than those who have not studied music (Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et 
al, 2013).  Similarly, a group of ballet dancers have been shown to have   
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higher empathy levels than an age matched control group (Kalliopuska, 
1989).  The ballet dancers also had more interest in other creativity based 
behaviours and less interest in technology (Kalliopuska, 1989).  It should 
however, be noted that all the studies mentioned above have employed a 
sample of children as their participants.  The current study thus differs as it is 
the first, as far as we are aware, to utilise an adult sample of participants 
from the general population to examine the connection between creativity 
and ToM as a form of empathy. 
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates that there is an effect of 
creativity, specifically little-c creativity in the form of creative behaviours and 
divergent thinking, on ToM as a form of empathy.  The study implies that 
individuals who are more creative, have a higher ToM ability.  These findings 
do concur with the few previous studies investigating the same connection, 
however this is largely lacking and has merely focused on child samples.  
Therefore much more research into creativity and ToM, as well as creativity 
and empathy in general, is warranted.  The present study suggests that 
creativity should be encouraged due to its positive effect on social cognition.  
This is particularly important since social cognitive skills such as ToM and 
empathy guide everyday interactions and are imperative when it comes to 
co-operation and sociocultural learning.  Furthermore, deficits in such skills 
have been associated with various pathologies, including sociopathy, autism 
spectrum disorders, and nonverbal learning disorders (Goldstein & Winner, 
2012).  Future research should focus on gender differences and the effects 
of creativity within an expert sample.  The next chapter examines another 
naturally varying trait, colour perception, as a predictor of empathy.  
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6.5 Chapter Highlights 
 There seems to be a gap in the literature investigating creativity in 
relation to empathy, and more so, theory of mind (ToM) as a form of 
empathy. 
 However, some research has provided evidence of a link between 
creativity and empathy and evidence of a positive correlation between 
creative cognition and ToM. 
 ToM is the ability to understand the mental states of other individuals, 
and one’s own mental states, enabling the ability to predict future 
behaviour based on those mental states. 
 The aims of the current study were to examine whether there was an 
effect of level of creativity on ToM ability. 
 The sample consisted of 39 adult participants with of history of autism. 
 Measures included self-reports and tests of cognition. 
 Results revealed that there is an effect of creativity, specifically little-c 
creativity in the form of creative behaviours and divergent thinking, on 
ToM. 
 The current findings provide some support for the hypothesis. 
 Much more research into creativity and ToM, as well as creativity and 
empathy in general, is warranted. 
 Future research should focus on gender differences and the effects of 
creativity within an expert sample. 
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Chapter 7: Colour Perception and Empathy 
This chapter is the subject of a manuscript in preparation entitled ‘Colour Perception as a 
Predictor of Empathy and Theory of Mind’, by Kiou J.L. and Lesk V.E 
7.1 Introduction 
 Now that the effects of creativity on empathy (Chapter 5) and ToM 
(Chapter 6) have been examined, it is important to look into whether colour 
perception can predict empathy and ToM.  The previous chapter (Chapter 6) 
has focused on the effects of creativity on ToM, for different types of 
creativity and two measures of ToM varying in difficulty.  It was shown that 
there was a significant positive effect of creativity, specifically little-c creativity 
in the form of creative behaviours and divergent thinking, on ToM.  This 
finding is important since very little research has focused on the link between 
creativity and ToM.  This chapter focuses on colour perception as a predictor 
of empathy, a particularly important avenue of research as no other research 
has examined this before.   
Colour perception effects the way in which individuals understand and 
interact with their surroundings, as colour not only serves as an aesthetic, 
but also contributes to emotion, cognition and behaviour (Elliot, 2015).  
However, very little is known about the perceptual capabilities of colour 
discrimination/acuity in relation to empathy.  Nevertheless, the relationship 
between colour and emotion is clear as much research has focused on this, 
showing that there are many colour-emotions associations (Clarke & Costall, 
2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954), and 
that these may have developed through learning and culture (Choungourian,   
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1968; Saito, 1996) and/or may simply be a by-product of evolution (Crozier, 
1999; Mollon, 1989).   
Colour is often used (particularly by artists and designers, and in 
advertising) to express emotion and elicit an emotional response in others, or 
to create some kind of atmospheric ambiance (Da Pos & Green-Armytage, 
2007).  Hence, it is evident that colour can hold a number of different 
meanings which give the individual extra information about objects and 
situations (Elliot et al, 2007), and it is these meanings that may cause, 
influence, or have an impact upon the mood and emotions that are felt when 
a colour is perceived in a certain context (Dijkstra et al, 2008; Elliot & Niesta, 
2008; Kuller et al, 2009; Yildirim et al, 2007).  Furthermore, research 
suggests that not only does the perception of colour affect a person’s 
feelings, but a person’s feelings may also affect their perception of colour 
(Fetterman et al, 2011; Sherman et al, 2012; Ziems & Christman, 1998).  
Thus, with colour and emotion being so closely connected, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that colour perception may be related to empathy.   
Colour perception occurs when light is projected onto (or transmitted 
by) a substance and then detected by the human eye, allowing a small 
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum to be visible as colour (Fehrman & 
Fehrman, 2004).  The human brain decodes colour in the visual cortex, 
specifically requiring single-opponent and double-opponent processes in 
areas V1 and the V4/V8 colour complex (Shapley & Hawken, 2011) (See 
Chapter 4).  Empathy is the capacity to feel and understand the affective 
experiences of another by sensing their feelings (known as emotional 
empathy) and/or understanding their perspective (known as cognitive   
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empathy) (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) (See Chapter 2).  Many brain regions have 
been shown to be involved in empathy, and emotional empathy and cognitive 
empathy may comprise of two separate neural systems (Shamay-Tsoory, 
2011).  Despite this, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) based 
quantitative meta-analysis has identified that specific brain regions are 
consistently activated during empathy in general; these include the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex, anterior medial cingulate cortex, supplementary 
motor area (dACC-aMCC-SMA) and the bilateral anterior insula (Fan et al, 
2011).  However, distinct brain regions were found to be more frequently 
active during emotional empathy and different distinct brain regions active 
during cognitive empathy: specifically, the right anterior insula for emotional 
empathy and the dorsal aMCC for cognitive empathy (Fan et al, 2011).  
Moreover, the neurochemical mechanism involved in each type of empathy 
differs; oxytocin is more involved in emotional empathy, whereas dopamine 
is more involved in cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).   
The aim of the current research is to determine whether there is a 
relationship between colour perception (specifically level of colour 
discrimination ability, also referred to as colour acuity) and empathy.  The 
study firstly explores colour acuity as a predictor of emotional empathy, and 
also as a predictor of emotional & cognitive empathy in general.  The study 
secondly uses exploratory analysis to examine the four subgroups of the 
measure of emotional & cognitive empathy.  The subgroups are: (i) 
perspective taking (cognitive), (ii) fantasy (cognitive), (iii) empathetic concern 
(emotional), and (iv) personal distress (emotional).  Since there is a clear link 
between colour and emotion (Clarke & Costall, 2008; Dijkstra et al, 2008;   
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Elliot & Niesta, 2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; Kuller et al, 2009; Terwogt & 
Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954; Yildirim et al, 2007), it is hypothesised that 
colour perception will be a significant predictor of empathy.   
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants  
The sample consisted of 38 adult participants consisting of both males 
and females.  Exclusion criteria was no uncorrectable vision problems, 
including colour blindness.     
7.2.2 Design 
All participants underwent the same testing conditions, thus making a 
within-subjects design.  The data were analysed through a regression model.  
All measures were standardised.   
7.2.3 Materials       
7.2.3.1 Self-reports  
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; Appendix 5) 
 See Chapter 5 for details. 
Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 2009; Appendix 9) 
  See Chapter 5 for details. 
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7.2.3.2 Test of Colour Perception  
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; 
Appendix 3) 
 This method for testing colour perception examines minute differences 
in colour discrimination on a level which is able to separate individuals with 
normal colour vision into classes of superior, average and low colour 
discrimination, whilst also measuring the zones of colour confusion within 
individuals who exhibit colour defects.  A computer based version of the test 
was employed within the current experiment.  The test contains four distinct 
rows, each consisting of 22 colour blocks varying in hue.  The two end blocks 
of each row serve as an anchor and are immovable.  Each participant was 
required to adjust the blocks between the anchors (row by row) in order to 
place them in the correct colour hue order, which, if done correctly, would 
result in the perfect blend from one anchor to the other.  The colour hue rows 
range from i) orange/magenta hues, ii) yellow/green hues, iii) blue/purple and 
iv) purple/magenta hues, specifically in this order.  Participants were given 
two minutes to complete each row, before scoring the test to obtain their 
result. 
7.2.4 Procedure 
 The study took place at the University of Bradford within an 
experimental cubicle, where on arrival, participants gave informed consent.  
The first task participants completed was the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue 
Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; Appendix 3), followed by empathy 
measures: the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (Spreng et al, 2009;   
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Appendix 9) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983; Appendix 
5).  Once all the tasks were completed, participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions.  The tasks requiring the most attention and 
concentration were presented to the participants first, followed by the 
questionnaires as these require the least amount of attention and 
concentration.  Ethical approval was granted from the Chair of the 
Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel, University 
of Bradford.       
7.3 Results 
 The present study aimed to examine colour acuity as a predictor of 
empathy.  See Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Colour Perception Farnsworth-
Munsell 100 Hue 
Colour Vision 
Test 
(Farnsworth, 
1957) 
32.84 21.50 0-82 0->100 
Emotional & 
Cognitive 
Empathy 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index 
(IRI; Davis, 
1983) 
70.50 14.03 35-97 0-112 
Emotional 
Empathy 
Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire 
(TEQ; Spreng et 
al, 2009) 
47.50 7.58 30-61 0-64 
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Figure 1: Scatterplots depicting the significant relationships between 
(1) colour acuity and emotional empathy and (2) colour acuity and 
emotional & cognitive empathy.  A lower colour perception score 
indicates better/more acute colour perception.  It is clear from the two 
graphs that as colour perception becomes less acute, empathy scores 
decrease. 
 
Linear regression was conducted to determine whether colour acuity 
could be a significant predictor of empathy.  This was done for emotional 
empathy and also for emotional & cognitive empathy as a whole.  Hence, 
colour perception was entered into SPSS as the independent variable, with 
emotional empathy as the dependent variable for the first regression, and 
emotional & cognitive empathy as the dependent variable for the second 
regression.  The results of the first regression analysis revealed significance 
(R2 = 0.12, F(1,36) = 4.26, p < 0.05), whereby colour acuity significantly 
predicted emotional empathy (β = - 0.33, t = 2.06, p < 0.05).  The results of 
the second regression also revealed significance (R2 = 0.12, F(1,36) = 5.10, 
p < 0.05), whereby colour acuity significantly predicted emotional & cognitive 
empathy (β = - 0.35, t = 2.26, p < 0.05).  See Figure 1 for scatterplots 
depicting these results. 
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Figure 2: Scatterplots depicting the significant relationships between 
(1) colour acuity and perspective taking and (2) colour acuity and   
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fantasy (a lower colour perception score indicates better/more acute 
colour perception) 
 
To investigate the relationship in more detail, exploratory analysis was 
then used to analyse the subscales of the measure of emotional & cognitive 
empathy on the IRI.  The subscales are: (i) perspective taking (cognitive 
empathy), (ii) fantasy (cognitive empathy), (iii) empathic concern (emotional 
empathy), and (iv) personal distress (emotional empathy).  These subscales 
were entered into a multivariate general linear model as dependent variables 
and colour perception was entered as the covariate.  Neither of the emotional 
empathy subscales were found to be significant (N.S), however, significance 
was found for both of the cognitive empathy subscales; namely, perspective 
taking (F(1, 36) = 5.99, p < 0.05) and fantasy (F(1, 36) = 4.82, p < 0.05).  
See Figure 2. 
 
7.4 Discussion 
This is the first study to examine colour perception in relation to 
empathy.  The findings support the initial hypothesis in showing colour acuity 
to be a predictor of empathy.  This was found for emotional empathy and 
also for emotional & cognitive empathy taken as a whole.  Since the measure 
of emotional & cognitive empathy is comprised of four subscales (empathic 
concern and personal distress for emotional empathy, and perspective taking 
and fantasy for cognitive empathy), further exploratory analysis was 
undertaken.  This revealed a significant effect of colour acuity on each of the 
cognitive empathy subscales (those with more acute colour perception had   
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higher levels of cognitive empathy), but no significant effect of colour acuity 
on either of the emotional empathy subscales. 
The premise of the current study, investigating whether there is a link 
between colour perception and empathy, comes from the extensive and 
widely acknowledged relationship between colour and emotion (Clarke & 
Costall, 2008; Dijkstra et al, 2008; Elliot & Niesta, 2008; Kaya & Epps, 2004; 
Kuller et al, 2009; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954; Yildirim et al, 
2007).  The most similar research to that of the current study comes from 
research examining colour perception in relation to emotion, particularly 
focusing on the effect of emotion in influencing colour perception (Fetterman 
et al, 2011; Sherman et al, 2012; Ziems & Christman, 1998).  For example, it 
has been shown that priming concepts of anger (versus sadness) led 
participants to be more likely to perceive red (a colour commonly associated 
with anger) as opposed to blue in ambiguous colour stimuli, and the same 
was also found for ‘evoked’ anger (Fetterman et al, 2011).  Another study 
has focused on the emotion of disgust and the colour white (due to its 
association with purity) in a series of three experiments (Sherman et al, 
2012).  Within this study, participants who reported greater sensitivity 
towards disgusting stimuli demonstrated greater ability at making subtle 
grayscale discriminations.  Furthermore, disgust-sensitive individuals 
exhibited a heightened ability at detecting deviations from white after viewing 
disgusting images (Sherman et al, 2012).  Thus, such findings concur with 
the current research as they suggest that emotion and emotional sensitivity 
is related to colour and colour perceptual sensitivity.   
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 Interestingly, the current findings show colour acuity to be a significant 
predictor of emotional empathy, measured by the TEQ (Spreng et al, 2009; 
Appendix 9).  However, when the subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1983; 
Appendix 5) were analysed, colour acuity was not shown to have a 
significant effect on either of the two emotional empathy subscales 
(empathetic concern and personal distress), yet a significant effect was 
found for each of the cognitive empathy subscales (perspective taking and 
fantasy), and colour acuity was shown to be a significant predictor of the 
measure as a whole.  Both the TEQ and IRI have previously been shown to 
demonstrate good reliability and validity (Christopher et al, 1993; Davis & 
Franzoi, 1991; Spreng et al, 2009).  Thus, these findings add to the 
ambiguity concerning empathy and the extent to which emotional and 
cognitive empathy are distinct versus similar.     
 Dopamine may be a relevant factor to consider in relation to the 
current research findings, as dopamine levels are implicated in both colour 
perception and empathy.  In particular, much research suggests that 
impaired colour perception, specifically on the blue-yellow axis, is related to 
retinal dopaminergic deficiencies (Banaschewski et al, 2006; Colzato et al, 
2014; Hulka et al, 2013; Tannock et al., 2006).  One recent study conducted 
by Colzato et al (2014), has shown individual differences in colour 
discrimination (considered as a marker of dopamine functioning) to 
statistically predict differences in the strength and stability of cognitive control 
within a sample of healthy young adults.  Better colour discrimination led to 
more efficiency in resolving response conflict, and a blue-yellow colour vision 
impairment was associated with less efficiency in handling response conflict   
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(Colzato et al, 2014).  Research also suggests that cognitive empathy is 
associated with dopaminergic functioning (Lackner et al, 2010; Uzefovsky et 
al, 2014).  Hence, the link between dopamine and colour perception, and 
dopamine and cognitive empathy, may explain the findings of the exploratory 
analysis of the IRI subscales (showing colour acuity to have a significant 
effect on cognitive empathy but not emotional empathy).   
In conclusion, the present experiment is the first to provide evidence 
of an association between colour perception and empathy.  Specifically 
showing colour acuity to be a significant predictor of empathy.  As a result, 
more research is needed into investigating the relationship between colour 
perception and empathy in order to establish the extent to which colour 
acuity is an important factor in relation to the different types of empathy, and 
also whether this is dependent on the main colour confusion axis.  If the 
observed effect concerns the blue-yellow axis only, and is related to 
cognitive empathy, it may suggest that dopamine is involved.  This now 
needs to be examined with different groups of people to test the effects of 
age and gender.  This study also has implications for better understanding 
disorders such as autism, ADHD, schizophrenia, addictive behaviours and 
Parkinson’s disease, all of which have been linked to dopamine.  The next 
study extends this one by looking at colour perception in relation to ToM.  
7.5 Chapter Highlights 
 Very little is known about the perceptual capabilities of colour 
discrimination/acuity in relation to empathy.  
113 
 
 The relationship between colour and emotion is clear, as much 
research has focused on this, showing that there are many colour-
emotions associations. 
 Research suggests that a person’s feelings may also affect their 
perception of colour. 
 The aims of the current study were to examine whether colour 
perception is a predictor of empathy. 
 The sample consisted of 38 adult participants. 
 Measures included self-reports and a measure of colour perception. 
 Results revealed colour perception to be a predictor of emotional 
empathy and emotional & cognitive empathy taken as a whole. 
 The current findings provide support for the hypothesis. 
 Dopamine may be a relevant factor to consider in relation to the 
current research findings, as dopamine levels are implicated in both 
colour perception and empathy. 
 More research is needed into investigating the relationship between 
colour perception and empathy in order to establish the extent to 
which colour acuity is an important factor in relation to the different 
types of empathy, and also whether this is dependent on the main 
colour confusion axis. 
 This study has implications for better understanding disorders such as 
autism, ADHD, schizophrenia, addictive behaviours and Parkinson’s 
disease, all of which have been linked to dopamine. 
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Chapter 8: Colour Perception and Theory of Mind  
This chapter is the subject of a manuscript in preparation entitled ‘Colour Perception as a 
Predictor of Empathy and Theory of Mind’, by Kiou J.L. and Lesk V.E 
8.1 Introduction  
 The previous chapter (Chapter 7) has looked into colour perception as 
a predictor of empathy (for different types of empathy).  It was shown that 
colour perception is a predictor of emotional empathy and emotional & 
cognitive empathy taken as a whole.  However, exploratory analysis into the 
subscales of the emotional & cognitive empathy measure revealed a 
significant effect of colour acuity/perception on each of the cognitive empathy 
subscales (higher cognitive empathy levels was found for those with more 
acute colour perception), but no significant effect of colour acuity/perception 
on either of the emotional empathy subscales.  Thus, adding to the ambiguity 
concerning empathy and the extent to which emotional and cognitive 
empathy are distinct versus similar.  The current study extends that of 
Chapter 7 by focusing on colour perception as a predictor of ToM (a form of 
cognitive empathy).  This study utilises the same measures of colour 
perception and ToM as the previous chapters. 
Whether or not consciously recognised, the subtle stimulation of 
seeing colour affects our everyday lives (Jalil et al, 2012); and it is evident 
that the perception of colour has many useful applications to humans, 
influencing factors such as emotion, cognition and behaviour (Elliot, 2015).  
Various research has looked into the effects of emotion in influencing colour 
perception (Barrick et al, 2002; Fetterman et al, 2011; Sherman et al, 2012;   
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Ziems & Christman, 1998), however, the question remains as to whether or 
not there is a link between colour perception and theory of mind (ToM), both 
of which vary within the general population.      
For humans, only a small portion of the electromagnetic spectrum is 
visible to the eye; this is known as colour and is perceived when light is 
projected onto (or transmitted through) a substance (Fehrman & Fehrman, 
2004).  Colour processing is complex and involves a number of stages, 
beginning with cone photoreceptors absorbing light (Conway, 2009).  Retinal 
signals carry colour information which is transmitted through the lateral 
geniculate nucleus of the thalamus (LGN) and up to the primary visual cortex 
(V1) (Conway, 2009).  These signals are then processed by the second 
visual area (V2), followed by cells located in sub-compartments (labelled as 
‘globs’) within the posterior inferior temporal (PIT) cortex (the brain region 
encompassing area V4 and areas immediately anterior to V4).  Further 
colour processing occurs within the inferior temporal (IT) cortex including 
area TE (Conway, 2009).         
Theory of mind (ToM) can be defined as the ability to acknowledge 
the mental states of oneself and of others in order to predict behaviour based 
on those specific mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  This ability to 
imagine another person’s thoughts and feelings is considered to be a form of 
cognitive empathy, and is also commonly referred to as mentalizing 
(Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  The set of brain regions implicated in ToM include: 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and the temporal poles (TP) (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).  
116 
 
 There may be a connection between colour perception and ToM 
through the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA).  It is, however, difficult to 
directly assess DA function in humans, as this is only possible via positron 
emission tomography (PET), which is both expensive and invasive due to 
radioactive contamination and arterial blood sampling (Colzato et al, 2014).  
Thus, where some studies show a direct link to DA, others merely suggest 
that a link may exist.  Firstly, the link between DA and cognitive empathy has 
been demonstrated in a recent two-part study conducted by Uzefovsky et al 
(2014).  The studies examined the association between the dopamine D4 
receptor (DRD4) and empathy, whilst also investigating the effect of gender.  
Study 1 consisted of 477 adult participants who completed empathy 
inventories (for cognitive empathy and emotional empathy) and were 
genotyped for the DRD4 exon 3 polymorphism (Uzefovsky et al, 2014).  
DRD4 is a gene which encodes the D4 receptor of dopamine and has a 
number of variations known as polymorphisms (Ben-Israel et al, 2015).  The 
7-repeat allele (7R-allele), within the exon 3 polymorphism, is one of the 
most researched because of its relevance to individual differences in social 
behaviour (Ben-Israel et al, 2015).  Findings revealed that women scored 
higher on all empathy measures than men (Uzefovsky et al, 2014).  No main 
effect of genotype was observed, however, a significant interaction was 
found between genotype and gender for cognitive empathy (but not 
emotional empathy).  Specifically, women carriers of the 7R-allele scored 
higher than non-carriers, whereas men 7R-allele carriers scored lower than 
non-carriers.    
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Study 2 consisted of 121 participants from an independently recruited 
sample and findings replicate those of Study 1.  Overall, the findings show 
the DRD4 exon 3 polymorphism to be associated with cognitive empathy, 
and the direction of the association to be gender-sensitive (Uzefovsky et al, 
2014).  Another study examined a sample of 91 children aged between 48–
62 months and found average eye blinks per minute (EBR) to be a strong 
unique predictor of children’s representational theory of mind (RTM) 
performance, thus providing indirect support for DA as being an important 
neurodevelopmental factor which affects RTM development (Lackner et al, 
2010).  Secondly, various research suggests that DA is linked to colour 
perception, specifically indicating poor discrimination on the blue-yellow axis 
due to a hypo-dopaminergic state in the retina (Banaschewski et al, 2006; 
Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka et al, 2013; Tannock et al., 2006).   
 This research aims to determine whether colour perception is related 
to ToM (a form of cognitive empathy).  Colour perception is examined 
through measuring individuals’ level of colour discrimination ability (referred 
to here as ‘colour acuity’) via the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision 
Test (Farnsworth, 1957).  Two measures of ToM have been employed due to 
their varying level of complexity; ToM Eyes is a more complex measure than 
ToM Faces.  Colour perception is hypothesised to be a significant predictor 
of ToM as DA seems to be implicated in both, and there is also a well-
documented link between colour and emotion. 
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8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Participants  
The participants consisted of 38 individuals, both male and female.  
All participants were 18 and over.  Exclusion criteria included no history of 
autism and no uncorrectable vision problems, including colour blindness.    
8.2.2 Design 
A within subjects design was used where each participant 
experienced the same testing conditions.  The data were analysed through a 
regression model, and all measures were standardised. 
8.2.3 Materials   
8.2.3.1 Tests of Cognition      
Faces Test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8) 
 See Chapter 6 for details. 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, Revised Version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 
2001; Appendix 7)  
 See Chapter 6 for details. 
8.2.3.2 Test of Colour Perception 
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; 
Appendix 3) 
 See Chapter 7 for details. 
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8.2.4 Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted at the University of Bradford within an 
experimental cubicle.  Participants provided informed consent before 
completing the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 
1957; Appendix 3).  They then completed the two ToM tests: the Eyes Test, 
revised version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; Appendix 7) and the Faces Test 
(Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8).  More challenging tasks were 
presented to the participants first.  Ethical approval was granted from the 
Chair of the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel, 
University of Bradford.  
8.3 Results 
The present study aimed to examine colour acuity as a predictor of 
ToM.  See Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Colour 
Perception 
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 
Hue Colour Vision Test 
(Farnsworth, 1957) 
32.84 21.50 0-82 0->100 
ToM Faces Faces Test (Baron‐Cohen 
et al, 1997) 
18.57 1.24 14-20 0-20 
ToM Eyes Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test, Revised Version 
(Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001)   
26.67 4.28 17-34 0-37 
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Linear regression was conducted to determine whether colour acuity 
is a significant predictor of ToM.  This was done for ToM Faces and for ToM 
Eyes.  Colour perception was entered into SPSS as the independent 
variable, with ToM Faces as the dependent variable for the first regression, 
and ToM Eyes as the dependent variable for the second regression.  The 
results of the first regression analysis revealed non-significance (N.S).  The 
results of the second regression did reveal significance (R2 = 0.15, F(1,36) = 
6.34, p < 0.05), indicating that colour acuity significantly predicted ToM Eyes 
(β = - 0.39, t = 2.52, p < 0.05).  See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
colour perception and ToM Eyes (a lower colour perception score 
indicates better/more acute colour perception)  
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8.4 Discussion 
 The results of the present experiment show colour acuity to be a 
significant predictor of ToM for the Eyes Test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; 
Appendix 7), but not the Faces test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8), 
thus providing some support for the hypothesis that colour perception will be 
a significant predictor of ToM.  As expected, although the Faces Test did not 
reach significance, both measures did demonstrate a positive relationship to 
colour acuity, indicating that better colour perception is related to better ToM 
ability within the general population.  Perhaps significance was obtained for 
the Eyes Test, but not the Faces Test, because the Eyes Test was devised 
in order to generate a more sensitive measure of adult social intelligence that 
can detect meaningful individual differences, whereas the original (Faces 
Test) was merely designed as a measure of extreme performances (Baron‐
Cohen et al, 2001). 
 So far, research seems to suggest that emotion influences colour 
perception, with the focus being on negative emotions.  For example, some 
research suggests that depression impairs colour perception/sensitivity 
(Barrick et al, 2002), whereas other research implies that certain negative 
emotions enhance colour discrimination for the colours associated to that 
particular emotion (i.e. red for anger; white/grey for disgust) (Fetterman et al, 
2011; Sherman et al, 2012).  The current study differs, and thus, is novel in 
the sense that it demonstrates that an individual’s level of colour perception 
(in the form of colour discrimination) is positively related to, and can predict, 
their social and emotional cognition (in the form of ToM).   
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 Other than a well-documented link between colour and emotion (as 
delineated above), another conceivable connection which could explain the 
current findings, is the mutual implication of the neurotransmitter DA in (i) 
colour perception (Banaschewski et al, 2006; Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka et al, 
2013; Tannock et al., 2006) and (ii) cognitive empathy (Lackner et al, 2010; 
Uzefovsky et al, 2014).  The research findings relating DA to colour 
perception suggest that the link specifically pertains to the blue-yellow colour 
axis, and is due to dopaminergic deficiencies in the retina.  However, this is 
beyond the scope of the current study as this experiment centred on the full 
spectrum and did not discriminate between certain colour axes.  For this 
reason, further research into different colour axes in relation to ToM (and 
empathy in general) is warranted.  
The current findings are also in line with autism research.  It is 
apparent that autistic individuals have an impaired ToM, and thus, exhibit 
difficulty in understanding the complex mental states of others’ goals and 
intentions (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 
1992).  Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated that individuals with 
autism perform less well (than controls) in colour discrimination tasks, and 
thus display impaired colour perception (Cranwell et al, 2015; Franklin et al, 
2008; Franklin et al, 2010; Hurlbert et al, 2011).  Hence, such research 
clearly suggests that a link between colour perception and ToM does exist, 
specifically indicating that they are both positively related, and that 
performance in colour perception can significantly predict performance in 
ToM (as demonstrated in the present experiment).  
123 
 
The present experiment is the first to show an association between 
colour perception and ToM.  A positive relationship between the two has 
been demonstrated, and moreover, colour acuity was found to be a 
significant predictor of ToM in the Eyes Test, but not the Faces Test.  Further 
research into this would be beneficial in assessing whether the same can be 
found in other measures of ToM and various other measures of cognitive 
empathy in general.  Furthermore, research could take a deeper look into 
this relationship by distinguishing between the different colour axes, and 
whether or not DA is an important factor in explaining the observed results.  
Obtaining a greater understanding of the relationship between colour 
perception and social cognition may contribute to further understanding of 
the neural mechanisms involved in various social cognitive deficits such as 
those found in autism.  The next study follows on from this by examining 
sensory processing sensitivity (an embodied trait) in relation to empathy, 
ToM and colour perception. 
8.5 Chapter Highlights  
 Various research has looked into the effects of emotion in influencing 
colour perception. 
 The question remains as to whether or not there is a link between 
colour perception and ToM. 
 There may be a connection between colour perception and ToM 
through the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA).   
 The aims of the current study were to examine whether colour 
perception is a predictor of ToM.  
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 The sample consisted of 38 adult participants with no history of autism 
and no uncorrectable vision problems, including colour blindness. 
 Measures included tests of cognition and a measure of colour 
perception. 
 Results revealed colour perception to be a predictor of ToM Eyes, but 
not ToM Faces, thus providing some support for the hypothesis. 
 The current findings are also in line with autism research as autistic 
individuals have an impaired ToM and perform less well (than 
controls) in colour discrimination tasks, and thus display impaired 
colour perception. 
 The present experiment is the first to show an association between 
colour perception and ToM, therefore further research is warranted. 
 Obtaining a greater understanding of the relationship between colour 
perception and social cognition may contribute to further 
understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in various social 
cognitive deficits such as those found in autism. 
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Chapter 9: Sensory Processing Sensitivity, 
Empathy, Theory of Mind, and Colour perception 
This chapter is the subject of a manuscript in preparation entitled ‘The Link between Sensory 
Processing Sensitivity, Empathy, Theory of Mind, and Colour Perception’, by Kiou J.L. and 
Lesk V.E 
9.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter (Chapter 8) focused on colour perception as a 
predictor of ToM.  It was found that colour perception was a significant 
predictor of ToM Eyes, but not ToM Faces, thus providing some support for 
the hypothesis.  It was the first experiment to show an association between 
colour perception and ToM, therefore much more research into this is 
needed.  The current study looks into sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) in 
relation to empathy, ToM and colour perception.  SPS is related to 
embodiment as it is concerned with sensing, and is important to study in 
relation to empathy/ToM and colour perception as little research has focused 
on this.  Furthermore, it is important to discover some of the positive aspects 
related to SPS, which may benefit those who are highly sensitive individuals, 
as much of the research tends to focus on its negative aspects.    
 Sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) refers to the extent to which an 
individual is sensitive, or responsive, to their surroundings, including both 
environmental (weather, smells, noises) and social (crowded spaces, conflict 
amongst others, others’ moods) stimuli (Acevedo et al, 2014).  Individuals 
high in SPS, measured by the Highly Sensitive Persons Scale (HSPS) (Aron 
& Aron, 1997; Appendix 10), are able to detect subtle differences within the   
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environment, such as changes in temperature, as they process and respond 
to lower thresholds of information (Liss et al, 2005).  According to Aron and 
Aron (1997), the highly sensitive person (HSP) has a more sensitive nervous 
system (where the nerves are overly reactive), and is thus, more easily 
overwhelmed when exposed to highly stimulating environments.  This 
condition occurs in approximately 15-20 percent of the population (Aron, 
1999).  The HSPS comprises of three subscales of forms of sensitivity, these 
are: (i) Ease of Excitation, (ii) Aesthetic Sensitivity, and (iii) Low Sensory 
Threshold (Smolewska et al, 2006).  A high score in ease of excitation is 
related to being mentally overwhelmed by both internal (pain, hunger, taste) 
and external (light, noise) stimuli.  Individuals who score high in aesthetic 
sensitivity have greater awareness and appreciation of beauty, and those 
who score high in low sensory threshold are more likely to feel unpleasantly 
aroused by external stimuli such as bright lights and loud noises (Smolewska 
et al, 2006).  Given the previous results of experiments within this thesis, for 
example, showing colour perception to be a predictor of empathy (Chapter 7) 
and ToM (Chapter 8), it now seems important to investigate this in relation to 
SPS in order to determine whether being sensitive in general (or whether 
certain types of sensitivities) affects social cognition, and if so, whether 
colour perception affects SPS, as there is a lack of research into this. 
The HSPS (Appendix 10) is a valid and reliable measure of the 
construct of SPS (Smolewska et al, 2006).  It is important to look into the 
positive aspects of SPS as the current research does, since much research 
has tended to focus on its negative aspects, including stress and ill health 
(Benham, 2006), anxiety (Liss et al, 2005; Neal et al, 2002), depression (Liss   
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et al, 2005), social phobia (Neal et al, 2002), avoidant personality disorder 
(Meyer & Carver, 2000), and social introversion and emotionality (Aron & 
Aron, 1997).  Furthermore, while high SPS itself is not a disorder, sensory 
processing disorder (where individuals may be over-responsive or under-
responsive to sensory input/stimulation) has been linked to autism, as those 
with autism have been shown to have abnormal auditory, visual, touch, and 
oral sensory processing compared to controls (Kern et al, 2006).  However, 
research into the HSPS subscales has shown aesthetic sensitivity to be 
related to more positive and beneficial outcomes such as well-being, positive 
affect and openness to experience (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), as well as 
conscientiousness (Ahadi & Basharpoor, 2010), greater attention to detail 
and good communication (Liss et al, 2008). 
Empathy refers to the ability to sense the feelings of others (emotional 
empathy) and the ability to understand the perspective of others (cognitive 
empathy) (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  Theory of mind (ToM) is a form of 
cognitive empathy which refers to the ability to acknowledge mental states of 
the self and of others in order to predict behaviour based on those specific 
mental states, including beliefs, hopes, desires and intentions (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978), as introduced in Chapter 2.  Colour perception (also 
referred to here as colour acuity), which occurs when light is transmitted 
through a substance becoming visible to the human eye, has already be 
found to be a predictor of empathy and ToM (Chapters 7 and 8).  This is the 
first experiment to be investigating colour perception in relation to SPS.   
Although research into SPS and empathy is sparse, one particular 
study conducted by Acevedo et al (2014) has found a link between the two.    
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The fMRI study investigated SPS in relation to the perception of other 
people’s emotions.  During the first part of the experiment, 18 participants 
viewed photos of either their romantic partners or of strangers displaying 
positive (happy) or negative (sad) facial expressions.  The experiment was 
replicated a year later with 13 of the 18 participants with an added neutral 
facial expression condition.  Brain activations were found in regions 
concerned with awareness, integration of sensory information, empathy 
(including a region of the mirror neuron system – the inferior frontal gyrus), 
and action planning in individuals scoring higher in SPS.  Furthermore, 
stronger activations were found in response to the images of individuals 
displaying positive emotions, and for the images of the participants’ romantic 
partners.  The findings suggest that highly sensitive individuals have greater 
awareness and are more in tune with environmental stimuli as they show 
stronger activations within brain areas concerned with awareness and 
integration of sensory information, and are more receptive to other people’s 
needs and emotions due to the enhanced activation in empathy brain 
regions.  Moreover, this is enhanced for positive emotions and for individuals 
whom the participants care for (Acevedo et al, 2014).  Furthermore, other 
research suggests that individuals high in SPS exhibit greater emotional 
responses to both positive and negative images (Jagiellowicz et al, 2016). 
The current research firstly aims to examine whether there is an effect 
of SPS on level of empathy (including emotional and cognitive empathy: IRI 
– Appendix 5, and emotional empathy: TEQ – Appendix 9) and ToM.  
Exploratory analysis also examines the subscales of the emotional and 
cognitive empathy measure, which include: (i) perspective taking (cognitive),   
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(ii) fantasy (cognitive), (iii) empathetic concern (emotional), and (iv) personal 
distress (emotional).  Secondly, the research aims to examine whether there 
is an effect of colour acuity on SPS as this has been found to be a predictor 
of empathy and ToM in previous experiments (Chapters 7 and 8), and 
exploratory analysis examines the subscales of the HSPS (including ease of 
excitation, aesthetic sensitivity, and low sensory threshold).  As individuals 
high in SPS have been shown to have greater emotional and empathetic 
responses to both positive and negative stimuli (Acevedo et al, 2014; 
Jagiellowicz, 2016), it is hypothesised that those high in SPS will score 
significantly higher on empathy and ToM measures, especially since both 
SPS and empathy are characterized by feeling and responding more greatly 
to external stimuli.  Moreover, since SPS is characterised by greater 
responsiveness to environmental stimuli (Liss et al, 2005), it is also 
hypothesised that individuals with more acute colour perception will score 
higher in SPS. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Participants  
 The sample consisted of 42 adult participants ranging from 18 years 
of age to 70 years of age, with a mean age of 30.12.  A total of 14 males and 
28 females took part.  Exclusion criteria was no history of autism and 
uncorrectable vision problems, including colour blindness.   
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9.2.2 Design 
The design was a within-subjects design as each participant 
underwent the same conditions.  All measures were standardised and the 
data was analysed through a general linear model and a regression model. 
9.2.3 Materials      
9.2.3.1 Self-reports  
Highly Sensitive Person Scale (HSPS; Aron & Aron, 1997; Appendix 10) 
 The HSPS is a measure of SPS.  It utilises a seven point Likert scale 
ranging from ‘Not at All’ to ‘Extremely’, with ‘Moderately’ in the middle, and 
consists of 27 statements.  The participant must write, next to each 
statement, the number which describes the extent to which the statement 
applies to them.  The measure contains three subscales: Ease of Excitation 
(the extent to which someone is mentally overwhelmed by both internal 
(pain, hunger, taste) and external (light, noise) stimuli), Aesthetic Sensitivity 
(an individual’s level of awareness and appreciation of beauty), and Low 
Sensory Threshold (the extent to which someone feels unpleasantly aroused 
by external stimuli such as bright lights and loud noises). 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; Appendix 5) 
 See Chapter 5 for details. 
Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 2009; Appendix 9) 
  See Chapter 5 for details. 
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9.2.3.2 Tests of Cognition and Perception  
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; 
Appendix 3) 
 See Chapter 7 for details. 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, Revised Version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 
2001; Appendix 7)   
  See Chapter 6 for details. 
9.2.4 Procedure 
 The experiment was an anonymous online study.  Firstly, participants 
provided informed consent and then completed the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 
Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; Appendix 3).  This was followed 
by the Highly Sensitive Person Scale (HSPS; Aron & Aron, 1997; Appendix 
10) and the ToM Eyes Test, revised version (Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; 
Appendix 7).  The participants then filled in the empathy questionnaires, 
which included the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 
2009; Appendix 9) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; 
Appendix 5) respectively.  More challenging tasks were presented first.  
Ethical approval was granted from the Chair of the Humanities, Social and 
Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel, University of Bradford.   
9.3 Results 
 The aim of the present experiment was to investigate SPS in relation 
to empathy and ToM.  This was achieved through examining the effect of 
SPS on level of empathy and ToM.  The present experiment also aimed to   
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examine the effect of colour perception on SPS.  Colour acuity and ToM was 
also examines to find out whether Experiment 4 (Chapter 8) results could be 
replicated.  See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics and Figure 1 for graphs 
displaying the significant relationships between SPS and emotional and 
cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and ToM.    
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Colour 
Perception  
Farnsworth-Munsell 
100 Hue Colour 
Vision Test 
(Farnsworth, 1957) 
25.86 35.17 0-150 0->100 
Emotional & 
Cognitive 
Empathy 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; 
Davis, 1983) 
71.33 14.40 27-100 0-112 
Emotional 
Empathy 
Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire (TEQ; 
Spreng et al, 2009) 
46.90 
 
8.64 22-60 0-64 
Sensory 
Processing 
Sensitivity 
(SPS)  
Highly Sensitive 
Person Scale (HSPS; 
Aron & Aron, 1997).   
113.17 23.37 60-153 27-189 
ToM Eyes Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test, 
Revised Version 
(Baron‐Cohen et al, 
2001)   
28.24 3.30 21-35 0-37 
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Figure 1: Scatterplots depicting the significant relationships between 
SPS and (a) emotional and cognitive empathy, (b) emotional empathy, 
and (c) ToM 
 
 A multivariate general linear model (GLM) was conducted with the 
dependent variables being the measures of emotional and cognitive empathy 
(IRI), emotional empathy (TEQ), and score on ToM Eyes.  The covariate was 
the measure of SPS (HSPS).  The analysis revealed significance (F(3, 38) = 
10.60, p < 0.001), showing a main effect of SPS on the empathy and ToM 
measures.  Significance was found in emotional and cognitive empathy 
(F(1,40) = 29.93, p < 0.001), emotional empathy (F(1,40) = 6.64, p < 0.05), 
and ToM (F(1,40) = 4.92, p < 0.05).  Figure 2 demonstrates the significant 
effect of SPS on the IRI subscales. 
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Figure 2: Scatterplots depicting the significant relationships between 
SPS and emotional and cognitive empathy measures 
 
 Exploratory analysis was used to further analyse the subscales of the 
measure of emotional & cognitive empathy (IRI) (these included: perspective 
taking (cognitive), fantasy (cognitive), empathic concern (emotional), and 
personal distress (emotional).  A multivariate analysis revealed significance 
with SPS (HSPS) as the covariate (F(4, 37) = 9.05, p < 0.001).  Significance 
was found in perspective taking (F(1, 40) = 8.95, p < 0.005), empathic 
concern (F(1, 40) = 12.45, p < 0.001), and personal distress (F(1, 40) = 
17.90, p < 0.001).  Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the significant effect of 
colour perception on SPS and the HSPS subscales. 
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Figure 3: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
colour perception and SPS (HSPS) 
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Figure 4: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
colour perception and HSPS subscales 
 
The data on colour perception was found not to be normally 
distributed, Shapiro-Wilkes was < 0.05, therefore a Wilcoxon test was 
conducted with the dependent variable being SPS (HSPS) and the 
independent variable being colour perception.  This revealed a significant 
difference in SPS based on colour perception (Z = -5.50, p < 0.001).  The 
median score for SPS was 115.50, and the median for colour perception was 
13.00.  Exploratory analysis was conducted into the subscales of the HSPS 
(these are: ease of excitation, aesthetic sensitivity, and low sensory 
threshold).  A multicollinearity analysis was run and this revealed that the 
three subscales to do not show multicollinearity, thus independence was 
assumed and three separate Wilcoxon tests were conducted.  A Bonferroni 
correction of 0.017 was applied.  The analyses revealed significance 
differences in excitation (Z = -4.20, p < 0.001) and in aesthetic sensitivity (Z = 
-2.42, p < 0.017) based on colour perception.  The median score for 
excitation was 62.50 and the median score for aesthetic sensitivity was 
34.00.  However, no significant difference was found in low sensory 
threshold (Z = -0.61, p > 0.017).  
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Figure 5: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
colour perception and ToM Eyes 
 Linear regression was conducted to determine whether colour acuity 
is a significant predictor of ToM Eyes.  Colour perception was entered into 
SPSS as the independent variable, with ToM Eyes as the dependent 
variable.  The results revealed significance and are in accordance with those 
found in Experiment 4, Chapter 8 (R2 = 0.12, F(1,40) = 5.38, p < 0.05), 
indicating that colour acuity significantly predicted ToM Eyes (β = - 0.34, t = 
2.32, p < 0.05). 
In summary, the results show a significant effect of SPS (HSPS) on 
emotional and cognitive empathy (IRI), emotional empathy (TEQ), and ToM 
Eyes scores, hence those who scored high in SPS also score high in these 
measures.  Looking into the subscales of the emotional and cognitive   
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measure (IRI) revealed a significant effect of SPS on perspective taking, 
empathic concern and personal distress, but not fantasy, suggesting that 
those who score high in SPS score higher in perspective taking, empathic 
concern and personal distress.  The results on colour perception show a 
significant difference in SPS based on colour acuity, indicating that those 
with better colour perception score higher in SPS.  Looking into the 
subscales of the HSPS revealed that colour acuity had a significant effect on 
excitation and aesthetic sensitivity, but not the low sensory threshold 
subscale, which shows that those with better colour perception score higher 
in excitation and aesthetic sensitivity.  Colour acuity was found to be a 
significant predictor of ToM Eyes, replicating the results of Experiment 4 
(Chapter 8), highlighting the strength and robust nature of this finding. 
9.4 Discussion 
 The findings of the current experiment provide support for the 
hypothesis that individuals high in SPS will score significantly higher on 
measures of empathy and ToM.  Specifically, the current findings show that 
there is an effect of SPS on emotional and cognitive empathy, emotional 
empathy, and ToM, showing that individuals high in SPS also score higher 
on the empathy and ToM measures.  Furthermore, the exploratory analysis 
of the emotional and cognitive empathy subscales (perspective taking 
(cognitive), fantasy (cognitive), empathic concern (emotional), and personal 
distress (emotional)) revealed a significant difference in all subscales, except 
fantasy, based on SPS, indicating that those high in SPS score higher in 
these empathy subscales.  The current findings do support the second 
hypothesis that individuals with more acute colour perception will score   
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higher in SPS.  Furthermore, exploratory analysis of the subscales of the 
HSPS (ease of excitation, aesthetic sensitivity, and low sensory threshold; 
Appendix 10) does reveal a significant difference in excitation and aesthetic 
sensitivity based on colour acuity (those scoring high in colour perception 
also scored high in these subscales), but no significant difference in the low 
sensory threshold subscale was found.  Moreover, colour acuity was found to 
be a significant predictor of ToM Eyes, replicating the results of Experiment 4 
(Chapter 8), highlighting the strength and robust nature of this finding.  
 The current behavioural findings, showing that individuals high in SPS 
score significantly higher on empathy and ToM measures, are consistent 
with the previous findings of an fMRI study which has shown scores on the 
HSPS (Appendix 10) to be associated with brain regions involved in empathy 
(including a region of the mirror neuron system – the inferior frontal gyrus) 
(Acevedo et al, 2014).  Both emotional empathy and cognitive empathy are 
shown to be linked to mirror neurons and embodiment (Gazzola et al, 2006; 
Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Pfeifer et al, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009).  
Another study also provides support of the current findings (Jagiellowicz et 
al, 2016).  The study examined the association between emotional 
responses to images (positive, negative and neutral) from the International 
Affective Picture System and SPS measured via the HSPS in a sample of 96 
participants.  Those high in SPS rated emotional pictures as being more 
valenced, especially positive images, than those low in SPS.  They also 
responded faster to the positive images.  Moreover, high compared to low 
SPS individuals who reported having high-quality parenting, reported greater 
arousal in response to the positive images (Jagiellowicz et al, 2016).  These   
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studies therefore show that those high in SPS have stronger emotional 
reactions to images than those low in SPS.  Within the exploratory analysis 
of the emotional & cognitive measure (IRI; Appendix 5), all subscales, except 
the fantasy subscale, revealed a significant effect of SPS within the current 
study, indicating that those who scored high in SPS scored high in the 
empathy subscales apart from fantasy.  Perhaps this is because the fantasy 
subscale may be a better assessment of imagination as opposed to the 
theoretically driven notions of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Spreng et al, 2009) which is worthy of further study. 
 In relation to the findings on colour perception and SPS, there was a 
significant difference in SPS based on colour acuity, in which those with 
higher colour acuity scored higher on the measure of SPS.  This is not 
surprising since previous results from experiments of this thesis 
(Experiments 3 and 4: Chapters 7 and 8) has shown colour acuity to be a 
significant predictor of empathy and ToM Eyes, and SPS in the present study 
has been shown to affect both of these.  Both Experiments 3 and 4 utilised 
the same measure of colour perception and measures of empathy and ToM 
as the current study.  Moreover, in the current experiment, investigation into 
the subscales of the HSPS (Appendix 10) has revealed excitation and 
aesthetic sensitivity to be significantly increased for individuals who have 
better colour perception.  Previous research (Ahadi & Basharpoor, 2010; Liss 
et al, 2008; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) into the subscales of the HSPS have 
shown aesthetic sensitivity to be related to more positive and beneficial 
outcomes than the ease of excitation and low sensory threshold subscales, 
and having a more acute colour perception is presumably a beneficial and   
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desirable attribute.  In particular, aesthetic sensitivity has been shown to be 
associated with positive affect and openness to experience in a sample of 
200 psychology student who completed online questionnaires measuring 
demographics, sensitivity, personality and well-being (Sobocko & Zelenski, 
2015).  Conscientiousness was also associated with aesthetic sensitivity in a 
sample of 180 participants who completed questionnaires on sensitivity, 
personality and mental health (Ahadi & Basharpoor, 2010).  Moreover, 
greater attention to detail and good communication was related to aesthetic 
sensitivity in a sample of 201 college students measured for sensitivity, 
anxiety, depression, alexithymia, and autism symptoms (Liss et al, 2008).  
Studies into genotyping show SPS to be associated with the serotonin (Licht 
et al, 2011) and dopamine (Chen et al, 2011) systems, showing SPS to be 
involved in social cognition.  Specifically, high scores on the HSPS were 
associated with the short(s), low-expressing variant of the repeat length 
polymorphism 5-HTTLPR (serotonin transporter, 5-HTT, Linked Polymorphic 
Region) (Licht et al, 2011), and Chen et al (2011) looked at all the genes (98) 
with polymorphisms that affect the dopamine system in relation to SPS and 
found a set of 10 loci on seven genes that predicted 15% of the variance of 
HSPS scores.  Interestingly, dopamine is also involved in cognitive empathy 
(Lackner et al, 2010; Uzefovsky et al, 2014), and in colour perception 
(Banaschewski et al, 2006; Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka et al, 2013; Tannock et 
al., 2006), and linking these together is an important next avenue of 
research. 
In conclusion, the present study has shown that SPS has a significant 
effect on level of empathy and ToM; specifically that highly sensitive   
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individuals have higher empathy levels.  This was shown for emotional and 
cognitive empathy taken as a whole, emotional empathy, ToM, perspective 
taking, empathic concern, and personal distress.  These findings suggest 
that SPS does have important implications for social cognition and may be 
beneficial in various contexts, as contrary to much previous research (Aron & 
Aron, 1997; Benham, 2006; Liss et al, 2005; Meyer & Carver, 2000; Neal et 
al, 2002), the current study shows SPS have beneficial outcomes such as 
enhanced social cognition, specifically increased empathy and ToM.  
Furthermore, importantly and in keeping with the aims of the thesis regarding 
colour perception, the current experiment revealed a significant effect of 
colour acuity on SPS, and the subscales excitation and aesthetic sensitivity, 
but not low sensory threshold.  This suggests that certain perceptual abilities 
may affect various types of sensitivities, and this should be studied further.  
For example, future studies should investigate other forms of perception, for 
example, visual perception and taste perception in relation to SPS.  Also, the 
results of the current study should be replicated using physiological 
measurements.  To conclude, the important results of the study of this 
Chapter has strong implications for clinical disorders such as autism, and 
may explain why autism is linked to sensory processing disorder (Kern et al, 
2006).  The results of Experiment 4 (Chapter 8) were also replicated, 
showing colour acuity to be a significant predictor of ToM for the Eyes Test.  
The next study focuses on the effects of age on aspects already studied 
within this thesis, namely, colour perception and empathy, as well as looking 
into the effect of age in relation to preference for paintings.  
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9.5 Chapter Highlights 
 SPS refers to the extent to which an individual is sensitive, or 
responsive, to their surroundings, including both environmental 
(weather, smells, noises) and social (crowded spaces, conflict among 
others, others’ moods) stimuli. 
 SPS is measured by the HSPS. 
 The HSPS comprises of three subscales, these are: (i) Ease of 
Excitation, (ii) Aesthetic Sensitivity, and (iii) Low Sensory Threshold. 
 Much research has tended to focus on its negative aspects of SPS. 
 Of all the subscales of the HSPS, aesthetic sensitivity is related to 
more positive and beneficial outcomes. 
 Acevedo et al (2014) has found a link between SPS and empathy. 
 The aims of the current study were to examine whether there was an 
effect of SPS on level of empathy, and to examine whether there was 
an effect of colour acuity on SPS. 
 The sample consisted of 42 adult participants.   
 Measures included self-reports and tests of cognition and perception. 
 Results revealed that those who scored highly in SPS scored high on 
measures of empathy and ToM, and those with better colour 
perception scored higher in SPS. 
 Colour acuity was also found to be a predictor of ToM Eyes, 
replicating the results of Experiment 4 (Chapter 8). 
 The current findings provide support for the hypotheses and previous 
research.  
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 The study should be replicated using physiological measures, and 
other types of perception (taste, smell) could also be examined. 
 The study has implications for clinical disorders such as autism. 
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Chapter 10: The Effects of Age on Colour 
Perception, Empathy and Preference for Paintings 
10.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter (Chapter 9) has focused on sensory processing 
sensitivity (SPS), empathy/ToM and colour perception, showing that those 
who scored highly in SPS scored high on measures of empathy and ToM, 
and those with better colour perception scored higher in SPS.  These are 
important findings as they show how SPS is linked to positive traits and is not 
merely related to negative ones such as stress, anxiety and depression, to 
name some examples.  This therefore, bridges a gap in the literature and 
brings a greater understanding of SPS in general.  The present study looks 
into the effects of age in relation to colour perception, empathy and 
preference for paintings.  This is particularly important because many things 
(including cognition) change with age, and is important to rule out age as an 
extraneous variable within the current thesis.    
 There seems to be a symmetry to human physical life, as individuals 
whom are young and middle aged are independent and robust, whereas 
those in infancy and old age are frail and dependent.  Thus, cognition 
appears to follow the pattern of building up and wearing down (Craik & 
Bialystok, 2006).  The effects of age are apparent throughout the lifespan.  
The current study looks into the effects of age in relation to colour 
perception, empathy, and preference for paintings.  A number of visual 
functions change with age, such as light sensitivity, susceptibility to glare,   
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colour perception, static and dynamic acuity, peripheral, vision and depth 
perception (Ishihara et al, 2001).  Studies have shown that performance on 
the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Test (Appendix 3) varies as a U-shape 
function of age, with children having higher total error scores than adults in 
their 20s, and performance for older adults deteriorating with age (Kinnear & 
Sahraie, 2002; Roy et al, 1991; Verriest et al, 1982).   
 Empathy allows the individual to feel and understand the affective 
experiences of another by sensing their feelings (emotional empathy) and/or 
understanding their perspective (cognitive empathy) (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  
In relation to age, there seems to be mixed results regarding the previous 
research, suggesting age-related gains (Sze et al, 2012), longitudinal stability 
(Grühn et al, 2008), and cohort decline (Grühn et al, 2008; Phillips et al, 
2002; Ruffman et al, 2008; Schieman & Van Gundy, 2000) in empathy and 
emotional recognition.  Age differences in empathy have also been found to 
be context dependent (Wieck & Kunzmann, 2015), as have age differences 
in emotion recognition (Richter et al, 2011).  For example, Wieck and 
Kunzmann (2015) found that there were age related deficits in empathy only 
when the task was of little relevance to the older adults, and Richter et al 
(2011) found that when younger and older women watched film clips 
featuring happiness, sadness, or anger, with or without sound, age-related 
deficits were only found for the films without sound.  One particular study has 
found evidence for an inverse-U-shaped pattern across age, where middle-
aged adults reported higher empathy than both young adults and older adults 
(O’Brien et al, 2013).    
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 There does not seem to be much research into the effect of age on 
preference for paintings, especially focusing on portraits compared to 
landscapes.  However, one particular study has looked into artistic 
preferences and individual differences (including the big ﬁve personality 
traits: extraversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism, agreeableness and 
openness to experience, and sex and age) in a sample of 91,692 participants 
(60% women and 40% men), aged 13–90 years (Chamorro‐Premuzic et al, 
2009).  It was found that the personality trait openness to experience was the 
strongest correlate of artistic preferences for overall preferences (all 
paintings) and specific preferences (specific art movements including: 
abstract, cubism, Northern renaissance, Japanese ukiyo-e woodblock prints, 
impressionism, secular Islamic art).  However, overall preferences were also 
positively inﬂuenced by age and visits to art galleries, as well as artistic self-
perception and conscientiousness (negatively) to a lesser degree.  For 
specific preferences, higher preference levels for impressionism were found 
for those who reported being more agreeable, more conscientious and less 
open.  Those who were younger and more extraverted showed higher levels 
of preference for cubism (as did males), and younger participants and males 
reported higher levels of preferences for renaissance (Chamorro‐Premuzic et 
al, 2009).  Another similar study examining 121 participants found age to be 
significantly positively correlated with positive ratings of representational art 
(Furnham & Walker, 2001).  
 The current study aims to determine whether there is an effect of age 
on colour perception (colour acuity), empathy (for emotional empathy and for 
emotional and cognitive empathy taken as a whole), and preferences for   
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paintings (specifically, do people prefer portraits or landscapes?  Which is 
particularly important since empathy relates to social interaction, which can 
be related to portrait liking/disliking).  Freedberg and Gallese (2007) propose 
a theory comprised of two notions: the first concerning empathy felt through 
the content and subject matter of art, and the second concerning empathy 
felt through the way in which the artist creatively uses their materials to 
convey a representation.  No interesting effects were found in relation to 
empathy and genre (history paintings, portraiture, genre paintings, 
landscape, still life, abstract) of paintings, thus the effects of age were 
studied.  The study comprises of self-report measures and a test of 
perception.  Exploratory analysis is used to examine the four subgroups of 
the measure of emotional and cognitive empathy.  These include: (i) 
perspective taking (cognitive), (ii) fantasy (cognitive), (iii) empathetic concern 
(emotional), and (iv) personal distress (emotional).  It is hypothesised that 
there will be an effect of age on colour perception, with performance 
deteriorating as age increases, as suggested by previous research (Kinnear 
& Sahraie, 2002; Roy et al, 1991; Verriest et al, 1982).  Although empathy 
and age research has provided mixed results, the majority does seem to 
suggest that while there may be no differences longitudinally, there are 
declines in empathy and emotion recognition with age in cohort designs 
(Grühn et al, 2008; Phillips et al, 2002; Ruffman et al, 2008; Schieman & Van 
Gundy, 2000), therefore, the second hypothesis is that there will be a 
significant difference in empathy scores based on age, with younger 
participants being more empathetic than older ones.  Lastly, and most 
importantly due to its novelty, it is also hypothesised that there will be effect   
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of age on preference for portraits compared to landscapes.  Whilst there is 
currently no research to suggest that this will be the case, this is predicted 
because empathy levels may increase or decrease with age, and if so, those 
who are more empathetic may prefer to look at images of people more than 
landscapes.  However, the opposite could also occur, as more empathetic 
people may feel more relaxed looking at the landscapes, and therefore prefer 
them to the portraits.      
10.2 Method 
10.2.1 Participants  
A total of 42 individuals, from two separate data sets (including the 
data from Chapter 9), including 6 males and 36 females with an age range of 
18 to 62 (mean = 25.83), participated in the study. Exclusion criteria was no 
uncorrectable vision problems, including colour blindness.  
10.2.2 Design 
A within subjects design was utilised whereby all participants were 
exposed to the same conditions.  The data was analysed through a general 
linear model.  All measures were standardised.  
10.2.3 Materials       
10.2.3.1 Self-reports 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983; Appendix 5) 
See Chapter 5 for details. 
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Participant Demographic Details 
Participants were asked their age, gender and handedness. 
Responses to Paintings 
This consisted of 42 Likert scales ranging from one to six, one being ‘I 
do not like it at all’ and six being ‘I like it very much’.   
Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et al, 2009; Appendix 9) 
See Chapter 5 for details. 
10.2.3.2 Test of Colour Perception 
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; 
Appendix 3) 
See Chapter 7 for details. 
10.2.3.3 Images  
Paintings (Appendix 12) 
The images of paintings consisted of 42 pictures, 21 portraits and 21 
landscapes, each was shown on a separate slide.  The height of each picture 
was made to fit the height of the slide.  The height and width of each picture 
remained proportionate to the original painting.  Paintings were chosen from 
seven different impressionist artists (Berthe Morisot, Camille Pissarro, 
Claude Monet, Edouard Manet, Hilaire-Germain-Edgar Degas, Paul 
Cézanne, Pierre-Auguste Renoir) to reduce an effect of style/artist/art 
movement.  Six pictures were shown form each artist (three portraits and 3   
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landscapes).  The images of paintings were mixed up and shown in random 
order to reduce order effects. 
10.2.4 Procedure 
 The study took place at the University of Bradford within an 
experimental cubicle.  On arrival participants firstly gave informed consent.  
They then filled out some demographic details and completed was the 
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Colour Vision Test (Farnsworth, 1957; 
Appendix 3), followed by the measure of emotional and cognitive empathy, 
specifically, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983; Appendix 5).  
Next, the participants looked at images of paintings (Appendix 12) and 
completed six-point Likert scales rating the extent to which they liked each 
image, one being ‘I do not like it at all’ and six being ‘I like it very much’.  
Once all the tasks were completed, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions.  Tasks requiring the most attention and concentration were 
presented first.  Ethical approval was granted from the Chair of the 
Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel, University 
of Bradford.        
10.3 Results 
 The present study aimed to examine whether there was an effect of 
age on colour perception, empathy and preference for portraits.  See Table 1 
for descriptive statistics. 
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Age  Participant 
Demographic 
Details 
 
28.00 12.05 18-70 18+ 
Colour Perception Farnsworth-
Munsell 100 Hue 
Colour Vision Test 
(Farnsworth, 
1957) 
25.85 35.17 0-150 0->100 
Emotional & 
Cognitive Empathy 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index 
(IRI; Davis, 1983) 
71.33 14.40 27-100 0-112 
Emotional Empathy Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire 
(TEQ; Spreng et 
al, 2009) 
46.90 
 
8.64 22-60 0-64 
Preference for 
Portraits 
Responses to 
Paintings 
 
47.50 7.58 -77-40 -252-504 
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Figure 1: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationships between 
colour acuity and age.  A lower colour perception score indicates 
better/more acute colour perception.  It is clear from the two graphs 
that as colour perception becomes less acute, age increases. 
 
The data on colour perception and age was found not to be normally 
distributed, Shapiro-Wilk was < 0.05.  Therefore, a Wilcoxon test was 
conducted to with the dependent variable being colour perception and the 
independent variable being age.  This revealed a significant difference in 
colour perception based on age (Z = -2.20, p < 0.05).  The median score for 
colour perception was 13.00, and the median for age was 22.50.   
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Figure 2: Scatterplots depicting the significant relationships between (i) 
emotional empathy and age and (ii) emotional and cognitive empathy 
and age  
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 The data on emotional and cognitive empathy and age was found not 
to be normally distributed, Shapiro-Wilk was < 0.05.  Therefore, two separate 
Wilcoxon tests were conducted to with the dependent variables being 
emotional empathy and emotional and cognitive empathy and the 
independent variable being age.  This revealed a significant difference in 
emotional empathy based on age (Z = -3.99, p < 0.001), and a significant 
difference in emotional and cognitive empathy based on age (Z = -5.17, p < 
0.001).  The median score for emotional empathy was 48.00, the median 
score for emotional and cognitive empathy was 72.50, and the median for 
age was 22.50.  
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Figure 3: Scatterplots depicting the significant relationships between 
age and emotional and cognitive empathy measures 
 
Exploratory analysis was used to further analyse the subscales of the 
measure of emotional & cognitive empathy (IRI) (these included: perspective 
taking (cognitive), fantasy (cognitive), empathic concern (emotional), and 
personal distress (emotional).  Four separate Wilcoxon tests were conducted 
to with the dependent variables being IRI subscales and the independent 
variable being age.  A Bonferroni correction of 0.0125 was applied.  
Significant differences were found in all subscales based on age, specifically, 
perspective taking (Z = -3.95, p < 0.001), fantasy (Z = -3.02, p < 0.01), 
empathic concern (Z = -2.64, p < 0.01), and personal distress (Z = -5.32, p <   
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0.001).  The medians were 22.50 for age, 18.50 for perspective taking, 20.50 
for fantasy, 20,50 for empathic concern, and 12.00 for personal distress. 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatterplot depicting the significant relationship between 
preference for portraits and age 
 
The data on age was found not to be normally distributed, Shapiro-
Wilk was < 0.05.  Therefore, a Wilcoxon test was conducted to with the 
dependent variable being preference for portraits and the independent 
variable being age.  This revealed a significant difference in preference for 
portraits based on age (Z = -5.52, p < 0.001).  The median score for 
preference for portraits was -16.50, and the median for age was 20.50.    
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10.4 Discussion  
 The findings of the current study do support the hypotheses in 
showing age to have an effect on colour perception, empathy and preference 
for paintings.  Specifically, age was shown to effect colour perception 
suggesting that as age increases, colour acuity decreases, thus younger 
adults are shown to have better colour perception than older adults.  
Similarly, age was shown to have an effect on empathy, indicating that as 
age increases, empathy levels decrease.  This was found for emotional 
empathy & emotional and cognitive as a whole.  Exploratory analysis of the 
subscales of emotional & cognitive empathy measure (IRI; Appendix 5) also 
revealed the same pattern, showing that perspective taking (cognitive), 
fantasy (cognitive), empathic concern (emotional), and personal distress 
(emotional) all decrease as age increases.  Lastly, age was shown to have 
an effect on preference for paintings, indicating that preference for portraits 
over landscapes increases as age increases. 
 The current findings on age and colour perception are in accordance 
with previous research which also suggests that colour perception 
deteriorates with age (Kinnear & Sahraie, 2002; Roy et al, 1991; Verriest et 
al, 1982).  For example, Roy et al (1991) tested 115 normal North American 
subjects aged 5–81 years.  Participants were measured on the Farnsworth-
Munsell 100-Hue test and the Lanthony Desaturated Panel D-15 test, and it 
was found that colour discrimination was best between the ages of 20 and 50 
years.  Increasing age was associated with an increase in total error scores 
on the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue test (Roy et al, 1991).  Both Kinnear and 
Sahraie (2002) and Verriest et al (1982) show that performance on the   
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Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue test (Appendix 3) varies as a U-shape function 
of age.  Verriest et al (1982) examined 232 normal participants between 10 
and 80 years of age.  Participants underwent both binocular and monocular 
testing.  Performance was found to be worse during monocular testing and 
for those who had no previous experience with the task.  Children and the 
elderly were also found to perform less well on the colour vision task 
(Verriest et al, 1982).  Kinnear and Sahraie (2002) measured colour vision in 
an equal number of male and female participants aged from five–79 years of 
age.  Participants completed the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue test (Appendix 
3) and it was found that younger children make more misplacement errors 
and therefore have higher total error scores than individuals in their 20s.  The 
performance of older adults was also found to deteriorate with age (Kinnear 
& Sahraie, 2002).   
 The current findings on empathy indicated that all types of empathy 
(emotional empathy and emotional and cognitive empathy, as well as the 
subscales: perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal 
distress) decrease as age increases.  This finding is in line with much of the 
cohort literature which suggests that there is an age related decline in 
empathy and emotional recognition (Grühn et al, 2008; Phillips et al, 2002; 
Ruffman et al, 2008; Schieman & Van Gundy, 2000).  However, although 
Grühn et al (2008) show cohort decline in empathy based on age, their 
findings also show that longitudinally (spanning 12 years) there seems to be 
no age related decline in empathy, thus suggesting a cohort rather than an 
age effect.  Since the current study was not longitudinal, it is questionable as 
to whether or not the same would have been found.  Contrary to the current   
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finding, other research has found age related gains in empathy (Sze et al, 
2012).  The study examined 70 older participants (60-80 years), 72 middle 
aged participants (40-50 years), and 71 young participants (20-30 years).  
Participants watched two films of individuals in need, one uplifting film and 
one distressing film.  Physiological measures (cardiac and electrodermal 
measures) were taken during the films, and self-reported levels of emotional 
empathy were taken after each film.  Prosocial behaviour was also measured 
by giving the participants a payment which they could contribute to charities 
supporting the individuals in the films.  Age related increases were found for 
emotional empathy (self-reported empathic concern and cardiac and 
electrodermal responding) and prosocial behaviour (size of contribution) for 
both films, as well as for self-reported personal distress to the distressing film 
(Sze et al, 2012).  In addition, a very large online study consisting of 75,263 
participants, has found support of an inverse-U-shaped pattern across age 
(O’Brien et al, 2013). Ages ranged between 18 and 90.  The study involved 
participants completing the IRI subscales of perspective taking and empathic 
concern.  Middle-aged adults reported higher empathy than both young 
adults and older adults (O’Brien et al, 2013).   
Furthermore, the relationship between age and empathy becomes 
more complicated due to the effect of context, as studies on both empathy 
and emotion recognition suggest that age differences in empathy are context 
dependent (Richter et al, 2011; Wieck & Kunzmann, 2015).  Specifically, 
Wieck and Kunzmann (2015) found that age deficits in empathy were only 
apparent when the task was of little relevance to the older adults, there were 
no negative age differences if the task was highly relevant to the older   
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participants.  The study investigated empathic accuracy (the ability to 
perceive another’s emotions accurately), emotional congruence (the capacity 
to share another’s emotions), and sympathy within a sample of 101 younger 
women (mean age 24) and 101 older women (mean age 69).  They viewed 
six film clips of a younger and older woman reliving and thinking aloud about 
an autobiographical memory, the emotional quality consisted of anger, 
sadness, and happiness (Wieck & Kunzmann, 2015).  Similarly, Richter et al 
(2011) examined the effect of context information on emotion recognition 
within a sample of 48 younger women (mean age 23) and 35 older women 
(mean age 70) who viewed 48 film clips depicting a female target who talked 
about an emotional biographical episode and expressed one of three 
emotions (happiness, sadness, or anger).  Half the film were shown without 
sound (context-poor condition) and half were shown with sound (context-rich 
condition).  Younger women were better at recognizing sadness and anger 
compared to older women, independent of the condition.  The condition did, 
however, have an effect on age differences in happiness recognition as age-
related deficits were only found in the context-poor condition.  Thus, 
suggesting that age differences in emotion recognition are dependent on the 
context and the emotion (Richter et al, 2011).  One of the main shortcomings 
of both of the above studies is that they employed only female participants. 
Although different types of paintings activate different areas in the 
brain, for example, portraits active the fusiform gyrus, landscapes activate 
the parahippocampus, and still lifes active the lateral occipital cortex 
(Chatterjee, 2011), there seems to be little research into the preferences for 
these different types of paintings.  The current research has looked into the   
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effect of age in preferences for portraits compared to landscapes, in 
particular, showing that preferences for portraits increases with age.  Other 
research looking at age and art preferences has shown that age has an 
effect on preferences for paintings in general, and also that younger 
participants show higher preferences for cubism and renaissance art 
(Chamorro‐Premuzic et al, 2009).  Another study specifically looking at age 
has shown a positive correlation between age and ratings of representational 
art (Furnham & Walker, 2001).  Other research which has not looked at age, 
but has examined portraits compared to landscapes, has found differences 
between the two in terms of colour (Polzella et al, 2005).  Specifically, 60 
students rated 20 paintings of landscapes and portraits of both traditional 
and modern style. Half the participants viewed the paintings in colour, while 
the other half viewed them in black and white.  Removing the colour from the 
portraits had a positive effect, showing increased pleasantness and beauty, 
and reduced tension.  However, removing colour from the landscapes 
reduced their perceived beauty, suggesting that colour in landscapes 
provided more information such as depth, whereas colour in portraits may be 
superfluous and distracting (Polzella et al, 2005).   
  In conclusion, the current study has provided evidence of the effect 
of age on three factors: colour perception, empathy, and preference for 
portraits.  Specifically showing that colour perception deteriorates with age, 
levels of empathy (for all types of empathy, including both emotional 
empathy and cognitive empathy) decrease with age, and preference for 
portraits increases with age.  Overall, this study suggests that age effects 
both aesthetics and social/emotional cognition.  Age is controlled for in all   
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experiments of empathy and social cognition.  In terms of future research, it 
would be worth finding out whether the effect of age on such factors is 
apparent within samples of artists, or those who specialise in the use of 
colour, particularly since previous studies within the thesis have shown 
creativity (Chapter 5) and colour perception (Chapter 7) to affect levels of 
empathy.  Furthermore, future research could be done to determine whether 
those who prefer portraits are less empathetic or vice versa.  The next study 
is an exploratory study looking into the creative achievement questionnaire in 
relation to the different dependent variables previously studied within the 
current thesis.        
10.5 Chapter Highlights 
 Cognition appears to follow the pattern of building up and wearing 
down. 
 Performance on the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Test varies as a U-
shape function of age, with children having higher total error scores 
than adults in their 20s, and performance for older adults deteriorating 
with age. 
 Research suggests age-related gains, longitudinal stability, and cohort 
decline in empathy and emotional recognition. 
 Age has been shown to positively influence preference for painting, 
and as found to be positively correlated with positive ratings of 
representational art. 
 The aims of the current study were to determine whether there is an 
effect of age on colour perception, empathy, and preferences for 
paintings.  
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 The sample consisted of 42 adult participants. 
 Measures included self-reports, a test of colour perception and 
images of paintings. 
 Results revealed that as age increases, colour acuity decreases, 
empathy levels also decrease as age increases, and preference for 
portraits over landscapes increases as age increases. 
 The current findings provide support for the hypotheses and previous 
research. 
  Future research could find out whether the effect of age on such 
factors examined within the current study is apparent within samples 
of artists, or those who specialise in the use of colour. 
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Chapter 11: Individual Creative Behaviours 
11.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter (Chapter 10) has looked into the effects of age 
on colour perception, empathy, and preference for paintings.  It was found 
that as age increases, colour acuity decreases, empathy levels also 
decrease as age increases, and preference for portraits over landscapes 
increases as age increases.  These findings are important as they show how 
social cognition and aesthetic preferences change as age increases, thus 
bringing a greater understanding of the process of aging.  The present 
exploratory study explored the creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ; 
Appendix 4), looking into the individual creative behaviours in relation to the 
different dependent variables previously studies within the current thesis.  
The reason for this was to not miss any important findings which may have 
otherwise been overlooked.  
 One potential shortcoming of the creative achievement questionnaire 
(CAQ; Appendix 4) is that it combines all scores from each individual creative 
behaviour.  Given that this thesis is looking at the wider field of empathy and 
embodied cognition, for exploratory purposes, it is important to discriminate 
between different types of creative behaviours.  For example, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that different creative behaviours will have different 
neuropsychological and neurobiological underpinnings. 
 The CAQ (Appendix 4) measures level of expertise in various creative 
behaviours, and not only do experts differ from laypeople in terms of brain 
activations (as reviewed in Chapter 3), but brain activations also differ   
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depending on the type of creative behaviour.  According to Milton et al 
(2007), experts in sport compared to laypeople/novices have developed a 
focused and efficient organisation of task-related neural networks due to 
extensive practice over a long period of time, unlike novices who have 
difficulty filtering out irrelevant information.  This was found in a sample of 
expert golfers and novices during a pre-shot routine, as they showed 
different brain region activations.  The brain regions activated in the novices 
were the posterior cingulate, the amygdala-forebrain complex, and the basal 
ganglia.  Activations in the experts on the other hand, were primarily in the 
parietal lobule, the dorsal lateral premotor area, and the occipital area (Milton 
et al, 2007).  A study examining expert divers compared to novices shows 
that the expert divers had increased cortical thickness in the left superior 
temporal sulcus, the right parahippocampal gyrus and the right orbitofrontal 
cortex, and years spent training also correlated with the mean cortical 
thickness of the right parahippocampus gyrus (Wei et al, 2011).  Other 
research has investigated the neural correlates of creative writing in 28 
health participants, showing that creative writing activates motor and visual 
brain areas for handwriting as well as cognitive and linguistic areas (Shah et 
al, 2013).  Therefore, these studies importantly show that different creative 
behaviours involve and activate different neural areas, and the neural areas 
which are involved/activated is strongly dependent on the level of expertise 
within a given field. 
Therefore, in this chapter, further analysis was conducted in order to 
compare whether scoring high or low on each individual creative 
achievement behaviour revealed a significant difference in the scores   
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obtained on the dependent variables (colour perception, divergent thinking, 
ToM Faces, ToM Eyes, emotional empathy, emotional and cognitive 
empathy, and imagination).  The creative behaviours asked about in the 
questionnaire are: (i) visual arts, (ii) music, (iii) dance, (iv) architectural 
design, (v) creative writing, (vi) humour, (vii) inventions, (viii) scientific 
discovery, (ix) theatre and film, and (x) culinary arts.  A person was classed 
as high scoring if they were above the mean score and low if they were 
below the mean score.   
11.2 Results 
The intention of the present experiment was to provide exploratory 
analysis into the different creative behaviours from the CAQ (Appendix 4) in 
relation to all the other dependent variables tested in this thesis, as listed in 
the table below.  The purpose was to investigate whether different creative 
behaviours are linked to different social cognitive mechanisms. To recap, a 
person was classed as high scoring if they were above the mean score and 
low if they were below the mean score.  See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.  
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for each Variable 
Variable Name of Test Mean SD Range 
(Actual 
scores) 
Range 
(Possible 
scores) 
Colour Perception Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue 
Colour Vision Test 
(Farnsworth, 1949, 1957) 
34.51 23.94 0-98 0->100 
Creative 
Achievement  
Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson 
et al, 2005) 
10.05 8.22 2-36 0->280 
Creative Behaviours Biographical Inventory of 
Creative Behaviours (BICB; 
Batey, 2007) 
6.95 3.87 1-17 0-34 
Divergent Thinking Alternate Uses Test, Form B 
Test Booklet (AUT; 
Christensen et al, 1960) 
17.65 6.28 1-33 0-36 
Emotional and 
Cognitive Empathy 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI; Davis, 1983) 
71.14 14.50 35-97 0-112 
Emotional Empathy Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire (TEQ; Spreng et 
al, 2009) 
47.81 7.66 30-61 0-64 
Imagination Two-factor Imagination Scale 
(TFIS; Thompson, 2008) 
46.38 10.51 28-64 0-66 
ToM Eyes Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test, Revised Version (Baron‐
Cohen et al, 2001)   
26.76 4.28 17-34 0-37 
ToM Faces Faces Test (Baron‐Cohen et 
al, 1997) 
18.57 1.24 14-20 0-20 
  
172 
 
As this is exploratory, the data were submitted to a MANOVA with the 
seven dependent variables (colour perception, divergent thinking, ToM faces, 
ToM eyes, emotional empathy, emotional and cognitive empathy, and 
imagination).  See Table 2 for significant values. 
 
Table 2: Significance Values for Individual Creative Behaviours 
 VS M D AD CW H I SD TF CA 
1 N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S 
2 N.S p < .05 N.S N.S N.S p < .05 N.S N.S N.S N.S 
3 N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S 
4 N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S 
5 N.S N.S N.S p < .05 N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S 
6 N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S 
7 N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S N.S p < .01 N.S N.S N.S 
  
Key: Visual Arts = VS, Music = M, Dance = D, Architectural Design = AD, 
Creative Writing = CW, Humour = H, Inventions = I, Scientific Discovery = 
SD, Theatre and Film = TF, Culinary Arts = CA, Colour Perception = 1, 
Divergent Thinking = 2, ToM Faces = 3, ToM Eyes = 4, Emotional Empathy = 
5, Emotional and Cognitive Empathy = 6, Imagination = 7 
 
 As shown in Table 2, most of the findings were N.S, however given 
that there were some significant findings, for those variables that reached 
significance, participants were split up into high and low achievers – see 
below for graphical representations of the data in order to investigate these   
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variables further.  As can be seen from the table and the graphs below, those 
creative behaviours that reached significance were music x divergent 
thinking, humour x divergent thinking, and architectural design x emotional 
empathy, all at the < 0.05 significance level.  Moreover, inventions x 
imagination also reached significance, showing a stronger significance level 
of < 0.01.  
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Figure 1: Bar charts displaying the significant differences in mean 
scores between low and high creative achievement groups on various 
creativity and empathy variables 
 
11.3 Discussion  
 Analysis of the individual creative behaviours for the CAQ (Appendix 
4) found significant differences in divergent thinking between individuals who 
scored high in music achievement compared to individuals who scored low in 
music achievement, showing that those who scored low in music had a 
higher level of divergent thinking ability.  Also for divergent thinking, 
significant differences were found between individuals who scored high in 
humour compared to those who scored low in humour, with those scoring 
high in humour having better divergent thinking ability.  Significant   
176 
 
differences were also found in emotional empathy between high and low 
scorers in architectural design, specifically, those scoring low in architectural 
design had higher levels of emotional empathy.  Furthermore, significant 
differences were found in imagination between high and low scorers in 
inventions, showing that those who scored high in inventions had better 
imagination.  To now discuss each finding in turn: 
11.3.1 Music 
 Divergent thinking, a thought process which is used to generate 
creative ideas through exploring a number of possible solutions, is thought to 
be a potential predictor of creative problem solving (Runco, 2008).  Contrary 
to previous research, the current finding shows that individuals who scored 
low in music achievement showed a higher level of divergent thinking ability.  
Previous research shows the opposite, for example, Gibson et al (2009) 
conducted two experiments, the first was a behavioural experiment which 
found enhanced creative thinking in musicians.  The second experiment 
revealed greater bilateral frontal activation during a divergent thinking task, 
than during a control task, within the same musicians via the use of 
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), suggesting that trained 
musicians are characterised by enhanced divergent thinking ability (Gibson 
et al, 2009).  Other studies have also demonstrated the advantage of music 
achievement on divergent thinking ability, and vice versa (Beaty et al, 2013; 
Benedek et al, 2014).  For instance, Beaty et al (2013) investigated 10 male 
jazz students in relation to cognitive and creative abilities.  The participants 
performed a video-recorded improvisation (a piece of music they had never 
previously performed) and completed measures of divergent thinking,   
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working memory, and fluid intelligence.  It was found that divergent thinking 
strongly predicted performance quality (Beaty et al, 2013).  Furthermore, 
Benedek et al (2014) tested 120 students of classical, jazz and folk music in 
relation to psychometric creativity and personality.  The jazz music students 
showed higher divergent thinking ability compared to the students from other 
genres, and also showed a higher number of creative activities and 
achievements in the musical domain (Benedek et al, 2014).  This study 
shows that divergent thinking ability may be dependent on the types or genre 
of music in which an individual shows talent.  Given the CAQ (Appendix 4) 
was not used for these studies this research cannot be directly compared to 
the present study.  Further research is required, however the result does 
indicate that the CAQ (Appendix 4) may not be the most useful measure of 
creative behaviour. 
11.3.2 Humour 
 The current study showed that those who scored high in humour had 
better divergent thinking ability than those who scored low in humour.  This 
finding concurs with research conducted by Kellner and Benedek (2017), 
who tested humour production in 151 participants.  They were instructed to 
generate funny punch lines to six caption-removed cartoons.  It was found 
that intelligence and creative potential predict humor production ability 
independently, and that divergent thinking fluency, as well as creativity and 
crystallized intelligence, explained unique variance of the funniness of humor 
productions (Kellner & Benedek, 2017).  Humour is not investigated par se in 
this thesis but investigation into different types of humour, of which there are   
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many, and its clear role in empathy and theory of mind is certainly worth 
further investigation.   
11.3.3 Architecture    
 According to the current findings, those who scored low in architecture 
have higher emotional empathy.  There seems to be no previous research 
into empathy and architecture, and the present finding seems unlikely and 
unconvincing, particularly since the sample did not focus on architects versus 
non-architects.  Moreover, it is less likely that non-experts generate a high 
score in the creative achievement of architectural design.  Still, again this is 
worth reporting here as it does question whether the CAQ (Appendix 4) is the 
best way to measure creative behaviours. 
11.3.4 Inventions   
 The current study found that those who scored high in inventions had 
better imagination.  Out of all the findings, this was shown to have the 
highest significance level, <0.01.  It is evident that in order to invent, you 
need a good imagination, however, again there seems to be no research on 
this.  Regarding further research, this subset of people would provide to be 
an interesting group to study in relation to the cognitive neuroscience of 
imagination/invention processing.  It is important to note that this may have 
been overlooked had the different creative behaviours from the CAQ 
(Appendix 4) not been split up and investigated separately here.   
11.3.5 General Discussion 
The main criticism of the CAQ (Appendix 4) in general is that is it 
better suited to measuring Big-C creativity (eminent or genius level creativity)   
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rather than little-c creativity (everyday creativity) (Kaufman & Sternberg, 
2007), which would be more representative of the general population.  The 
population sample used here did not compare experts and laypeople, instead 
the sample was taken from the general population, which may not be the 
best fit for analysing high compared to low scores on the CAQ (Appendix 4), 
however it is expected that a stronger finding would be seen when using a 
group of experts in the analysis. 
 Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to look at other creative 
behaviours, in conclusion, this exploratory analysis did reveal a different 
pattern of results on the dependent variables for some of the different 
creative behaviours measured with the CAQ (in particular music, humour, 
inventions and architecture).  Therefore combining all results from the CAQ 
(Appendix 4) may lead to the omission of interesting and important findings.  
Future research could aim to adapt the questionnaire in a way that will allow 
robust data to be gathered for each creative behaviour separately.  This will 
help the wider field of creativity, along with specific research into different 
creative behaviours, to progress.  
11.4 Chapter Highlights  
 It is important to discriminate between different types of creative 
behaviours. 
 The CAQ measures level of expertise in various creative behaviours. 
 Experts differ from laypeople in terms of brain activations. 
 Analysis was conducted in order to compare whether scoring high or 
low on each individual creative achievement behaviour revealed a   
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 significant difference in the scores obtained on the dependent 
variables. 
 The sample consisted of 37 adult participants. 
 Measures included self-reports and tests of cognition and perception. 
 Results revealed significant differences for music, humour, 
architecture and inventions. 
 Those who scored low in music had a higher level of divergent 
thinking ability. 
 Those scoring high in humour had better divergent thinking ability. 
 Those scoring low in architectural design had higher levels of 
emotional empathy. 
 Those who scored high in inventions had better imagination. 
 The main criticism of the CAQ in general is that is it better suited to 
measuring Big-C creativity (eminent or genius level creativity) rather 
than little-c creativity (everyday creativity). 
 Future research could aim to adapt the questionnaire in a way that will 
allow robust data to be gathered for each creative behaviour 
separately. 
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Chapter 12: General Discussion and Conclusion 
12.1 Introduction 
 This thesis has presented a series of experiments that have added 
knowledge to the field of embodied cognition, which assumes that cognition 
is related to the physical body and that an individual’s understanding of the 
world is dependent on simulations using neural and bodily systems of action, 
perception, and emotion (Glenberg et al, 2013).  Specifically, the thesis 
examined creativity (Chapters 5 & 6), perception – particularly colour 
perception (Chapters 7 & 8) - and sensory processing sensitivity (Chapter 9) 
and how they link with social cognitive processes such as empathy and ToM.  
The thesis also looked at the effect of aging – specifically in relation to 
empathy and colour perception which deteriorate with age, painting 
preference whether it be those with a social component (e.g. portraits) or not 
(e.g. landscapes) (Chapter 10) and explored the reliability and usefulness of 
investigations into individual creative behaviours (Chapter 11) which are 
usually combined to reveal a single/total score.  This final chapter focuses on 
a discussion of the findings from the experimental chapters and their 
implications.  Furthermore, this chapter will summarise the thesis as a whole, 
and it will also address the various methodological considerations and 
provide ideas for possible future research.    
12.2 Motivation 
Theories of embodiment have become a major conceptual framework 
for understanding the mind, including the social mind, over recent years 
(Winkielman et al, 2015).  According to theories of embodiment, the   
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processing of information about flavours, emotional faces, driving directions, 
social/personality characteristics, as well as social, emotional, moral, and 
motivational concepts, and many other kinds of information, is influenced, 
informed by, associated with, and sometimes dependent on perceptual, 
somatosensory, and motor resources (Winkielman et al, 2015).  The finding 
of mirror neurons, which activate when the individual performs an action and 
when they observe or hear the same action (Di Pellegrino et al, 1992), 
provides support for embodiment through embodied simulation.  Through 
embodied simulation, the brain-body system re-uses part of its neural 
resources to map other people’s behaviours (Gallese & Guerra, 2012).  For 
example, the motor system is activated when other people’s actions are 
witnessed (Gallese & Guerra, 2012).  Furthermore, when an individual 
activates other cortical regions they re-use their affective and sensory-motor 
neural circuits to map the emotional and somatosensory experiences of 
others, thus allowing a direct access to the world of others (Gallese & 
Guerra, 2012).   
The recently established link between embodiment and aesthetics is 
only just beginning to build momentum within the domain of the cognitive 
sciences.  Thus, much more research is needed to fully understand the 
extent of the relationship between the two.  The relatively recent proposal 
made by Freedberg and Gallese (2007), assumes that empathy may be felt 
through the content and subject matter of art, and also that empathy may be 
felt through the way in which the artist has creatively used their materials to 
convey a representation.  According to Freedberg and Gallese (2007), 
embodied simulation may be a crucial factor in allowing the individual to   
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empathize with others through activating their own internal representations 
concerning the actions, emotions, or sensations of the bodily states which 
are being expressed by the other.  This is related to the shared manifold 
hypothesis (Gallese, 2001) which assumes a link between mirror neurons 
and empathy, as it is through a shared manifold that individuals are able to 
recognise other human beings, and that it is a mirror matching mechanism 
which allows others’ pains, emotions and sensations to be empathised with 
and understood. 
Thus far, although sparse due to its recent emergence and current 
surge in popularity, there is evidence of a link between embodiment and 
aesthetics (Di Dio et al, 2007; Ticini et al, 2014; Tschacher et al, 2012).  This 
has specifically shown a relationship between physiological responses during 
the perception of artwork and report based aesthetic-emotional experiences 
of it (Tschacher et al, 2012); motor resonance congruent with the movements 
portrayed in sculptures (Di Dio et al, 2007); and the influence of action 
priming on aesthetic appreciation (Ticini et al, 2014).  Furthermore, it is 
apparent that specialising in a particular creative activity enhances mirror 
neuron activation during the observation of the same creative stimuli 
(Bangert et al, 2006; Calvo-Merino et al, 2005), however it remains unknown 
whether creative individuals in general have a stronger overall mirror 
mechanism, thus being more empathetic in general.  Therefore, it was 
important to investigate the link between level of creativity and level of 
empathy as there is a lack of research into this.  Moreover, the innate trait 
known as SPS was another important aspect to investigate as SPS, which is 
characterised by greater sensitivity to social and environmental stimuli   
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(Acevedo et al, 2014; Jagiellowicz et al, 2016), is also linked to embodiment 
and includes a measure of aesthetic sensitivity. 
The thesis has also focused on colour perception in relation to 
empathy and ToM as this has not yet been investigated in the literature as 
far as the researcher is aware.  The perceptual stimulus of colour is a 
ubiquitous human trait (Elliot & Maier, 2014).  The purposes of colour are 
often considered in relation to aesthetics, however the effects of colour on 
humans has been widely studied and it is evident that colour is imbued with 
meaning and can profoundly influence an individual’s affect, cognition, and 
behaviour (Elliot & Maier, 2014).  Various research into the psychology of 
colour has demonstrated that colour is related to an individual’s feelings and 
emotions in terms of associations (Clarke & Costall, 2008; Kaya & Epps, 
2004; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Wexner, 1954) and the effects that it has 
on mood (Hatta et al, 2002; Stone & English, 1998; Stone, 2001; Stone, 
2003).  Moreover, colour has also been shown to have an impact on 
physiological reactions, for example red has been shown to cause changes 
in heart rate, and a room with visible brown posts/beams caused a state that 
was less calm and more active/aroused compared to an ordinary designed 
room with plain white walls (Kuller et al, 2009; Tsunetsugu et al, 2005).  
Other research also shows that a person’s feelings and emotions may alter 
their perception of colour, for example, depression has been shown to impair 
colour perception/sensitivity and other emotions have been shown to 
enhance colour discrimination (i.e. red for anger and white/grey for disgust) 
(Barrick et al, 2002; Fetterman et al, 2011; Sherman et al, 2012).  Thus, 
since there is a strong link between colour and emotion, and as feelings may   
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alter colour perception, it was important to decipher whether colour 
perception is related to empathy and ToM, two processes involved in social 
cognition.   
12.3 Main Findings  
 Overall, in a series of experiments, this thesis has shown that an 
individual’s level of (i) creativity, (ii) colour perception and (iii) SPS influences 
their embodied and social cognition, specifically, level of empathy and ToM 
ability.  According to the shared manifold hypothesis (Gallese, 2001), this 
would suggest that those individuals who are more creative, have better 
colour perception, and are high in SPS, have a stronger mirror mechanism.  
The results obtained throughout the thesis therefore provide a firm basis for 
future research.  It was then important to investigate this in a cohort with 
lower empathy levels and lower colour perception.  This was looked at via 
ageing as these two variables decrease with age and the main findings were 
that (i) colour perception deteriorates with age, (ii) levels of empathy (for all 
types of empathy, including both emotional empathy and cognitive empathy) 
decrease with age, and (iii) preference for portraits increases with age.  
Finally a thorough analysis of the creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ; 
Appendix 4) was investigated (given that findings remained unclear in a 
number of the studies used here) and it was found that (i) those who scored 
low in music had a higher level of divergent thinking ability, (ii) those scoring 
high in humour also had better divergent thinking ability (iii) individuals 
scoring low in architectural design had higher levels of emotional empathy, 
and (vi) those who scored high in inventions had better imagination.  For   
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each experiment within the thesis, as many participants were recruited as 
possible within the time limits available. 
The results of Chapter 5 show that there is a link between creativity 
and empathy, specifically showing that empathy levels are dependent on an 
individual’s level of creativity.  A number of creativity and empathy measures 
were employed, including self-reported creative achievement, creative 
behaviours, and a test of creative cognition/divergent thinking, self-reported 
emotional empathy, and emotional & cognitive empathy taken as a whole.  
There was a significant effect of creative behaviours on emotional empathy, 
as well as the emotional & cognitive empathy subscales: perspective taking 
and empathic concern.  Furthermore, divergent thinking was shown to have 
a significant effect on the emotional & cognitive empathy subscales: 
perspective taking and personal distress.  These particular findings suggest 
that individuals who are more creative exhibit greater levels of empathy for 
certain types of creativity and empathy, providing some support for previous 
research (Kalliopuska, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013) and 
the current hypothesis.  This was the first study, as far as the researcher is 
aware, to examine different types of creativity in relation to different types of 
empathy within an adult sample of the general population.   
Similarly, Chapter 6 examined different types of creativity in relation to 
ToM, a form of cognitive empathy.  Two different measures of ToM were 
employed, specifically ToM Faces (Appendix 8) and ToM Eyes (Appendix 7), 
both vary in difficulty as the Faces Test shows images of the full face, 
whereas the Eyes Test merely shows images of the eye region (See 
Appendix 7 and Appendix 8).  It was shown that there was a significant effect   
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of creative behaviours on ToM Faces and ToM Eyes, and a significant effect 
of divergent thinking on ToM Faces (but not ToM Eyes).  Again, this was the 
first study, as far as the researcher is aware, to examine different types of 
creativity in relation to ToM.  There was no effect of creative achievement on 
any of the empathy and ToM measures in either study (Chapter 5 or Chapter 
6).  Perhaps this is because it was not the best measure for a general 
population sample, and would therefore be better suited for an expert 
sample, particularly as it seems to be a measure of Pro-c and Big-C 
creativity (expert and genius level creativity) (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007; 
Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009).  Results from these two chapters suggests that 
the measure of creative behaviours (BICB; Batey, 2007; Appendix 1) and the 
test of divergent thinking (AUT; Guilford et al, 1960; Appendix 6), are better 
tools for measuring level of creativity with the general population, as they 
both measure little-c creativity (everyday creativity). 
 Chapters 7 and 8 looked into colour perception as a predictor of 
empathy and ToM respectively, as colour serves as an aesthetic and is 
involved in many aspects of creativity.  This was particularly important since 
no research, as far as the researcher is aware, has ever linked colour 
perception with empathy/ToM before.  The closest research to the current 
study suggests that the perception of colour may be effected by emotion, for 
specific colours and emotions, particularly those that are associated with one 
another (Fetterman et al, 2011; Sherman et al, 2012; Ziems & Christman, 
1998).  Such findings are similar to the findings of the current experiments as 
they suggest that emotion and emotional sensitivity is related to colour and 
colour perceptual sensitivity.  The study of Chapter 7 revealed colour acuity   
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to be a significant predictor of empathy, for emotional empathy and for 
emotional & cognitive empathy taken as a whole, specifically showing that 
those with better colour perception have higher levels of empathy.  
Exploratory analysis into the emotional & cognitive empathy subscales 
showed colour acuity to have a significant effect on both cognitive subscales 
(perspective taking and fantasy), but none of the empathy subscales 
(empathetic concern and personal distress), which is interesting because this 
particular finding may suggest that dopamine is an important factor to 
consider, as dopamine is related to both colour perception (Banaschewski et 
al, 2006; Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka et al, 2013; Tannock et al., 2006) and 
cognitive empathy (Lackner et al, 2010; Uzefovsky et al, 2014).  Both the 
TEQ (Appendix 9) and IRI (Appendix 5) have previously been shown to 
demonstrate good reliability and validity (Christopher et al, 1993; Davis & 
Franzoi, 1991; Spreng et al, 2009).   
The study of Chapter 8 looked specifically at ToM mechanisms and 
showed colour acuity to be a significant predictor of ToM Eyes, 
demonstrating that an individual with better colour perception is more likely to 
have better ToM ability, which is a novel and important finding for the field of 
social cognition.  However, although a positive relationship was also found 
for ToM Faces, it did not reach significance.  The differences found between 
these two types of ToM may be because the ToM Eyes Test (Appendix 7) 
was devised in order to generate a more sensitive measure of adult social 
intelligence which is able to detect meaningful individual differences, 
however the original (ToM Faces Test; Appendix 8) was merely designed as 
a measure of extreme performances (Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001).  
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 Chapter 9 investigated SPS and empathy, ToM and colour perception.  
It was important to focus on some of the positive aspects (increased 
empathy, ToM and better colour perception) of SPS as previous research 
has tended to focus on its negative aspects (stress and ill health, anxiety, 
depression, social phobia, avoidant personality disorder, and social 
introversion and emotionality) (Aron & Aron, 1997; Benham, 2006; Liss et al, 
2005; Meyer & Carver, 2000; Neal et al, 2002).  In this experiment, it was 
found that there is a significant effect of a person’s SPS on emotional & 
cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and ToM, showing that individuals 
high in SPS have higher empathy and ToM ability.  Exploratory analysis into 
the emotional & cognitive empathy subscales revealed that those high in 
SPS have significantly higher empathy levels for all subscales (perspective 
taking, empathic concern, and personal distress) except the fantasy 
subscale.  This may be because the fantasy subscale may be a better 
assessment of imagination as opposed to the theoretically driven notions of 
empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Spreng et al, 2009).  
Imagination itself is an interesting area to study in future research.  The study 
of Chapter 9 also shows that individuals with more acute colour perception 
score significantly higher in SPS, providing a good link between all results.  
Exploratory analysis into the HSPS subscales (ease of excitation - being 
mentally overwhelmed by both internal (pain, hunger, taste) and external 
(light, noise) stimuli, aesthetic sensitivity - awareness and appreciation of 
beauty, and low sensory threshold - unpleasant arousal by external stimuli 
such as bright lights and loud noises) revealed a significant difference in 
excitation and aesthetic sensitivity based on colour acuity indicating that   
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individuals with more acute colour perception score higher on these 
subscales, however, no significant difference in the low sensory threshold 
subscale was found.  Colour acuity was also found to be a significant 
predictor of ToM Eyes, replicating the results of Experiment 4 (Chapter 8), 
and highlighting the strength and robust nature of this finding.     
 Chapter 10 found that age has an effect on colour perception, 
empathy and preference for paintings and whether the paintings had a social 
component (portraits) or not.  It was important to look into the effects of age 
as previous research suggests that there are age related declines in colour 
perception (Kinnear & Sahraie, 2002; Roy et al, 1991; Verriest et al, 1982) 
and in empathy/emotion recognition (in cohort designs) (Grühn et al, 2008; 
Phillips et al, 2002; Ruffman et al, 2008; Schieman & Van Gundy, 2000).  
Firstly, within the current research, age was shown to have an effect on 
colour perception, specifically showing that as age increases, colour acuity 
decreases, indicating that younger adults have better colour perception than 
older adults which is comparable to the literature (Kinnear & Sahraie, 2002; 
Roy et al, 1991; Verriest et al, 1982).  Secondly, it was found that age has an 
effect on empathy (for emotional empathy and emotional & cognitive 
empathy as a whole) showing that as age increases, empathy levels 
decrease.  Research on empathy and emotional recognition in cohort 
designs supports this (Grühn et al, 2008; Phillips et al, 2002; Ruffman et al, 
2008; Schieman & Van Gundy, 2000).  This analysis shows that this is also 
the case for all of the emotional & cognitive empathy subscales (perspective 
taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress).  Lastly, age was 
shown to have an effect on preference for paintings, indicating that   
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preference for portraits over landscapes increases as age increases, thus 
older adults prefer portraits compared to landscapes.  Whilst Freedberg and 
Gallese (2007) assume that empathy may be felt through the content and 
subject matter of art, it was of interest to see if there was a stronger 
preference in particular for stimuli that had a social component (portraits) v 
non-social (landscapes).  This showed that as colour perception and 
empathy levels decreased (with age) preference for social stimuli increased.  
An interesting finding, further study is warranted. 
The last experimental chapter, Chapter 11, focused on examining the 
individual creative behaviours through the CAQ (Appendix 4) in relation to 
each variable studied within the thesis (including colour perception, divergent 
thinking, ToM Faces, ToM Eyes, emotional empathy, emotional & cognitive 
empathy, and imagination).  Chapter 11 was therefore more of an 
exploratory chapter looking into the wider field of empathy and embodied 
cognition through examining the creative behaviours individually.  These 
include: (i) visual arts, (ii) music, (iii) dance, (iv) architectural design, (v) 
creative writing, (vi) humour, (vii) inventions, (viii) scientific discovery, (ix) 
theatre and film, and (x) culinary arts.  Significant findings were revealed for 
music, humour, inventions and architecture.  Specifically, it was found that 
those scoring low in music had higher levels of divergent thinking ability, 
those scoring high in humour also had better divergent thinking ability.  
Furthermore, individuals scoring low in architectural design had higher levels 
of emotional empathy, and those who scored high in inventions had better 
imagination.  Given these mixed findings and the lack of significance in some 
of the experiments of this thesis using this particular questionnaire, it calls   
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into question the efficacy of using this exact questionnaire for this type of 
research, especially when quite often the score on the questionnaire is 
totalled (Carson et al, 2005).  Although the sample of participants was from 
the general population within this study, and all the studies throughout the 
thesis, the CAQ (Appendix 4) may be a better measure of Big-C creativity 
(eminent or genius level creativity) rather than little-c creativity (everyday 
creativity), thus it is expected that the results obtained may differ if from an 
expert sample, which is worthy of further study.  Still it is important to 
investigate the usefulness of this tool for this field of research. 
12.4 Future Work 
  The findings of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 which suggest a link 
between creativity and empathy, and creativity and ToM, should be further 
investigated in a sample of experts as the current experiments within the 
thesis only focused on a general population sample.  Previous research 
suggests that those who are more creative, i.e. partake in a particular 
creative subject, such as music or dance, have higher empathy scores than 
those who do not (Kalliopuska, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 
2013).  However, these studies only utilised samples of children.  It would 
therefore be worthwhile examining whether similar results would be obtained 
in an adult sample.  Moreover, it is suggested that the mirror mechanism 
learns through experience (Gallese, 2010), and research supports this 
showing that the same brain regions activated more strongly whilst watching 
a particular creative act if the participant was an expert in the same creative 
activity as opposed to laypersons (Bangert et al, 2006; Calvo-Merino et al, 
2005).  Thus, it would be worth examining whether adult creative experts (in   
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various fields of creative expertise) have higher levels of empathy and better 
ToM ability than laypeople. 
It is clear from the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 that creativity should 
be encouraged (i.e. in schools, prisons/rehabilitation, and everyday life) due 
to its benefits regarding social cognition, as skills such as empathy and ToM 
are important in daily interactions, especially in relation to co-operation and 
sociocultural learning.  Deficits in such skills has been shown to be 
associated with various pathologies such as sociopathy, autism spectrum 
disorders, and nonverbal learning disorders (Goldstein & Winner, 2012).  
However, with some disorders, specifically frontotemporal lobar 
degeneration, patients sometimes develop a new preoccupation with art, 
greater attention to visual stimuli, and increased visual creativity (liu et al, 
2009). 
From the findings that colour perception is a significant predictor of 
empathy (Chapter 7), and colour perception is a significant predictor of ToM 
(Chapter 8), it is clear that much more research into the association between 
colour perception and social cognition is warranted, especially as these 
findings are novel and are therefore in their infancy.  Moreover, since 
dopamine is implicated in both colour perception (Banaschewski et al, 2006; 
Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka et al, 2013; Tannock et al., 2006) and empathy, 
particularly cognitive empathy (Lackner et al, 2010; Uzefovsky et al, 2014), 
further research into a link between the two in relation to this 
neurotransmitter is needed.  Specifically, it is important for future research to 
discriminate between the colour confusion axes: protan (red), deutan 
(green), and tritan (blue) (Pache et al, 2003), as the research findings   
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relating dopamine to colour perception suggests that the link pertains to the 
blue-yellow colour axis, and is due to dopaminergic deficiencies in the retina.  
Therefore, it would be interesting to discover whether the same axis of 
confusion (blue-yellow) is associated with empathy and ToM.  Importantly, 
the blue-yellow colour perception problems have been found in various 
disorders including attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Tourette 
syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, and Huntington’s disease (Banaschewski et 
al, 2006). 
Chapter 9 shows SPS to have a significant effect on empathy and 
ToM, indicating that highly sensitive individuals have higher levels of 
empathy and better ToM ability.  This finding is of importance because it 
shows SPS to have some positive and beneficial outcomes (i.e. enhanced 
empathy and ToM), whereas much previous research into SPS has tended 
to focus on its negative associations such as stress and ill health (Benham, 
2006), anxiety (Liss et al, 2005; Neal et al, 2002), depression (Liss et al, 
2005), social phobia (Neal et al, 2002), avoidant personality disorder (Meyer 
& Carver, 2000), social introversion and emotionality (Aron & Aron, 1997), 
and autism (Kern et al, 2006).  However, research which has looked into the 
HSPS subscales (ease of excitation, aesthetic sensitivity, and low sensory 
threshold) has found aesthetic sensitivity to be related to some 
positive/beneficial outcomes, including well-being, positive affect and 
openness to experience (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), conscientiousness 
(Ahadi & Basharpoor, 2010), and greater attention to detail and good 
communication (Liss et al, 2008).  Thus, future research into the more 
positive aspects of SPS in general (or as a whole) is need in order to balance   
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the literature, as being a highly sensitive person may not necessarily be 
negative, as could potentially be suggested by the current results.  These 
findings may also explain why autism is linked to sensory processing 
disorder (Kern et al, 2006).  Sensory processing disorder is where individuals 
find it difficult to regulate responses to sensations and specific stimuli, 
suggesting poor sensory integration in the central nervous system, and this 
can affect one or multiple sensory systems, such as vision, auditory, 
gustatory (taste), olfactory (smell), tactile (touch), proprioceptive (joint 
position sense), and vestibular (balance and movement) (Pfeiffer et al, 
2011). 
In addition, another important finding from Chapter 9, shows that there 
is a significant link between colour acuity on SPS, and the subscales 
excitation and aesthetic sensitivity (but not low sensory threshold) i.e. those 
with better colour perception scored higher in SPS in general, as well as the 
afore mentioned subscales.  This suggests that certain perceptual abilities 
may affect various types of sensitivities, which warrants further study.  
Specifically, other forms of perception, such as visual perception and smell, 
touch, and taste perception for example, should be investigated in relation to 
SPS and its subscales in order to find out which types of perception are most 
affected by SPS.  Furthermore, the results of Chapter 9 should be replicated 
using physiological measurements to investigate whether the results would 
be supported by such measurements. 
From Chapter 10 it is clear that age affects both aesthetics and 
social/emotional cognition.  In particular, Chapter 10 shows age to affect 
colour perception, empathy, and preference for portraits, indicating that   
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colour perception deteriorates with age, levels of empathy decrease with 
age, and preference for portraits increases with age.  These findings may 
also be connected to ToM and the Eyes and Faces test as portraits may 
resemble such tests, and previous studies have also shown colour 
perception to be a predictor of ToM (Chapter 8).  However, unlike ToM 
measures, the preferences for portraits was based on how much the 
participant liked the portrait rather than whether they were able to correctly 
detect the emotion expressed in the image.  From this, future research could 
look into the effect of age on the variables colour perception, empathy, and 
preference for portraits in specialised samples such as artists and those who 
specialise in the use of colour, as chapters within the current thesis have 
shown creativity (Chapter 5) and colour perception (Chapter 7) to have an 
effect levels of empathy, which has been shown to be affected by age 
(Chapter 10).  Moreover, more research should be carried out in relation to 
the difference between preferences for portraits and preferences for 
landscapes to determine why this preference is being seen, what this 
‘marker’ is actually showing and how it relates to social cognitive 
neuroscience mechanisms.  Such research would be beneficial in the 
domains of aesthetics and embodied cognition. 
Although Chapter 11 found some interesting findings in regards to the 
individual creative behaviours and the other variables studied within the 
thesis, it is clear that the CAQ (Appendix 4) is a better measure of Big-C 
creativity (eminent or genius level creativity), therefore future research would 
benefit from studying experts and laypeople in relation to the other variables 
in order to distinguish between the two, rather than focusing on high and low   
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scorers of creativity in the general population.  On the other hand, the CAQ 
(Appendix 4) could benefit from being adapted to fit a general population 
sample.  The CAQ (Appendix 4) could also be adapted to allow more robust 
data to be gathered for each creative behaviour separately.  This would be 
advantageous to the wider field of creativity, and would allow specific 
research into each individual creative behaviour to progress further.  Future 
studies could develop a more appropriate questionnaire to study social 
cognition, and although this questionnaire is often used in social cognitive 
experiments (Jung et al, 2010; Kaufman et al, 2016; Silvia et al, 2009; Silvia 
et al, 2011; Zabelina et al, 2010) this chapter questions its suitability, 
especially for experiments testing the general population. 
12.5 Evaluation of Measures and Limitations  
 When considering the reliability and validity of the specific measures 
being utilized within the thesis, the CAQ (Carson et al, 2005; Appendix 4) 
measuring creative accomplishments within 10 different domains, has not 
rendered itself open to the traditional analyses of internal consistency.  The 
reason being, each item within each of the domains does not carry the same 
weight, thus being independent (Silvia et al, 2012).  For this reason, the 
estimation of internal consistency for the 10 domain scores is more 
informative than the estimation of internal consistency for each of the 
particular domains (Silvia et al, 2012).  Thus, as a whole, the CAQ (Appendix 
4) has been shown to contain strong internal reliability (a = .96) (Carson et al, 
2005).  Moreover, the CAQ (Appendix 4) has been widely used and research 
has provided evidence of its validity (Silvia et al, 2012).  For example, 
various studies have shown that openness to experience is a strong   
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predictor of CAQ scores (Hirsh & Peterson, 2008; Silvia et al, 2009).  CAQ 
scores have also been shown to correlate with the scores obtained from the 
Creative Behavior Inventory (Dollinger, 2003), as well as correlating with 
scores from divergent thinking tests (Silvia & Kimbrel, 2010).  Similarly, the 
BICB (Batey, 2007) has been shown to be both reliable (Batey & Furnham, 
2008; Batey et al, 2010) and valid, correlating with openness to experience 
and divergent thinking fluency (Furnham et al., 2008; Batey et al, 2010).  
Furthermore, Guilford’s Alternative Uses Test (1967) (Appendix 6) which is a 
measure of divergent thinking ability was also used within the thesis.  
Research has provided neurological evidence demonstrating that divergent 
thinking abilities are enhanced within creative individuals, thus providing 
support for a relationship between divergent thinking and creativity (Gibson 
et al, 2009).  However, it is recognised that divergent thinking tests are not 
completely representative of creativity in general; they are merely an 
estimate or potential predictor of creative problem solving and creative 
cognition/processing (Piffer, 2012; Runco, 2008).  Hence, overall, 
experiments within the thesis have measured creative achievement, creative 
behaviour and creative cognition, with the aim of generating a more complete 
overview of the participants’ level of creativity. 
Within the experiments in this thesis, empathy was measured using 
various self-reported methods, namely the IRI (Davis, 1983; Appendix 5) and 
the TEQ (Spreng et al, 2009; Appendix 9).  The TEQ (Appendix 9) is a fairly 
recently developed questionnaire which was designed to measure empathy 
primarily as an emotional process (Spreng et al, 2009).  According to Spreng 
et al (2009), the TEQ (Appendix 9) is a brief, reliable and valid measure of   
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empathy; specifically showing strong convergent validity and positively 
correlating with behavioural measures of social decoding and self-reported 
measures of empathy.  The TEQ (Appendix 9) also correlated (negatively) 
with a measure of autism symptomatology and demonstrated high test-retest 
reliability and good internal consistency within three studies (Spreng et al, 
2009).  A strength of the IRI (Appendix 5) is that it measures both emotional 
and cognitive empathy, containing four subscales: perspective taking 
(cognitive), fantasy (cognitive), empathetic concern (affective), and personal 
distress (affective) (Davis, 1983) which was important for the studies of this 
thesis so all empathy levels could be assessed, analysed and critiqued.  Its 
initial validation revealed internal consistency (Davis, 1994) and further 
studies have also confirmed good internal consistency and predictive and 
convergent validity (Christopher et al, 1993; Davis & Franzoi, 1991).  
However, it has been criticised by some as not being an accurate measure of 
empathy (Alterman et al, 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Cliffordson, 2001; Spreng et al, 2009).  For example, the fantasy and 
personal distress subscales may be a better assessment of imagination as 
opposed to the theoretically driven notions of empathy (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Spreng et al, 2009), and the personal distress subscale 
also seems to measure discomfort, anxiety, and loss of control in negative 
situations (Spreng et al, 2009).  Perhaps this is why Chapters 5 and 7 
generated some non-significant findings concerning the exploratory analysis 
into the IRI subscales.  Furthermore, although personal distress may be an 
important factor to consider, it is not a representative form of empathy itself 
(Lawrence et al, 2004), thus failing to measure the primary concept of   
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empathy (Cliffordson, 2001).  Within the IRI (Appendix 5), the empathetic 
concern and perspective taking subscales may be the most accurate 
components for measuring the concept of empathy (Alterman et al, 2003).  
Future research that is similar to the present studies is needed using 
physiological measures of empathy and brain imaging techniques to support 
the current findings.   
Social cognition has been examined through the use of two perception 
tests, specifically measuring social sensitivity through theory of mind.  
Namely, the reading the mind in the Eyes Test (ToM Eyes), revised version 
(Baron‐Cohen et al, 2001; Appendix 7) and the Faces Test (ToM 
Faces)(Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997; Appendix 8).  The Eyes Test depicts 
images of different emotional states showing the eye region only; it was 
devised in order to generate a more sensitive measure of adult social 
intelligence that can detect meaningful individual differences, whereas the 
original was merely a measure of extreme performances (Baron‐Cohen et al, 
2001).  It has been validated through showing that adults with Asperger’s 
syndrome and high-functioning autism exhibit a significant impairment on this 
specific test, but not on a gender recognition control test (Baron‐Cohen et al, 
2001).  In addition, an fMRI study has revealed that the amygdala is active in 
the normal brain, and not active in the autistic brain, whilst adults were 
engaged in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al, 1999).  The Faces Test is a 
similar measure of theory of mind which depicts images of the full face 
expressing both basic and complex mental states (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997).  
Again, this test has been shown to be valid, demonstrating that control adult 
participants interpret mental states in the full face fairly consistently and   
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adults with autism and Asperger’s syndrome could detect basic mental states 
(happy, sad, angry, afraid), but their performance was impaired when 
detecting complex mental states (scheme, admire, interest, thoughtfulness) 
within the full face (Baron‐Cohen et al, 1997). 
The measures used were all investigator-administered.  An advantage 
of this is that questions could be clarified by the investigator if required, and 
the presence of the investigator often encourages participants to respond to 
every question (Mitchell & Jolley, 2012).  On the other hand, the presence of 
an investigator may have reduced perceived anonymity, and hence, 
participants may have been less open and honest with their responses, thus 
increasing social desirability and impression management whereby the 
participants try to portray themselves in the best possible way (Langdridge & 
Hagger-Johnson, 2009; Mitchell & Jolley, 2012), however this remained 
consistent for all participants.  The tests of perception aimed to decipher how 
participants process and interpret information, thus determining their innate 
intelligence and intellectual functioning based on specific perceptual qualities 
(i.e. social cognition and colour discrimination in the research).  With both 
questionnaires and tests of perception, participants may have displayed 
boredom effects and participant fatigue, however, where participants may 
have tried to portray themselves in the best possible way through 
questionnaires, this was not possible within the tests of perception 
(Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009).   
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12.6 Implications of the Thesis 
 The results presented within this thesis are important for the fields of 
embodied cognition, Neuroaesthetics and creativity research.  They highlight 
how embodied cognition and its relationship with empathy/ToM is an 
important aspect to consider in relation to creativity, colour perception, and 
aesthetics.  Findings from this thesis have revealed that there is a link 
between creativity and empathy and creativity and ToM.  While the link 
between creativity and empathy has already been shown (Carlozzi et al, 
1995; Kalliopuska, 1989; Kalliopuska, 1991; Rabinowitch et al, 2013), an in-
depth and thorough exploration into the different types of creativity and the 
different types of empathy had not been provided until now, and this is the 
first experiment, as far as the researcher is aware, to provide a link between 
creativity and ToM.  If those who are more creative are also more empathetic 
and have better ToM ability, as this thesis suggests, then it is clear that 
creativity should be encouraged in order to enhance social/emotional 
cognition, which would be beneficial to society in general.  Creativity could be 
used in systems such as education/schools, prisons, and mental health 
(particularly in conditions such as psychopathy which involves low levels of 
empathy).  Concerning the research aims, these findings may imply that 
creative individuals do have a stronger mirror mechanism than less creative 
individuals, however more research is needed to confirm this.  For example, 
brain imaging studies into creativity and empathy/ToM should be conducted 
in the future.  Mirror neuron activity could be investigated through analysis of 
fMRI, MEG, and EEG, particularly mu frequency band oscillations recorded 
with scalp electrodes over the sensorimotor cortex (Ulloa & Pineda, 2007).    
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The mu rhythm is an 8-13 Hz oscillation generated in the sensorimotor cortex 
which reaches maximal amplitude when individuals are at rest, and when 
they move, imagine movements, or observe movements, mu amplitudes are 
reduced as neurons in this area fire asynchronously.  Frontal mirror neuron 
activity has been linked to this mu rhythm suppression (Ulloa & Pineda, 
2007). 
 The important and novel findings that colour perception is a predictor 
empathy, and also that colour perception is a predictor of ToM, suggests that 
dopamine may be a factor to consider for future research as it is implicated in 
both colour perception (Banaschewski et al, 2006; Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka 
et al, 2013; Tannock et al., 2006) and cognitive empathy (Lackner et al, 
2010; Uzefovsky et al, 2014).  These findings may be important for autism 
research as individuals with autism have impaired ToM, and find it difficult to 
understand the complex mental states of others’ goals and intentions (Baron-
Cohen et al, 1985; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992), and also 
perform less well than controls in colour discrimination tasks, indicating 
impaired colour perception (Cranwell et al, 2015; Franklin et al, 2008; 
Franklin et al, 2010; Hurlbert et al, 2011).  It is thought that one way to 
improve colour perception is by practicing colour matching, which involves 
choosing a particular colour and using paints or pencil crayons to make the 
exact same colour though mixing and blending colours together.   
 The findings concerning SPS, showing that highly sensitive individuals 
have higher levels of empathy and better ToM ability, has important 
implications for the field of social cognition.  High SPS can be beneficial in 
various contexts, and it is important not to just focus on the negative aspects   
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of SPS, as much of the previous literature has done (Aron & Aron, 1997; 
Benham, 2006; Liss et al, 2005; Meyer & Carver, 2000; Neal et al, 2002).  It 
seems that there is much more to be learned about SPS, particularly 
concerning its beneficial outcomes.  One particular study that supports the 
current finding has found a link between empathy and SPS via means of 
fMRI (Acevedo et al, 2014).  The experiment consisted of participants 
viewing images of either their romantic partners or strangers displaying 
positive (happy) or negative (sad) emotions through their facial expressions.  
A year later the experiment was replicated with an added facial expression 
(neutral).  Brain activations were found in regions concerned with awareness, 
integration of sensory information, empathy (including a region of the mirror 
neuron system – the inferior frontal gyrus), and action planning in individuals 
scoring higher in SPS.  It was also found that activations were stronger in 
response to the positive emotions, and when the image was of the 
participant’s romantic partner (Acevedo et al, 2014).  In addition, research 
has shown SPS to be linked to serotonin (Licht et al, 2011) and dopamine 
(Chen et al, 2011) indicating that SPS is involved in social cognition, and this 
is interesting since dopamine is implicated in cognitive empathy (Lackner et 
al, 2010; Uzefovsky et al, 2014) and colour perception (Banaschewski et al, 
2006; Colzato et al, 2014; Hulka et al, 2013; Tannock et al., 2006) also.  
Especially as colour perception is shown to have an effect on SPS within the 
current thesis (Chapter 9) (also a novel finding).  Such findings may have 
important implications regarding clinical disorders such as autism, 
Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia, and ADHD as dopamine is strongly 
implicated in these disorders (Banaschewski et al, 2006; Colzato et al, 2014;   
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Hulka et al, 2013; Lackner et al, 2010; Tannock et al., 2006; Uzefovsky et al, 
2014).   
  Age was found to affect colour perception, empathy, and preference 
for portraits.  Both colour perception and empathy decreased with age and 
preference for portraits increased with age.  It is interesting that with age, 
empathy decreases yet preferences for portraits increases, i.e. as people get 
older they become less empathetic, but they tend to prefer portrait paintings 
more when compared to landscape paintings, which is a novel and 
interesting finding.  One explanation for this is that as individuals get older 
they prefer portraits more because they feel less emotional arousal towards 
them, and therefore do not become too emotionally stimulated by the 
images, and those who are more empathetic (younger adults) may feel more 
relaxed when viewing the landscapes and therefore prefer portraits less.  
Thus, future studies could use questionnaires measuring participants’ 
arousal levels, as well as physiological measurements, whilst viewing portrait 
and landscape paintings to test whether these scores correlate with empathy 
measures.        
12.7 Thesis Conclusion 
 This thesis has aimed to fill an important gap in the literature 
concerning embodiment and aesthetics.  This thesis has investigate the link 
between embodied cognition and aesthetic experiences by focusing on 
creativity, colour perception, and SPS in relation to empathy and ToM 
mechanisms.  Experiments within the present thesis have looked further into 
the link between creativity and empathy by focusing on different types of   
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creativity in relation to the different types of empathy, as well as ToM (a form 
of cognitive empathy) within an adult sample from the general population and 
found that there is a link between creativity and empathy and creativity and 
ToM.  An in-depth study into the link between creativity and empathy (and 
ToM) has never been done before, as far as the researcher is aware.  Colour 
perception/colour acuity as a predictor of empathy, and as a predictor of 
ToM, was also examined and the results showed that colour acuity is a 
predictor of empathy and ToM.  As far as the researcher is aware, no other 
literature has either studied, or even hinted at a link between the two before 
making this an exciting finding for the field of social cognition and its 
relationship with perception and cognition.  Furthermore, in order to balance 
the literature, it was important to focus on some of the positive aspects of 
SPS.  Thus, SPS in relation to empathy and ToM was examined.  As was the 
effect of colour perception on SPS, which is also novel.  Results showed that 
highly sensitive individuals have higher empathy levels/ToM ability, and that 
there is a significant effect of colour acuity on SPS.  The thesis has also 
looked into the effect of age on colour perception, empathy/ToM, and 
preference for paintings, as well as the effects of different types of creative 
behaviours, and the findings were that colour perception deteriorates with 
age, levels of empathy decrease with age, and preference for portraits 
increases with age.  Overall, the thesis raises questions concerning the way 
in which individuals interact with, and understand, the external world’s stimuli 
and how this may be affected by their level of sensitivity towards it.  
 The thesis encompasses a range of subject areas, including cognitive 
psychology, neuropsychology, Neuroaesthetics, and social psychology, as   
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aspects such as embodied cognition, empathy, sensation, perception, and 
social cognition have been examined.  Many of the areas which this thesis 
has covered are at a nascent stage of development, particularly the study of 
creativity and the arts, and embodied cognition.  Moreover, the findings 
regarding colour perception are especially novel and innovative.  The 
research has implications for systems such as education/schools, prisons, 
and mental health, as well as having implications for clinical conditions such 
as autism, Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia, and attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. 
 This thesis has generated novel findings which are worthy of future 
considerations.  Much more research into the areas concerning this thesis is 
needed in order to generate a more holistic overview of the current findings.  
Particularly, more brain imaging and physiological research is warranted.  
This will help the wider fields of embodied cognition and creativity/aesthetics, 
and Neuroaesthetics to progress.   
 To summarise, this thesis has provided a number of novel 
experiments which have generated further knowledge into the fields of 
creativity, aesthetics and embodiment.  Such research will aid the 
development of future studies within these areas, which will hopefully bring a 
greater insight into some clinical conditions.  From this thesis it is evident that 
both colour and creativity are important aspects to consider in relation to 
empathy and social cognition, and activities involving these should be 
encouraged. 
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Appendix 1: Biographical Inventory of Creative 
Behaviours 
 
Please answer as truthfully as you can.  Place a cross (X) next to the 
activities you have been actively involved in.   
In the past 12 months have you… 
 
1  Written a short story    
2  Written a novel    
3  Organized an event, show, performance or activity    
4  Produced a TV/Play script    
5  Designed and produced a textile product (e.g. made an item of 
clothing or household object)   
6  Redesigned and redecorated a bedroom, kitchen, personal space, 
etc.,    
7  Invented and made a product that can be used    
8  Drawn a cartoon    
9  Started a club, association or group    
10  Produced a picture, i.e. NOT a doodle (using paint, pencils, charcoal, 
acrylic, etc.,)    
11  Had an article published    
12  Formed a sculpture using any suitable materials    
13  Recognised where an accepted scientific theory/approach does not 
explain what it purports to    
14  Produced your own food recipes    
15  Produced a short film    
16  Produced your own website    
17  Produced a theory to explain a phenomenon    
18  Invented a game or other form of entertainment    
19  Selected to lead/manage others    
20  Made someone a present     
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21  Composed a poem    
22  Adapted an item and used it in a way that it was not designed to be, in 
what you consider to be an ingenious way  
23  Published research    
24  Choreographed a dance    
25  Designed and planted a garden    
26  Produced a portfolio of photographs (NOT photographs of a holiday, 
party, etc.,)    
27  Acted in a dramatic production    
28  Delivered a speech    
29  Mentored/Coached someone else to improve their performance    
30  Devised an experiment to help understand something    
31  Made up a joke    
32  Been made a leader/captain of a team/group (e.g. Debating society 
chairperson, Captain of the Hockey team, etc.,)  
33  Composed a piece of music    
34  Made a collage   
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Appendix 2: Colour Perception Score 
 
 
Farnsworth Munsell 100 hue test score: 
 
 
Total error score =       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
241 
 
Appendix 3: The Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue 
Colour Vision Test – Example Stimuli 
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Appendix 4: Creative Achievement Questionnaire 
 
I. Place a check mark beside the areas in which you feel you have 
more talent, ability, or training than the average person. 
 
 
__ Visual arts (painting, sculpture) 
__ Music 
__ Dance 
__ Individual sports (tennis, golf) 
__ Team sports  
__ Architectural design  
__ Entrepreneurial ventures  
__ Creative writing 
__ Humour 
__ Inventions 
__ Scientific inquiry 
__ Theatre and film  
__ Culinary arts 
 
II. Place a check mark beside sentences that apply to you. Next to 
sentences with an asterisk (*), write the number of times this 
sentence applies to you. 
 
A. Visual Arts (painting, sculpture) 
__ 0. I have no training or recognized talent in this area. (Skip to 
Music).  
__1. I have taken lessons in this area.  
__2. People have commented on my talent in this area.  
__3. I have won a prize or prizes at a juried art show.  
__4. I have had a showing of my work in a gallery.  
__5. I have sold a piece of my work.  
__6. My work has been critiqued in local publications.  
*__7. My work has been critiqued in national publications. 
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B. Music 
__ 0. I have no training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to 
Dance). 
__1. I play one or more musical instruments proficiently. 
__2. I have played with a recognized orchestra or band. 
__3. I have composed an original piece of music. 
__4. My musical talent has been critiqued in a local publication. 
__5. My composition has been recorded. 
__6. Recordings of my composition have been sold publicly. 
*__7. My compositions have been critiqued in a national 
publication. 
 
C. Dance 
__ 0. I have no training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to 
Architecture) 
__1. I have danced with a recognized dance company. 
__2. I have choreographed an original dance number. 
__3. My choreography has been performed publicly. 
__4. My dance abilities have been critiqued in a local publication. 
__5. I have choreographed dance professionally. 
__6. My choreography has been recognized by a local publication. 
*__7. My choreography has been recognized by a national 
publication. 
 
D. Architectural Design  
 
__0. I do not have training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to 
Writing).  
__1. I have designed an original structure.  
__2. A structure designed by me has been constructed.  
__3. I have sold an original architectural design.  
__4. A structure that I have designed and sold has been built 
professionally.  
__5. My architectural design has won an award or awards.   
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__ 6. My architectural design has been recognized in a local 
publication.  
*__7. My architectural design has been recognized in a national 
publication. 
 
E. Creative Writing  
__0. I do not have training or recognized talent in this area (Skip to 
Humour).  
__1. I have written an original short work (poem or short story).  
__2. My work has won an award or prize.  
__3. I have written an original long work (epic, novel, or play).  
__4. I have sold my work to a publisher.  
__5. My work has been printed and sold publicly.  
__6. My work has been reviewed in local publications.  
*__7. My work has been reviewed in national publications. 
 
F. Humour  
__0. I do not have recognized talent in this area (Skip to 
Inventions).  
__1. People have often commented on my original sense of 
humour.  
__2. I have created jokes that are now regularly repeated by 
others.  
__3. I have written jokes for other people.  
__ 4. I have written a joke or cartoon that has been published.  
__5. I have worked as a professional comedian.  
__6. I have worked as a professional comedy writer.  
__7. My humour has been recognized in a national publication. 
 
G. Inventions  
__0. I do not have recognized talent in this area.  
__1. I regularly find novel uses for household objects.   
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__2. I have sketched out an invention and worked on its design 
flaws.  
__3. I have created original software for a computer.  
__4. I have built a prototype of one of my designed inventions.  
__5. I have sold one of my inventions to people I know.  
*__6. I have received a patent for one of my inventions.  
*__7. I have sold one of my inventions to a manufacturing firm. 
 
H. Scientific Discovery  
__0. I do not have training or recognized ability in this field (Skip to 
Theatre).  
__1. I often think about ways that scientific problems could be 
solved.  
__2. I have won a prize at a science fair or other local competition.  
__3. I have received a scholarship based on my work in science or 
medicine.  
__4. I have been author or co-author of a study published in a 
scientific journal. 
*__5. I have won a national prize in the field of science or 
medicine.  
*__6. I have received a grant to pursue my work in science or 
medicine.  
__7. My work has been cited by other scientists in national 
publications. 
 
I. Theatre and Film  
__0. I do not have training or recognized ability in this field.  
__1. I have performed in theatre or film.  
__2. My acting abilities have been recognized in a local 
publication.  
__3. I have directed or produced a theatre or film production.  
__4. I have won an award or prize for acting in theatre or film.  
__5. I have been paid to act in theatre or film.  
__6. I have been paid to direct a theatre or film production.  
*__7. My theatrical work has been recognized in a national 
publication.  
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J. Culinary Arts  
__0. I do not have training or experience in this field.  
__1. I often experiment with recipes.  
__2. My recipes have been published in a local cookbook.  
__3. My recipes have been used in restaurants or other public 
venues.  
__4. I have been asked to prepare food for celebrities or 
dignitaries.  
__5. My recipes have won a prize or award.  
__6. I have received a degree in culinary arts.  
*__7. My recipes have been published nationally. 
 
K. Please list other creative achievements not mentioned above. 
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Appendix 5: Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a 
variety of situations.  For each item, indicate how well it describes you by 
choosing the appropriate letter on the scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, 
D, or E.  When you have decided on your answer, fill in the letter on the 
answer sheet next to the item number.  READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY 
BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly as you can.  Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
 
 A               B               C               D               E 
DOES NOT                                                      DESCRIBES ME 
DESCRIBE ME                                                  VERY 
WELL                                                              WELL 
 
 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might  
     happen to me.  
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of  
     view.  
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having  
     problems.  
 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.  
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.  
 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get 
completely caught up in it.  
 
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision. 
 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
towards them.  
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional  
      situation.  
 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective.  
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12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare  
       for me.  
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.  
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to 
other people's arguments.  
 
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the  
       characters.  
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.  
 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very 
much pity for them.  
       
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.  
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at  
       them both. 
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of       
       a leading character.  
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies.  
 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for    
       a while.  
 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would 
feel if the events in the story were happening to me.  
 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to 
pieces. 
 
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in 
their place.  
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Appendix 6: The Alternate Uses Test, Form B Test 
Booklet – Example Stimuli 
Name as many possible uses as you can think of for each common 
household item: 
1. Brick 
2. Paperclip 
3. Newspaper 
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Appendix 7: The Eyes Test (Theory of Mind) – 
Example Stimuli 
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Appendix 8: The Faces Test (Theory of Mind) – Example 
Stimuli 
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Appendix 9: Toronto Empathy Questionnaire 
Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and rate 
how frequently you feel or act in the manner described. There are no right or 
wrong answers or trick questions. Please answer each question as honestly 
as you can. 
Never = 0;  Rarely = 1;  Sometimes = 2;  Often = 3;  Always = 4.  
Write the most appropriate number as your answer next to the 
question. 
1. When someone else is feeling excited, I tend to get excited too 
2. Other people’s misfortunes do not disturb me a great deal 
3. It upsets me to see someone being treated disrespectfully 
4. I remain unaffected when someone close to me is happy 
5. I enjoy making other people feel better 
6. I have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me 
7. When a friend starts to talk about his\her problems, I try to steer the 
conversation towards something else 
8. I can tell when others are sad even when they do not say anything 
9. I find that I am “in tune” with other people’s moods 
10. I do not feel sympathy for people who cause their own serious 
illnesses 
11. I become irritated when someone cries 
12. I am not really interested in how other people feel 
13. I get a strong urge to help when I see someone who is upset 
14. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I do not feel very much 
pity for them 
15. I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness 
16. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of 
protective towards him\her  
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 Appendix 10: Highly Sensitive Person Scale 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: This questionnaire is completely anonymous and 
confidential. Answer each question according to the way you personally feel, 
using the following scale: 
 
1         2                 3               4             5           6         7 
Not at All                  Moderately              Extremely 
 
____ 1. Are you easily overwhelmed by strong sensory input? 
____ 2. Do you seem to be aware of subtleties in your environment? 
____ 3. Do other people's moods affect you? 
____ 4. Do you tend to be more sensitive to pain? 
____ 5. Do you find yourself needing to withdraw during busy days, into bed 
or into a darkened room or any place where you can have some privacy and 
relief from stimulation? 
____ 6. Are you particularly sensitive to the effects of caffeine? 
____ 7. Are you easily overwhelmed by things like bright lights, strong 
smells, coarse fabrics, or sirens close by? 
____ 8. Do you have a rich, complex inner life? 
____ 9. Are you made uncomfortable by loud noises? 
___ 10. Are you deeply moved by the arts or music? 
___ 11. Does your nervous system sometimes feel so frazzled that you just 
have to go off by yourself? 
___ 12. Are you conscientious? 
___ 13. Do you startle easily? 
___ 14. Do you get rattled when you have a lot to do in a short amount of 
time? 
___ 15. When people are uncomfortable in a physical environment do you 
tend to know what needs to be done to make it more comfortable (like 
changing the lighting or the seating)? 
___ 16. Are you annoyed when people try to get you to do too many things at 
once?  
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___ 17. Do you try hard to avoid making mistakes or forgetting things? 
___ 18. Do you make a point to avoid violent movies and TV shows? 
___ 19. Do you become unpleasantly aroused when a lot is going on around 
you? 
___ 20. Does being very hungry create a strong reaction in you, disrupting 
your concentration or mood? 
___ 21. Do changes in your life shake you up? 
___ 22. Do you notice and enjoy delicate or fine scents, tastes, sounds, 
works of art? 
___ 23. Do you find it unpleasant to have a lot going on at once? 
___ 24. Do you make it a high priority to arrange your life to avoid upsetting 
or overwhelming situations? 
___ 25. Are you bothered by intense stimuli, like loud noises or chaotic 
scenes? 
___ 26. When you must compete or be observed while performing a task, do 
you become so nervous or shaky that you do much worse than you would 
otherwise? 
___ 27. When you were a child, did parents or teachers seem to see you as 
sensitive or shy? 
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Appendix 11: Two-Factor Imagination Scale 
 
Instructions: Answer the following questions.  If a question simply does not 
apply, leave it out completely and continue with the next.  Each question can 
have one of 2 possible answers.  Please tick the most appropriate. 
 
 
 
More 
Often True 
Less Often 
True 
 
My imagination persistently generates 
daydreams and fantasies without any 
conscious effort on my part 
 
  
 
My daydreams and fantasies frequently 
produce unexpected themes 
 
  
 
Elaborate imaginary themes often come to me 
instantaneously, seemingly out of nowhere 
 
  
 
The products of my imagination are usually 
ones that I initiate; i.e. they generally don’t 
come on their own 
 
  
 
My imagination is usually not spontaneous 
and surprising, but rather is used/employed in 
a more controlled fashion 
 
  
 
I tend to terminate imaginal exercises once I 
have reached a pre-determined or desired 
goal of the activity 
 
  
 
When designing or inventing something, or 
when participating in artistic activities, my 
imagination often directs the process with little 
mental deliberation 
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I am frequently astonished at the scenarios my 
imagination generates 
 
  
 
My imagination produces elaborate scenarios 
in an instant without prior deliberation on the 
theme 
 
  
 
Imagining is an act I choose to commence; it 
is rarely something that just “happens to me” 
 
  
 
I tend to guide the direction of my imaginative 
processes, rather than relying on the 
possibility that imagination will autonomously 
guide the process 
 
  
 
I usually terminate impractical or unwanted 
imaginal exercises by distracting myself, 
emptying my mind, or by initiating a brand new 
exercise in imagination 
 
  
 
When a friend feels upset my imagination 
automatically generates an internal image of 
their predicament, helping me to understand 
what they are feeling 
 
  
 
My imagination tends to conjure/suggest 
realities contrary to those I would habitually 
expect 
 
  
 
The images and scenarios of my imagination 
usually take time and persistence to construct 
 
  
 
I use my imagination mainly for practical 
means, e.g., like how to work out a problem or 
construct a useful idea or object 
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When I imagine something I prefer to control 
the contents, direction, spatial character, and 
duration of the imagined scenario 
 
  
 
I tend to allow imaginative experiences to 
reach their own natural conclusion, rather than 
me calling a halt to the activity 
 
  
 
The products of my imagination take 
considerable effort to construct 
 
  
 
The products of my imagination are generally 
predictable 
 
  
 
I frequently find myself imagining something, 
even when I have not chosen to do so! 
 
  
 
I often do not have control, nor take control of 
an imaginative experience, but allow the 
contents, direction and spatial characteristics 
of the imaginal presentation to direct 
themselves 
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Appendix 12: Images of Paintings (shown in order 
as seen by participants) 
Image of Painting Name of Artist Name of Painting 
 
Camille Pissarro Portrait of Rodo 
Pissarro Reading 
(the Artist's Son) 2 
 
Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir 
The Doge's Palace 
 
Hilaire-Germain-
Edgar Degas 
Carlo Pellegrini 
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Edouard Manet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Balcony 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul Cézanne View of The 
Domaine Saint-
Joseph 
 
Hilaire-Germain-
Edgar Degas 
Two Dancers On 
Stage 
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Hilaire-Germain-
Edgar Degas 
Portrait of Elena 
Carafa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir 
Landscape at 
Beaulieu 
 
Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir 
Jeanne Samary in a 
Low Necked Dress 
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Paul Cézanne Forest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claude Monet Self Portrait 
 
Camille Pissarro Portrait of Jeanne 
 
Claude Monet Portrait of Blanche 
Hoschede 
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Hilaire-Germain-
Edgar Degas 
Landscape at 
Valery-sur-Somme 
 
 
 
 
 
Berthe Morisot Psyche 
 
Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir 
In the Woods 
 
Edouard Manet The Kearsarge at 
Boulogne 
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Berthe Morisot Willows in the 
Garden at Bougival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul Cézanne Mont Sainte-Victoire 
seen from Bellevue 
 
Berthe Morisot At The Ball 
 
Camille Pissarro View from my 
Window, Eragny 
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Claude Monet San Giorgio 
Maggiore at Dusk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Camille Pissarro Hoar Frost 
 
Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir 
Self-Portrait with a 
White Hat 
 
Hilaire-Germain-
Edgar Degas 
Landscape 
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Paul Cézanne Pierrot and 
Harlequin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edouard Manet The Battle of the 
Kearsarge and the 
Alabama 
 
Paul Cézanne The Boy in the Red 
Vest 
 
Hilaire-Germain-
Edgar Degas 
Landscape with 
Rocks 
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Berthe Morisot The Garden at 
Bougival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Camille Pissarro Peasant Girl 
Drinking her Coffee 
 
Edouard Manet Argenteuil Basin 
with a Single 
Sailboat 
 
Berthe Morisot On the Balcony 
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Claude Monet Young Girl in the 
Garden at Giverny 
 
 
 
 
 
Edouard Manet Portrait of Emile 
Zola 
 
Paul Cézanne Woman in a Green 
Hat. Madame 
Cézanne 
 
Claude Monet Branch of the Seine 
near Giverny 
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Edouard Manet The Fifer 
 
 
 
 
Berthe Morisot Hollyhocks 
 
Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir 
By the Seashore 
 
Camille Pissarro Jallais Coast, 
Pontoise 
 
Claude Monet Artist’s Garden at 
Giverny 
  
